Drifting Consciousness

Rawls' "A Theory of Justice"

2009-02-26T11:34:00.003-07:00

The following is a brief treatment of the main ideas in John Rawls’ book A Theory of Justice. Rawls’ theory of justice has two parts. First, there are two principles of social justice, which he puts forward as the most acceptable principles of justice. Second, he argues for these principles by means of a hypothetical social contract argument. I will start by explaining the two principles and then discuss his social contract argument.

For Rawls, principles of justice have to do with the distribution among members of a society for desirable goods such as rights, freedoms, wealth, and opportunities. Such good he calls primary goods, which he defines as things people want regardless of whatever else they want. They are wanted in this way because they are general means essential for achieving most of our aims in life. Rawls’ first principle of justice focuses on one of these goods, liberty. It says that liberty should be distributed equally and that citizens should have an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all. Rawls calls this the Equal Liberty Principle.

The second principle deals with social and economic goods and here inequality is allowed if two conditions are met:

First, the inequalities must make everyone better off than they would be if such goods were distributed equally, and they must do this in a way that those who end up in the lowest positions are as well off as they can be.
Second, everyone must have and equal opportunity of ending up in the best of positions and they have this when positions are allocated on the basis of qualifications, and everyone has an equal chance of developing whatever socially useful talents they innately, which Rawls calls Fair Equality of Opportunity.

The first part of the second principle is called the Difference Principle and the second part the Equal Opportunity Principle.

The Difference Principle states that any societal change may be considered just and depart from equality if and only if it benefits the least advantaged. Inequality, in Rawls’ view is acceptable if it makes everyone better for it, but it must not just maximize the overall utility by benefitting the most advantaged. It must maximize the benefit to the least advantaged or as it is called, maximizing the minimum or Maximin. The minimum is maximized when any attempts to raise it would be counter-productive and would make those on the bottom worse off than they would have been if such attempts had not been made. In this sense, Rawls defends a welfare state whose crucial concern about justice is for those worst off. Transferring money directly from the rich to the poor is not the only or best way to raise their condition. Funds for better education, better employment skills, guaranteed health care might be more appropriate to fit into the Difference Principle to Maximin.

I will now discuss Rawls' social contract argument in support of his two principles of justice. Rawls understands a society as a group of people who cooperate for the production of mutual benefits. Principles of justice are principles about the appropriate allocation of these benefits and of the burdens necessary for their production. Rawls' core idea is that the best principles of justice are those which would be chosen by people in a situation which is fair to all those doing the choosing. The best principles of justice, he argues, are those which people in a fair situation would choose. He calls this fair situation the original position. He argues that in this hypothetical situation, the choosers are self-interested, rational, and required to come to a unanimous agreement. The most important condition is that the choosers are under a veil of ignorance about their own social relations and talents. They do not know their social class, their abilities, or their conception of the good. Rawls argues that a position with such a veil represents fairness between free and equal persons and that persons in this original position would choose his two principles of justice.

Concerning De Vitoria's "De Jure Belli"

2009-02-18T15:39:00.003-07:00

Just War Theory traces its roots to Cicero over 2000 years ago but is more popularly associated with St. Augustine in the 5th century C.E. Just War Theory is broken up into the jus ad bellum concerning the conditions that must be met for war to be justifiably initiated and the jus in bello concerning the tactics that may be justifiably employed during war. Catholic theologian and philosopher Francisco de Vitoria is considered one of the first modern theorists to formulate rules of war related to the jus ad bellum and jus in bello. He developed five jus ad bellum propositions in De Indis et de Jure Belli (c. 1532), a treatise related to the wars the Spanish Conquistadors waged against Indians in South America. Those propositions are as follows:

Difference of religion is not a just cause for war.
Extension of empire is not a just cause of war.
Neither the personal glory of the prince nor any other advantage to him is a just cause for war.
A wrong received is the only just cause for commencing a war.
Not every kind and degree of wrong can suffice for commencing a war.

I will detail de Vitoria’s argument including premises and appeals he used to develop his conclusions. I will then discuss a difficulty with his argument related to differing religious worldviews and interpretations of a “wrong received”. Lastly, I will argue that he provides a prima facie argument against the initiation of an unjust war but that it could be strengthened to fit the modern world to include a provision concerning just trade.

De Vitoria structures his treatise as responses to questions in the form of propositions and doubts in numerical order. The first question related to the jus ad bellum asks what is the reason and cause of a just war. His first proposition is that difference of religion is not sufficient to be a cause of a just war. He appeals to St. Thomas Aquinas on this point and adds, “… religion forms conscience and conscientious acts in ignorance of natural law are not guilty in justifying our penal interventions.” As a devout Catholic, he seemed to abhor the subjugation and slaughter of people in the name of religion as the Conquistadors were doing in Central and South America. The second proposition is that extension of empire is not sufficient for initiating a just war. He claims self-evidence on this point and sets up a reductio ad absurdum with an example of two belligerent states waging war against each other in the quest of empire. The contradiction is that since each state would be justified and therefore innocent, it would be unlawful to kill combatants on either side.

The third proposition is that neither the personal glory of the prince nor any other advantage to him is a just cause for war. He supports this claim with the premise that even though the prince is the only authority to initiate war, he should subordinate both peace and war to the people. The quest for glory and personal gain mark the difference between a lawful king and a tyrant in this respect. De Vitoria appeals to Aristotle to note that since the prince derives his authority from the state, he ought to use it for the good of the state. Lastly, he comments that the difference between freemen and slaves is that slaves are exploited for the good of the master while freemen exist in their own interest. De Vitoria makes this analogy to the jus ad bellum to show the difference between a prince initiating a just war on behalf and in support of the people to that of a tyrant conscripting subjects into an unjust war for glory and personal gain.

The last two propositions relate to the initiation of a just war based on wrongs done to the state by other states. The fourth proposition claims that the single and only cause for commencing a war is a wrong received. This would include war in self-defense and offensive war for avenging a wrong. De Vitoria appeals to Augustine and Aquinas for support in addition to the Bible relating to taking up the sword against an enemy. Specifically, he says, “ … a prince has no greater authority over foreigners than over his own subjects unless they have done something wrong.” From the Bible he quotes St. Paul from Romans, “He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.” The fifth and last proposition claims that not every kind and degree of wrong is sufficient for commencing a war and so he introduces the notion of proportionality into the Just War Theory. The premise for this claim is that fact that not every crime warrants death or atrocious punishment. De Vitoria also makes an appeal to the Bible by citing Deuteronomy that says, “… the degree of punishment ought to correspond to the measure of the offence.” These five propositions make up de Vitoria’s first canon of warfare. Besides the principles listed above, he argues that a prince should only reluctantly initiate war and live in peace as St. Paul urges in Romans. The prince should also remember that, “… others are his neighbors, whom we are bound to love as ourselves, and that we all have one common Lord, before whose tribunal we shall have to render our account.”

It is important to frame de Vitoria’s argument within history to understand the importance of his contribution to Just War Theory and its implications in a modern context. The Spanish conquest of the Aztecs led by Cortés took place between 1591 and 1521, 11 years before de Vitoria wrote his treatise in 1532. The battle of Tenochtitlan alone saw the deaths of 40,000 Aztecs in a single day in the name of conquest, glory, and religious justification. In 1517, Martin Luther posted his 95 theses on the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg and began the Protestant Reformation that would lead to violence such as the Knights War of 1522 and the Peasants War of 1524 that left over 100,000 dead. Religious based violence and war was spreading throughout Europe and would continue to do so until the signing of the peace treaties of Westphalia in 1648. As such, de Vitoria was ahead of his time with his propositions that war based on religion, empire, and glory was not a just cause for war. This is even more striking considering he was a Roman Catholic at a time when corruption and politics within the Church was rampant and led not only to the Reformation but the imprisonment of Pope Clement VII and the end of the Italian Renaissance in 1527. His claims, however, are not without difficulties and as I will show, need to be reformulated to include just trade to fit in the modern world.

Although religion is not a just cause for war as de Vitoria claims in his first proposition, it is the source through which morality and therefore right and wrong are determined. As such, this leaves open his fourth and fifth proposition to religious interpretation as to what qualifies as a wrong received and a just cause for war. Religious worldview colors the determination of both proportionality and threshold of a wrong received therefore entailing that a wrong received in one culture with one type of religious worldview would justify the initiation of a war while the same wrong to another culture with a different religious worldview would not meet that same threshold. The controversy surrounding the 2005 Danish Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons that resulted in a Fatwah issued by Mahmoud-al Zahar, the leader of Hamas, is an example of difference in belief of wrong received based on religious worldview. For most people in the U.S. and Europe, the issue was a matter of free speech and not considered the level of wrong that much of the Islamic world held it to be. To many Muslims, the cartoons were blasphemous to the point that many, including Mahmoud-al Zahar, believed that violence against Denmark and the cartoonist was justified. The argument for or against such an edict is beyond the scope of this essay; however, it is clear that religion, arguably in an indirect manner, continues to play a role for the justification of violence. A stronger formulation of de Vitoria’s jus ad bellum would have to include not only the proposition that religion is not a just cause of war but cultural and/or religious wrongs never meet the threshold to initiate a just war.

The modern world is certainly different from the world of de Vitoria with borders meaning less now than ever before. Trade is also different today than in his time with a global economy that has affected political dynamics, interdependency, and, in a sense, justice. Even though de Vitoria provides a prima facie argument against unjust war, his propositions must be reformulated to fit in this modern world. National self-sufficiency is desirable but mostly unattainable with global resource distribution scattered and uneven. Unjust trade practices, sanctions, and prime resource control create a potential for suffering that may justify a wrong that meets the threshold of a just cause for war. As such, a provision for just trade would have to be added to his jus ad bellum to insure against this. Skyrocketing food prices around the world has led to violence in Haiti and Africa while 15% of all gas in the United States comes from bio-fuels derived from food. 2 billion people are starving while 860 million cars are in use throughout the world, 62 million in the U.S. alone. It may be justifiable in the modern world to initiate a just war to demand this right to subsistence against the unfair advantage of trade. De Vitoria’s intent was the elimination of all war and the propagation of peace among all peoples of the earth. If he were alive today, trade would be a legitimate concern for him in the attainment of such peace. Further, his principle of justice, in a modern context, would have to more clearly define "wrong received" and account for war in the name of humanitarian intervention and preemptive war in the name of self-defense along with how his principles would be used under the current U.N. charter.

Concerning Shue's "Basic Rights"

2009-02-17T21:08:00.003-07:00

In his book Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, Henry Shue argues that everyone has a right to subsistence and that this right is as important as the right to physical security. This argument runs counter to a common view that the right to physical security is more stringent than the right to the necessities of life. In addition, the common view could be argued to hold that the right to life is a right that is overridden or justly violated only in extreme conditions, while the right to an adequate diet or minimal health care are more easily overridden. I will provide a brief overview of Shue’s argument and what he means by a basic right, right to security, and right to subsistence. I will also explain why people, in his view, think it is easier to justify rights to security than rights to subsistence and why Shue rejects this reasoning. Lastly, I will evaluate and expand on Shue’s argument from a cost perspective that subsistence rights are basic and just as important as security rights.

Shue approaches his argument by first defining a moral right as providing, “… the rational basis for a justified demand that the actual enjoyment of a substance be socially guaranteed against standard threats.” The rational basis allows for insistence to the right without shame and resistance to the denial of the right. The actual enjoyment of a substance refers not precisely to enjoyment of the right but rather to enjoyment of what the right provides such as liberty, security, or food. For a right to be socially guaranteed against standard threats arrangements must be made, mostly by a government in the form of laws, for people to enjoy the right. “Standard” in this case means a reasonable level, not absolute level of guarantee. In other words, a guarantee against any murders would not be feasible but a system that provided strong deterrents, law enforcement, and a judiciary to as much as possible minimize the instances of murder would be considered reasonable and “standard”.

From this framework, Shue proceeds to define a basic right as right that is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights. When a right is basic, “… any attempt to enjoy any other right by sacrificing the basic right would be self-defeating, cutting the ground from beneath itself.” In other words, a basic right is the foundation from which other rights build upon and without which we literally could not live without. As such, non-basic rights such as free speech or assembly may be justifiably sacrificed, if necessary, to protect basic rights. The question then is what qualifies as a basic right. Shue answers by first arguing that security qualifies as a basic right because no other rights can be enjoyed if a right to physical security is not protected. The argument is more formally structured as follows:

Everyone is entitled to enjoy something as a right.
Everyone is entitled to the removal of the most serious and general condition that would prevent or severely interfere with the exercise of whatever rights the person has.
Therefore, anyone who is entitled to anything as a right must be entitled to physical security as a basic right so that threats to his or her physical security cannot be used to thwart the enjoyment of the other right.

Shue also claims that the basic right of security is universal because the argument applies to everyone.

The order of Shue’s reasoning within his argument is important because up until now, few would disagree that physical security is a basic right. This is important in his argument for subsistence as a basic right because of the similarity he will draw between security and subsistence. By subsistence or minimal economic security, he means access to unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate shelter, and minimal preventative health care. He recognizes that his claim is a form of distributive justice but refrains from treating broader economic rights at this point. In addition, he limits the scope of the basic right of subsistence to at least those who cannot provide for themselves. As such, the same considerations that support physical security as a basic right support subsistence as a basic right because no one can fully, if at all, “… enjoy any right that is supposedly protected by society if he or she lacks the essentials for a reasonably healthy and active life.” The same reasoning applies to prevention of deficiency of essentials for survival and indeed may be more basic than physical security because a healthy individual may be able to fight off an attack where physical security is violated while a hungry or sick individual could not fight off such an attack. Both security and subsistence are equally essential to a normal, healthy life and before exercise of other rights are possible. This is not to say that a right to security and subsistence are means to the enjoyment of other rights but are instead inherent necessities. He concludes by referring back to the definition of a moral right to show that a social guarantee of protection against threats to both security and subsistence is necessary because giving less priority to a basic right rather than to non-basic or other moral rights is “literally impossible”.

Shue attempts to show that the common view of accepting security and not subsistence as a basic right lies within the view of negative and positive rights. A negative right is a right of noninterference or simply leaving people alone while a positive right is giving to others or redistributing wealth. The prima facie argument against a basic right to subsistence relies on the view that subsistence is a positive right and therefore secondary to the negative right of security. Shue rejects this argument and suggests that both security and subsistence impose positive as well as negative duties. These duties include not depriving the right-holder the object of the right, protection of the right-holder against such deprivation, and aid to those who have already been deprived. In the case of security, Shue claims that it is impossible to protect a right to physical security without taking or making payment for positive action such as salaries for police officers, judges, and maintenance of correctional facilities. In the case of subsistence, he shows that fulfillment of the right to subsistence may not involve a redistribution of wealth or grants of commodities but rather protection from individuals or institutions that would otherwise harm them and prevent them from providing for themselves. According to the opposing view, this is a negative right related to security. Further, he briefly discusses the misconception that negative duties cost less than positive ones and suggest that this argument rests upon “… empirical speculation of dubious generality.” Shue does not deny that reasonably guaranteeing a right to subsistence would involve some form of redistribution of wealth but only that denial of the right to subsistence based upon the premises that security only involves negative duties while subsistence involves only positive duties is fallacious. Shue briefly mentions the cost of security versus the cost of subsistence to further weaken the claim that it subsistence is not a basic right or at least secondary to the right of security. I will expand upon this concept and show that in many respects, the right to subsistence may actually be cheaper than the right to security. I will also show that the resources of security, like subsistence, favors the rich and therefore also involves a redistribution of wealth to socially guarantee security as a basic right for all.

Controversy has surrounded the concept of redistributing wealth for centuries and has been the subject of political philosophers from Immanuel Kant in the 18th century to modern philosophers such as Rawls, Pogge, and Singer. In regards to the costs associated with the
realization of subsistence rights in comparison to actual costs associated with maintaining security rights, the common view is that achieving the right to subsistence would be costly and therefore involve a substantial redistribution of wealth. Based on current spending in the United States alone, I argue that costs necessary to achieve subsistence rights domestically and make a significant increase to achieve international subsistence rights are obtainable without any additional cost to the American taxpayer. In 2007, the United States spent an estimated $693.3 billion for all military expenditures and domestic police protection, corrections, judicial, and legal activities. Based on these statistics alone, the annual per capita expense for security in the United States is, at minimum, $2,311. In contrast, the United States spent $49.9 billion in total foreign aid and its domestic food stamp program in 2007. Assuming all U.S. foreign aid went strictly to subsistence, this equates to an annual per capita expense of $161 or 7.1% of the per capita expense of security. As Shue has shown, security and subsistence rights both involve positive and negative duties thereby defeating the argument against subsistence rights on the grounds of redistribution of wealth. Further, as the numbers indicate above, a simple shift in expenditures would go far to achieve subsistence as a basic right without any further cost to the American taxpayer. For example, a 9.5% decrease in military spending could effectively double the current U.S. expenditures for both foreign aid and domestic food stamp program. One could argue that U.S. security expenditures are necessary and the funding required to achieve subsistence as a right, even domestically, would overburden the taxpayer and more specifically the wealthy. With over 700 military bases in 130 countries and an unpopular war in Iraq that costs approximately $5 billion a month, I find arguments either against subsistence as a basic right or as an unachievable ideal both weak and immoral especially since it is clear that shifts in expenditures could make a difference without any further taxpayer cost.

Concerning Hobbes' "Leviathan", Morality, and Human Nature

2009-02-17T21:02:00.003-07:00

Thomas Hobbes may not have realized when he published Leviathan in 1651 that he would establish a base of Western political thought that would still be relevant over 350 years later. One of the most novel and controversial ideas to come out of Leviathan regarded the function of morality. Hobbes took a pessimistic view of human nature and believed that morality did not exist outside the constraints of the state or in our natural state without government. To fully understand Hobbes’ claim to our natural lack of morality and its function within society, I will first provide an overview of natural condition of mankind and the doctrine of egoism upon which his treatise is built. I will also briefly discuss the social contract, the origin of the state, and function of government. I will argue that Hobbes’ view of human nature and morality is problematic because egoism does not adequately explain human motivation and would not allow the initial creation of the state. Lastly, I will show that Hobbesian philosophy is still of value concerning international affairs within certain limitations.

Hobbes claims that nature endowed humans with a rough equality of ability. No one is born with an overly significant amount of strength or mental ability. He envisioned a state of nature for humans as a natural condition without laws, rules, or government inhabited by people with this inherent rough equality of ability. Further, everyone is of equal value and may act in any way necessary to protect or advance their interests. Most importantly, everyone would act out of self-interest at all times moved by short-term passion rather than long-term reason. The doctrine that individuals always act out of self-interest and self-interest alone is called psychological egoism and is key to Hobbes’ argument. He also believes that due to unchecked self-interest and this base, rough equality, “… ariseth, equality of hope in attaining of our ends” leading to competition for resources. Add to the equation the quest for prestige, respect and glory also inherent to human nature and a dangerous mixture is created. In fact, in a state with no laws and punishment where self-interest rules and competition for resources, justified paranoia, and quest for glory are ever present, enemies and violence are everywhere. This means that the state of nature is actually a state of war.

Life then in the state of nature then is, “solitary, poore, nasty brutish, and short.” For Hobbes, two Laws of Nature counter an unimaginable, uncivilized life without morality. The first Law of Nature is that humans should try to attain peace. If peace is not possible, one would have unlimited rights as in the state of nature. The second Law of Nature states that if everyone agrees to peace in mutual rather than individual defense then it is within reason to give up all rights inherent within the state of nature. These rights would be given to that entity that would enforce all agreements made within this social contract. That entity is the state or sovereign. In exchange for peace, rebellion, questioning authority, and breaking the social contract is expressly forbidden even if that sovereign abuses power to become a tyrant. The point is that even the worst state of government is better than the state of nature.

For Hobbes, morality does not exist in the state of nature nor is it part of human nature. The origin of government came about from the inherent desire of peace in a state of constant violence and passion for all that could not be possible in the state of nature. This includes culture, art, enterprise, and property that would be impossible without cooperation and a system that enforced certain rules of behavior. The function of government is simply to enforce the rules of cooperation necessary for society to function. Another way of stating the function of government is that it instills fear of punishment into its subjects. Morality functions then as promoting the rules of cooperation that restrain self-interested behavior. Since self-interest is natural, morality is unnatural and law is equivalent to coercion and lack of freedom. This is the price, however, we must pay for peace, progress and protection of our life, property, and enterprising interests. It is interesting that Hobbes believes that the very sovereign that allows our elevation out of the state of nature is, in fact, in a state of nature with other sovereigns. This makes sense because there are no sovereigns to govern sovereigns and therefore, no fear of punishment or reason to act out of anything other than self-interest. For Hobbes, morality from an international viewpoint does not exist.

Hobbes’ justification of authoritarian government is problematic and in many respects implausible. First, absolute psychological egoism would not allow our species to live more than a couple of generations at most. Life driven by passion without constraint would be too destructive to imagine. Mothers would not care for their babies who, more than likely, were fathered out of rape. If a baby were lucky (or unlucky) enough to make it to childhood, no one would take the time to teach her anything entailing no communication above a grunt or a club on the head. Without communication, the first social contract would be impossible. Hobbes’ first Law of Nature conflicts with the motivations within a state of nature. Only through reason is the social contract possible and as Hobbes stated, “A Law of Nature … is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by reason …”. In the state of nature where reason is utilized to promote self-interest or protect oneself from the violence of others, reason would be overwhelmed and therefore, not allow cooperation necessary to begin to agree on even the simplest social contract. Some sense of morality and cooperation must have existed in humans before the first government originated. Ethical egoism is the doctrine that we should act according to self-interest while psychological egoism which is the doctrine that is part of our nature to always act according to self-interest. It is unclear whether Hobbes was an absolute ethical egoist or not but it is clear that absolute psychological egoism is not plausible. Lastly, it could be argued that altruism is a fantasy but there does seem to be evidence of genuine giving to others without personal gain of any sort. All of the major religions of the world promote altruism and abound with stories of self-stories of selfless giving in history and everyday life. The existence of communication, cooperation, and altruism seems to point to a more optimistic human nature than Hobbes claims thereby weakening his argument for the justification of authoritarian government. Lastly, it seems that Hobbes did not fully believe in a world completely without altruism thereby making his state of nature more of interesting thought experiment.

It is important to note that even though his argument is weakened, it does not entail that his political philosophy is not of value. As it concerns international affairs, Hobbesian philosophy is evident and sometimes necessary concerning relations between states. This is due to the difference between individual and populations along with the abuse of power that may develop within a regime. Imperialism that led to World War II and the U.S. invasion of Iraq could be argued to be an example of Hobbesian political thought in action since both are of questionable morality and seem to be driven by national self-interest. Political and military intervention by nations against other nations to stop genocide as in Darfur is also Hobbesian because of the questionable legality of interfering with another sovereign state. It could be argued that the United Nations makes such an intervention legal. Further, international morality and altruism also go against the Hobbesian idea of a state of nature between sovereigns, however, it is clear that disregard of a sovereign’s right to rule is both morally justified and Hobbesian. Much more could be said regarding Hobbesian political thought and international relations that is beyond the scope of this paper. Even though still somewhat controversial, it is likely that aspects of the philosophy of Hobbes will remain an important part of Western political thought.

Moral Nihiism, Moral Skepticism, and the Function of Conscience

2009-02-07T11:54:00.002-07:00

Philosophers have searched for moral truth and argued for varying principles that allow for the determination of right and wrong action since before the time of Plato and Aristotle. Plato developed his system of ethics based on the Theory of Forms while Aristotle developed a teleological theory of ethics in Nicomachean Ethics. The Enlightenment of the late 18th and early 19th century saw the birth of the deontological ethical principles of Kant and consequentialism of Mill. The late 19th and 20th century, however, saw the development of a different idea of ethics in the form of moral skepticism and moral nihilism. The claim that either moral knowledge is impossible or moral value does not exist, defined respectively, is more popularly associated with J.L. Mackie from Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong and Michael Ruse from Biology and the Foundation of Ethics. I will provide a detailed overview of arguments for moral nihilism and moral skepticism and distinguish the differences between the two. Both arguments are difficult to argue against since the denial of the validity of moral belief does not provide much of a base to argue against; however, I will show how the phenomena of conscience may defeat the arguments for either moral skepticism or nihilism.

Moral skeptics conclude that no moral belief is justified and deny the possibility of real knowledge to anything’s moral status. Moral truth may exist but moral skeptics claim that discerning this truth is impossible. Adam Morton suggests that, “… many of our firm moral beliefs may be mistaken (perhaps there is nothing inherently wrong with telling lies).” The simplest argument in support of moral skepticism is based on the fact that people from different cultures, backgrounds, and educational levels disagree on certain moral truths. For example, the U.S. Republican Party that represents 55 million Americans supports an anti-abortion platform based on the idea that the procedure is equivalent to murder and therefore always wrong. The Democratic Party on the other hand, represents approximately 72 million Americans and supports a platform that abortion is not always wrong. If so many people disagree then maybe knowledge on any moral claim is unknowable. Other arguments for moral skepticism include Rene Descartes’ argument against justification based on the contrary hypothesis. He argues that if a contrary hypothesis to any belief cannot be ruled out then that belief is not justified. For example, if I believe that I will not get in a car accident while going down to the corner store, but cannot rule out that I won’t, then my belief is not justified. This is an argument that supports generalized skepticism but seems especially poignant related to moral knowledge. If I believe that torturing babies is always wrong but cannot definitively prove otherwise then according to this argument, my belief cannot be justified. Again, this does not speak to the existence or non-existence of moral truth but only that knowledge of that truth is impossible.

Moral nihilism, however, supports the claim that nothing is morally wrong and therefore knowledge claims of right and wrong are meaningless. Moral skepticism is an epistemological position while moral nihilism is a metaphysical one. The moral skeptic may allow for the possibility that torturing babies is wrong, although epistemically unjustifiable, while the moral nihilist would not assign a truth-value either way. Moral disagreement supports the moral nihilist claim in addition to arguments from the field of evolutionary psychology. The inherent value of some moral conduct may have nothing to do with moral truth but is inherently valuable in propagating the species. Torturing babies does not allow the passing on of their genetic code, which is bad from a species, survival perspective. Moral skepticism claim that knowledge of moral truth is unattainable while the moral nihilist claims that moral truth does not exist. I will show, however, that the phenomena of conscience and may provide a counter argument that the moral skeptic or nihilist may not be able to defeat.

John Henry Newman was a 19th century philosopher and Catholic Apologeticist who argued for the rationality of religious belief. In Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford, he explores the difference between natural and revealed religion to start his argument supporting this claim. He attempts to show that natural religion as an abstract, individual spirituality arises out of the faculty of conscience. Newman states, “… conscience implies a difference in the nature of actions … brings with it no proof of its truth … and subdues the appetites.” It is beyond the scope of this essay to evaluate his religious claims but there is no denying that conscience exists among individuals across all cultures and time periods. According to Newman, moral systems arise from instances of conscience and the avoidance of discomfort. In other words, if I feel bad the first time I torture a baby then I will be less likely to do it again in the future. Differences in reasoning, appeals to authority, or culture may lead to the development of differing moral systems and therefore moral disagreements between groups. Reason, affect, and environmental influences subdue conscience in this respect. I argue that this process leads to a corruption of what the conscience was pointing to in the first place which might be moral truth.

Evidence supporting the faculty of conscience pointing in the direction of moral truth is that certain acts are universally looked upon as immoral. Stealing and murder without justification are an example of what may be a universal moral truth. I argue that no culture at anytime has looked favorably upon these two types of acts without some sort of justification. From an evolutionary point of view, my claim is problematic because conscience as a natural phenomenon is explained by propagation of the species instead of pointing in the direction of moral truth. Conscience then is simply a function of natural selection and supports arguments for moral skepticism and moral nihilism. Justification for moral belief or the existence of moral truth may be illusory to pass on the genetic code. Evolutionary psychology is arguably controversial because speculation on the origin of behaviors is not easily verified. It is here, however, that moral skepticism and nihilism have a weak spot from which to start a strong counterargument. If even one instance of conscience prior to the development of moral system could be shown to have no evolutionary benefit then conscience may point in the direction of moral truth and therefore weaken their position. For example, some acts of altruism are not easily explainable as an evolutionary benefit and as such are candidates for such a counterargument. The argument would be tricky because it would also have to be immune to a claim of environmental influence such as how a child is raised within a culture. The key would be to show an instance of conscience that was universal, therefore strongly supporting it as natural, but explanatory by neither a nurture claim nor an evolutionary claim. If this can be shown then it would provide a starting point from which to argue for moral principles. All we would have to do at that point is agree on what principles most directly point to moral truth … but that’s another question.

On Ryle's Knowledge-How and Knowledge-That

2009-02-06T17:53:00.001-07:00

Oxford philosopher and linguist Gilbert Ryle wrote The Concept of Mind in 1949 that proved to be influential in the fields of philosophy of mind and epistemology. His thesis rejects what he calls “The Official Doctrine” of Cartesian dualism that claims that the mind and body are separate entities with different properties. According to Ryle, the mind is categorically different from the body but integrated or simply the same to allow intelligence and the exercise of intelligence observable in behavior. His project is mostly ontological but he also introduces the epistemological concept of knowledge-how and knowledge-that to distinguish between two types of knowledge that also supports his argument for an integrated mind and body. I will provide a brief overview of Ryle’s theory of mind along with what he terms a category mistake in reference to descriptions of the mind. I will then discuss his argument for knowledge-how and knowledge-that in addition to showing how this concept supports his argument for integration of the physical and the mental. Lastly, I will discuss difficulties with Ryle’s thesis and argue that even though he introduces a much broader view of the mind compared to the classical Cartesian model, he still does not provide the scope necessary to explain certain types of knowledge.

According to Ryle, a category mistake is using the same terms to describe properties of the body to that of the mind. Quite simply, the mind and the body are of two distinct logical descriptive types, not similar types that vary by degrees. This is not to say that mind and body are separate as a Cartesian dualist would claim but rather that they have different properties that integrate in a fashion to produce intelligent action. The idea of mental substance compared to physical substance does not make sense because substance refers to matter that is part of the physical world. Location, divisibility, extension, and lack of these properties are also terms that have been used to define the mind. To Ryle, this is illogical because again, those terms are derived from the physical world. As he states, “… saying that ‘there occur mental processes’ does not mean the same sort of thing as ‘there occur physical processes’, and therefore, it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the two.” It is important to note that he means that they cannot be conjoined or disjoined in a descriptive sense not in an ontological or functional sense. To Ryle, the workings of the mind are not distinct from the actions of the body. They are simply the same. Vocabulary commonly used to describe the mind or mental processes are, as such, merely a different manner of describing action.

According to Ryle, mental processes are merely intelligent acts. There are no mental processes that are distinct from intelligent acts. The operations of the mind are not merely represented by intelligent acts but are the same as those intelligent acts. Acts of learning, remembering, imagining, knowing, or willing are not merely clues to hidden mental processes or to complex sequences of intellectual operations but are the way in which those mental processes or intellectual operations are defined. Logical propositions are not merely clues to modes of reasoning; they are those modes of reasoning. Ryle argues that there is no hidden entity called "the mind" inside a mechanical apparatus called "the body.” The workings of the mind are not distinct from the actions of the body and are better conceptualized as a way of explaining the actions of the body. The concepts of knowledge-how and knowledge-that illustrate not only Ryle’s mind-body integration in this respect but support a counterintuitive epistemic ideal that justified true belief may not be sufficient to define knowledge.

Ryle describes knowledge-that as propositional in nature. He describes knowledge-how as being skill-based and “of the limbs”. The best way to distinguish the two kinds of knowledge is to use the example of riding a bicycle. When one learns how to ride a bike, she does not learn physics, anatomy, and physiology before jumping on but stumbles her way to proficiency with the help of training wheels and a patient parent. If she did learn the theory of the science behind riding a bike to analyze how to ride it she would be exercising knowledge-that which probably wouldn’t help her much the first time she placed your feet on the pedals. Think of knowledge-how as the knowledge that builds and utilizes muscle memory, coordination, and balance. Proposition formation is not involved with knowledge-how and therefore justification in the strictest sense cannot be claimed. Sometimes we know how to do things without being able to formulate how we know. In regards to riding a bike, imagine trying to explain to someone that has never seen a bicycle before how to ride a bike without showing them or talking them through it with a bicycle present. It would certainly be a challenge if not outright impossible. This is an example of Ryle’s knowledge-how.

Knowledge-that would, however, come later when racing the bicycle in the Tour de France and reasoning your way through the science of increasing your performance. Knowledge-that is what Descartes would classify as the mind in the dualist separation of mind and body by using argumentation before deliberative action. Ryle conceptualizes integration between mind and body with action according to rules and standards as defining intelligence. It is important to remember that knowledge-that is not a priori to knowledge-how or vice versa. Drinking a glass of water without spilling it all over you is an intelligent action that is an example of knowledge-how only. Designing a landscape architecture project would first require knowledge-that in the planning stage and both joint knowledge-how and knowledge-that in the actual drawing of the plans.

The epistemological distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that is important to fully understand Ryle’s ontological position of mind and body. He places himself in a tricky position by arguing for these two types of knowledge because of his theory’s relationship to dualism and materialism. His thesis refutes dualism but knowledge-that does function like the proposition-driven mind as in the traditional Cartesian sense. One version of the intellectualist model argues that reason functions deductively and is the source of all knowledge or justification. Ryle’s knowledge-that functions similarly but does not represent the whole picture or the only source of knowledge or justification. Knowledge-how, on the other hand, implies a type of materialism that he wants to avoid because of categorical difference he posits between the body and the mind. The functioning of the mind is the same as the body but since they are categorically different, the mental is not exactly the same as the physical as a materialist might claim. It is arguably correct to say that Ryle places himself on a spectrum with dualism on one end and materialism on the other. His claim that we have both knowledge-how and knowledge-that minimizes the slippery slope in either direction even though proponents of both camps might disagree in favor of their own position. For example, a Cartesian might claim that the knowledge-how of the riding a bike is simply reasoning functioning deductively or like knowledge-that without the attention given to other types of reasoning such as with logic or math.

The output of knowledge-how and knowledge-that including Ryle’s conceptualization of knowledge and belief are also important to understand his ontological position of the mind. According to Ryle, consciousness might be analyzed into what Ryle calls “episodes” of behavior. These episodes of behavior are events that actually occur so can be empirically observed. In addition, when we describe people we do so in terms of dispositions to behave in certain ways, which means that they will do certain things if a certain situation arises. Therefore, their “mental” state of belief and knowledge can be analyzed as potential behavior, which would be observable if it occurred. Ryle uses the example of cigarette-smoking to show that actually smoking a cigarette is an episode but to say that someone is a cigarette smoker is a disposition because we do not mean anything about their consciousness, merely that they have a disposition to buy cigarettes and smoke them. Knowledge for Ryle then is when a person ‘knows’ something they have a disposition to be right about it when the situation arises. A person has belief if they have a disposition to behave in a certain way when the situation arises. This is the epistemological link to his ontological position that distinguishes him from and provides a broader picture of the mind than classical Cartesians or materialists.

The Concept of Mind no doubt contributed significantly to the field of philosophical psychology in addition to epistemology. Many of the difficulties of his theory are beyond the scope of this essay; however, I will argue that knowledge-that and knowledge-how do not provide the scope necessary to explain certain types of knowledge. For example, intuition does not seem to fit within either type of knowledge or as a combination of the two. By definition, intuition is the faculty if attaining knowledge or cognition without rational thought or inference. It is not propositional like knowledge-that and it is not of the limbs or muscle memory like knowledge-how; however, it is at least a small part of how we define certain kinds of knowledge and belief. For example, it is a common view that “Mother’s Intuition” sometimes allows a mother to know when something is wrong without any direct evidence or justification. Ryle might argue that this is a form of knowledge-how but it does not seem to be a part of the body like drinking a glass of water or riding a bike. Further, religious belief seems to be outside Ryle’s two types of knowledge in the same way as intuition. For most non-theologians or those that claim to believe in God but are inconsistent with religious practice, ‘knowledge” and/or belief in God is not propositional or even arguably rational and certainly not an example of knowledge-how unless one were to claim that being religious is somehow built into our bodies. The complexity of the human mind and how we come to claim knowledge or belief is beyond Ryle’s theory of mind. This is not to say that his refutation of Cartesian dualism is fallacious, only that more work on his project is necessary to fully describe the human mind.

The Humean Problem of Induction

2009-02-06T17:31:00.002-07:00

David Hume wrote An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748, eight years after the less than successful reception of his book A Treatise of Human Nature. Enquiry reworked some main points of Treatise (Book 1) that would prove to be highly influential in philosophy, especially in epistemology. In §4 and §5 of Enquiry Hume formulates an argument that would come to be known as “The Problem of Induction”. The problem of induction raises doubts relating to the validity of empirical claims such as those made by using the scientific method. I will provide an overview of his argument along with implications of his conclusions related to inductive reasoning. I will then discuss Hume’s claim that justified belief is not possible when the assumption is made that the future will resemble the past. Lastly, I will argue that Hume is distinguishing between two different types of knowledge that does not exclude inductive reasoning because of the difference between philosophical skepticism and ordinary life.

Hume begins §4 by distinguishing between "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact”. Relations of ideas are propositions that do not require experience or are a priori. Relations of ideas are also logically true and as Hume stated, “… discoverable by mere operation of thought without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe”. Denial of such a proposition would lead to a contradiction just as denial of the statement “all bachelors are unmarried” would be contradictory. Hume argues that matters of fact deal with experience or are learned a posteriori and cannot be disproved by an appeal to reason. If I make a matter of fact statement such as “it is raining outside” one cannot disprove my statement by reasoning alone but may do so by looking out the window and observing the sun shining. Hume suggests that we know matters of fact about unobserved things through a process of cause and effect. I have knowledge that my essay is due next Wednesday and that the sun will rise tomorrow by referencing a syllabus or inferring from past experience. But how do we know of the principle of cause and effect? He suggests that this knowledge cannot be a priori but “… arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other”. He also points out that matters of fact allow for the possibility of contradiction. For example, it is not inconceivable that the sun will implode and not rise tomorrow (matter of fact) unlike the concept that tomorrow a triangle will have four sides (relations of ideas).

Hume starts Part II of §4 by reminding us that the nature of our reasoning concerning matters of fact relates to cause and effect while the foundation for that reasoning rests upon experience. It is here that he asks upon what do we rest the foundation of all conclusions from experience. He distinguishes between two types of propositions:
1. “I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect,”
and
2. “I foresee, that other objects, which are in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects”

The first proposition refers to present and past events while the second refers to future events based on past events. Hume argues that we cannot know that the future will resemble the past by means of demonstrative reasoning of matters of fact since there is no contradiction in suggesting that the future will not resemble the past. If all our predictions about the future are based on this principle and that principle is derived from past experience, we cannot know that it will remain true in the future except by assuming that principle from the outset. Hume suggests that we infer to the future similarities from the past but that there is no form of reasoning that can justify these inferences with absolute certainty.

At the end of §4, Hume confesses that he may simply have failed to identify an argument that could give a rational foundation for inferences to the future. He claims, however, that we learn to infer matters of fact not through reasoning but through the conditioning of custom. For example, a child or “brute beast” knows from experience that a flame will burn. Hume does not suggest that we abandon experiential learning or inference to the future from past events but only that, from the point of view of a philosopher, there is not a reasonable, discernible argument that can justify such an inference. In this respect, he is only a philosophical skeptic not a skeptic as an ordinary person.

In §5 Hume attempts to show how and why we necessarily make inferences from the past to the future and other inductive connections even though he showed in the prior section that true justification is not possible. At the beginning of §5, he expands on the differences between the ordinary life and that of “academic or skeptical philosophy”. He warns the reader that passionate philosophy, like religious thought, runs the risk of being inclined to “… reason us out of virtue, and of social enjoyment.” He claims that nature always wins out against abstract reasoning but argues that there is value in further enquiry to discover the principles behind natural processes. In this case, he is referring to the type of reasoning required to justify assumptions made by inferring past events onto the future. The main point in the beginning of this section is to remind us that he is not advocating deep skepticism relating to induction in everyday life but has the right to do so in a philosophical sense.

Hume then sets up a thought experiment to understand the process of cause and effect by asking us to imagine someone that has been thrust into the world with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection but without experience. He claims that this person would see a succession of events but would not be able to discover what would come next because he would not yet have a sense of cause and effect or custom. The world would not make sense because without custom, reasoning concerning matters of fact could not extend beyond memory and sense experience. We could not speculate nor act if custom did not give us the ability to see certain actions as having certain consequences. According to Hume, “Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone, which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past.”

Hume argues, however, that all reasoning from experience ultimately falls back upon simple impressions. What I know about current events may rest upon the impression I get from the local news channel and what I speculate about the future might be based upon impressions I am making in the present. In other words, our speculations about unobserved matters of fact rest upon a constant conjunction with our present impressions. Hume suggests that we make inferences by means of the imagination but distinguishes between fiction and belief. Fiction is the product of pure imagination while belief is a combination of imagination and a certain sentiment that we cannot control which corresponds to reality. When memory or sense impression is present to us, custom will engage belief and we will infer from that impression to what it is constantly conjoined. This force of custom functions on our beliefs and helps us make sense of the world.

Hume then reduces his argument regarding how we make inferences to three principles of connection as follows:
1. Resemblance – the likeness or absence of likeness relating to ideas or affect.
2. Contiguity – sequential or proximity to ideas or affect.
3. Causation – relates to the belief of correlation between events.

These 3 principles “… are the only bonds, that unite our thoughts together, and beget that regular train of reflection or discourse…” Custom and the three principles of connection allow us to find harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas without which we could not function. He does not claim to understand the prima causa to the phenomenon but he notes that this has not stopped enquiry in other phenomena of nature. He concludes §5 by reinforcing the idea that inference is essential for human subsistence even though it is susceptible to error, sometimes slow in operation, and does not appear in the first years of infancy. Lastly, he comments that just as nature has given us use of our limbs without knowledge of the muscles, nature has also given us instinct through which the principles of inference and connection are utilized without knowledge of how this truly functions to justify belief.

The implications of Hume’s skepticism are profound. Although he allows for the contrary by appealing to the ordinary life, from a philosophical standpoint, Hume’s argument could be interpreted in 2 ways:
1. When we reason inductively we are assuming the future will resemble the past and we can never justify that assumption.
2. When we reason inductively we are blindly following a way of thinking that cannot be shown to be reliable.

Interpretation #1 is implicit in §4 Part II and is what he is generally known for as a skeptic. If we cannot reliably or rationally justify any inferences based on previous connections then everything we believe will happen must be irrational. Accordingly, the only reasoning we may trust is a priori or based on immediate sensations. Even then, impressions are subject to error and as such, may not be used as rational justification of belief. This supports both interpretations because the justification of only immediate sensation excludes inductive reasoning of any sort because connections necessarily involve temporally prior events. In that respect, we are blindly following a way of thinking that cannot be shown to be reliable. The fact that we sometimes make judgment errors or have false beliefs only supports this notion. Hume is an empiricist but strictly so because of the doubt he associates with any reasoning by connection. The implication of Humean skepticism is also profound to science because observations and connections are inherent to the development of hypotheses and models of prediction. In a nutshell, Hume supports the claim that most reasoning cannot be trusted and therefore cannot be justified. As I will show, however, Hume would not argue that we abandon science, question every single belief we possess, or claim that we are irrational by nature.

At the beginning of §5 Hume distinguishes in more detail between rationality related to the philosophical skeptic and that of an ordinary person. He does so because he realized that the knowledge and arguments of the time justified his argument against inductive epistemic certainty. He also realized that acceptance of his argument in day-to-day life was not only unrealistic but infeasible as well. He is correct to claim that epistemic certainty is out of reach due to the nature of our senses and reasoning; however, our nature, senses, and reasoning seem to do a good job of keeping us alive and moving along the path of progress. Humean skepticism would grind life to a halt if we fully accepted that every connection and association might be faulty. What would prevent the child from repeatedly putting her hand into a flame other than inductive reasoning? The real value of the argument against inductive reasoning lies in epistemology and science because it is important to remember that our reasoning may be faulty and that our belief may not be fact. The evolution debate is an example of why this important. Observation and connections across multiple fields of study strongly support the theory of evolution yet many skeptics dismiss it as “only a theory” and not fact. This is frustrating for those that support the theory but it only encourages further study to find support that will answer the challenges of the skeptics. It may be possible that science or philosophy will eventually provide a valid argument for inductive reasoning that defeats Hume’s claim. Until then, Humean skepticism demands constant academic questioning that can only benefit those that walk through everyday life with somewhat faulty reasoning.

Ethical Issues Surrounding Newborn Medical and Genetic Screening: Project Update

2009-01-29T05:53:00.003-07:00

It has been some time since I have written here concerning the UROP project with Professor Tabery. Since I am presenting today at the capital, I thought I'd share this with everyone as well.

Currently, there are over 1,200 tests available to determine the genetic component of various medical disorders, predispositions, and traits. The state of Utah currently mandates that 46 screening tests be performed on all newborns to identify and treat certain disorders. The number of genetic tests will increase in the future, requiring policymakers to make decisions concerning what tests to require, allow, or prohibit. Guidelines for making such decisions require standardized, objective criteria; however, critical analysis of the criteria to justify these decisions is lacking in scientific and public policy literature.

In 1968, Wilson and Jungner were the first to develop criteria for making such decisions. In 2004, the American College of Medical Genetics developed more sophisticated criteria for newborn screening tests. Our analysis found that these criteria either consist of ambiguous language or are insufficient when applied to some current newborn screening tests and some tests for disorders currently being debated for possible mandate. Our research also found that significant variation exists between states related to newborn screening ranging from 17 to 53 mandated tests. Our goal is to provide policymakers with usable guidelines to make informed, ethical decisions for requiring, allowing, or prohibiting newborn screening tests. Our guidelines include two philosophical concepts necessary to make an informed, ethical decision concerning permissibility:

Understanding of the causal relationship between genes and disorders. The genetic component must be high in order for the state to consider a newborn screening test mandatory. In addition, the causal relationship between genes and disorders must be morally positive or neutral and free from scientific controversy. All tests within the impermissible category have a significant environmental component or are morally controversial related to causation and/or treatment.
Treatability. In order for a test to be mandatory, the treatment must be readily available, of reasonable cost to the parents, and benefit the least advantaged. A test may still be mandated by the state if it does not meet these criteria if and only if it is of significant public health concern and is currently under debate for possible public assistance related to treatment. We name the first category as mandatory-treatable (MT) and the latter as mandatory-informational (MI).

The following provides a brief outline of key concepts and arguments that we have developed to support this legislative formula.

The causal relationship between genes and phenotypic traits or disorders is important in the permissibility debate on newborn screening because it relates to a level of confidence medical professionals and patients may place in test results. In the traditional equation for phenotypic expression, P = G + E + (G x E), G must be high and E negligible for any test to be considered mandatory. This means that scientific consensus must conclude that a test have an insignificant environmental (E) component in order to justify mandatory testing and have a high correlation between specific genetic markers and expression of disorder near or at 100%. If there is a high genetic component but expression is not at or near 100%, then it may still be considered MI or permissible. In regards to justifying permissible or impermissible newborn tests, we argue that that the causal understanding of the genetic component may be high or low but are excluded from the mandatory category due treatability factors discussed below. The paradigmatic disorders for both ends of this spectrum include phenylketonuria (PKU) on the mandatory side and anti-social personality disorder (ASPD) on the impermissible side.

Newborn testing of PKU utilizes high-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) as part of a tandem mass spectrometry (TMS) panel in most states. This tests for the genetic markers associated with the absence of an enzyme necessary to break down phenylalanine. Without this enzyme, the brain builds up toxic levels of phenylalanine resulting in mental retardation, brain damage, and eventually death. Early detection and a carefully controlled diet free of phenylalanine prevent morbidity and mortality in those individuals with this genetic disorder. The genetic component in this case is 100% with no environmental component in the expression of the disorder. The expression correlation of this disorder is also 100%. If a child is born with the defective gene, he or she will develop the disorder. PKU was the first newborn screening test used in the United States and is part of the mandatory testing program in each of the 50 states.

ASPD is a psychiatric condition symptomatic of behaviors associated with the term "evil" or "predator". The terms "sociopath" and "psychopath" are also sometimes used to describe a person with ASPD. Characteristics of the disorder include deception, violence, criminal acts, lack of empathy, and disregard for social norms. Many with ASPD simply do not seem able to emotionally differentiate or "morally" restrain their actions. Poverty, alcoholism, and drug abuse also are related to ASPD. It is estimated that in the U.S. general population as many as 5.8% of males and 1.2% of females meet the criteria for ASPD while the incidence in U.S. prison populations is anywhere from 50-80%. A genetic test for ASPD has been proposed that determines the markers associated with low levels of monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), correlated with ASPD in conjunction with severe childhood maltreatment. The association of ASPD with low levels of MAOA functions off an interactive predisposition model developed and is significantly impacted by the environmental component in expression of the disorder. No states currently require newborn testing of MAOA although its requirement was proposed by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair before the House of Commons in 2005. We argue that screening for this disorder should be impermissible because the high environmental component associated with its expression and the controversy surrounding genes and behavior. The causal component must be understood in consensus with the scientific community to have a genetic component of near 100% and be free from association related to behavior or other moral considerations that are still currently under debate. We believe that testing for ASPD in newborns represents a clear case of a test that should be made impermissible by the state.

Treatability is also important in any decision factoring for mandatory, permissible, or impermissible newborn testing. The American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG) developed criteria in 2004 that includes scores for availability, cost of treatment, efficacy, and benefits to both the individual and society. We argue that although this is a significant improvement from the ambiguous language used in the Wilson and Jungner criteria, it is still missing an important component related to inequality and social justice. This component derives from philosopher John Rawls’ Difference Principle from his work A Theory of Justice. The Difference Principle states that any system of justice must address the need and indeed benefit the least advantaged within the system. He also argues that even though the system will allow for inequality, it should be minimized at birth so everyone starts with an equal opportunity. This is important to any legislative decision regarding newborn screening because the state should not perpetuate or increase differences between classes of people. In other words, any test that is possible for mandate in the future must be treatable by means of availability, benefit, and cost across all classes of people including the least advantaged. Any newborn test for which treatment perpetuates or increases inequality between classes should be judged impermissible by legislators. Any test that is deemed permissible may involve treatment that is morally neutral or does not promote any type of inequality.

The role of the legislature as it relates to newborn screening must address the needs of public health and rights of the individual. Our formula includes the components of causal understanding of the underlying genetic mechanisms and a universal notion of treatability that follows a theory of justice. This will give legislators the tools to evaluate both current newborn screening tests for possible revision and more importantly, future tests that may not be as paradigmatic as PKU or ASPD. Our formula will also help standardize the number and type of newborn screening tests performed between states so that all American newborns may have a healthy start on life. We believe the newborn screening issue and our proposed solution is both conceptually important and practically necessary in the field of medical ethics.

Conscience As It Relates To Natural Religion: An Analysis of John Henry Newman

2009-01-15T15:10:00.003-07:00

In Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford Between A.D. 1826 and 1843 (15S) and An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (GA), John Henry Newman compares natural religion to that of revealed religion in an apologia of faith. I will provide an overview of his definition of natural religion including how it changes over the course of his writings. I will then argue that the faculty of conscience is the common thread that holds his definition of natural religion together between the two works. Lastly, I will explore whether conscience is sufficient to keep Newman’s definition of natural religion coherent within his argument for revealed religion.

In “Sermon II: The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion Respectively” (15S), Newman attempts to show how Christianity as authenticated, revealed religion relates to natural religion. He starts by claiming that, “No people (to speak in general terms) has been denied revelation from God …” He says that only a portion of the world; however, enjoy authenticated revelation, which refers to the Christian God of the Gospels. He then introduces a definition of natural religion as an attainable creed that arises from this general revelation evidenced by the writings of pious men from what he calls the heathen world. This is still too general a definition for his purposes but he must get past some of the prima facie objections that the term “Natural Religion” carried with it in the eighteenth century. It is here that he introduces conscience as an obvious and essential principle of religion. Conscience allows an understanding of the difference in the nature of action and motivates one to act in one way over another. Happiness begins to be associated with acting in favor of conscience because we vaguely feel remorse when we act against it. The idea of evil is also associated with the feeling of acting against conscience and together with general revelation, a presentiment of life after death and judgment of our deeds begins to form. Happiness is then connected with right action, which then becomes the basis of an individual moral system. From here, a disciplined mind might develop a religious creed that points to the individual’s idea of moral truth. Keep in mind that the source of the religious creed arose out of conscience but even though it may be built from there on the principles of logic and observations of nature, it remains problematic.

Newman claims that this is how natural, religious creed is attained; however, is not truly attained because others reach different conclusions pointing in a different direction of moral “truth”. The mind may go in the direction of philosophy, which would make the religious creed too abstract, or it may go in the direction of rude natural feeling, which would make the religious creed unintelligible. What seems to be lacking in natural religion is an insight into God’s true personality and a doctrine for moral action that points in the direction genuine moral truth. Authenticated or revealed religion provides this deficiency. Natural religion allows for deep and true religious feeling but with an object to place affections and a standard by which all can gauge moral action. Revealed religion provides the unity of a “Judge and Governor” to keep any corruption of reasoning in check. A large portion of his work is how reason functions in relation to faith, which is beyond the scope of this essay, but it is important to note that natural religion relies more on obedience to moral principles by reasoning alone while teaching religious truth by investigation. Revealed religion enforces obedience more on faith and teaches religious truth historically. Revealed religion engages the faculty of faith, indeed all of our faculties more completely, and as such, it fulfills our nature in a way that natural religion is never able achieve. From Fifteen Sermons, the crucial point to remember is that natural religion prepares the mind for the moral truth and recommends doctrine that revealed religion brings.

It is interesting that the definition of natural religion depends, in a large part, on the definition of revealed religion. This works well in supporting his argument that there is a relationship between the two but I will now discuss how Newman’s definition for natural religion changed over the next 20-40 years as evidenced in A Grammar of Assent. In “Chapter Five: Apprehension and Assent in the Matter of Religion” (GA), Newman considers the dogmas of belief in one God, the Holy Trinity, and dogmatic theology in addition to their relation to notional and real assent. He claims that it is natural to associate empirical evidence of nature with an individual outside of our senses. He then claims that God indirectly gives us through our conscience an insight to His nature. This is the first departure from how he postulated conscience as a starting point for natural religion in Fifteen Sermons. Now he argues that revelation works through conscience rather than as a separate phenomenon. Further, he refers to a child’s response to conscience and states, “The child keenly understands that there is a difference between right and wrong; and when he has done what he believes to be wrong, he is conscious that he is offending the One to whom he is amenable, whom he does not see, who sees him. His mind reaches forward with a strong presentiment to the thought of a Moral Governor, sovereign over him, mindful, and just.” This is another departure from his argument in Fifteen Sermons because he is now claiming that conscience more directly leads to the truth of revealed religion versus a process that requires introduction to the doctrine and truth of the Holy Bible. Lastly, he implies in §1 “Belief in One God” of the same chapter that natural religion relates to notional assent. In his introductory comments, he distinguishes between real and notional assent by associating religious acts with real assent and theological acts with notional. This entails that natural religion is a theological or an intellectual endeavor and therefore more abstract. Here again, he generalizes natural religion into one category of the abstract versus into two categories of abstract or rude natural feeling that arise from the development of a religious creed as posited in Fifteen Sermons.

The differences between the definition of natural religion in Fifteen Sermons and Grammar of Assent may be subtle but I argue that it is significant enough to require a defense of its coherency. My claim is that there may be contextual differences that are explanatory to the differences. Fifteen Sermons fits within the context of a sermon while Grammar of Assent is a philosophical treatise defending Catholic faith. It is beyond the scope of this essay to more fully detail why there are differences in his definition but I argue instead that the faculty of conscience lends support to the coherency of his conceptualization. Since I developed the role of conscience in Fifteen Sermons, I will now focus on Newman’s concept of conscience in Grammar of Assent to support my claim.

In §1 of Chapter 5 (GA), Newman first addresses conscience as mentioned above. He then expands on his definition of conscience along the same lines from Fifteen Sermons in addition to claiming its legitimacy alongside memory, reasoning, and imagination. Further, he discusses the consequences of conscience, which are a moral sense and a sense of duty. This is in line with how he previously conceptualizes the essence of natural religion in Fifteen Sermons. Remember that conscience allows a moral system to develop or be a consequent from the vague apprehension of right and wrong. He asks us to consider conscience as, “ … not as a rule of conduct, but as a sanction of right conduct. This is its primary and most authoritative aspect.” He expands here on his original definition again by discerning conscience from taste and claiming that conscience concerns itself primarily with people and the actions of people or with the self and actions of the self. According to Newman, taste relates more to aesthetic preferences for beauty and ugliness rather than the rightness or wrongness of action. The important point is that his definition so far remains coherent concerning the faculty of conscience between the two works. Lastly, he adds to the definition of conscience by stating, “… when the conscience is good, as real though less forcible, self-approval, inward peace, lightness of heart … constitute a specific difference between conscience and other intellectual senses … indeed they would also constitute between conscience and moral sense…” The disconnect between the concept of natural religion in Fifteen Sermons contrasted with Grammar of Assent becomes less incoherent when attention is focused on the faculty of conscience. The idea of what natural religion is and how conscience relates to it must arguably be teased apart more in Grammar of Assent; however, the same structure of natural religion is apparent when evaluated as a consequent of conscience. The disconnect then may be attributed to contextual differences and sheer length of time between the two works. His conceptualization of conscience evolved over the course of years but the primary function, definition, and relationship to natural religion remains the same.

The question remains whether conscience is a sufficient explanation to maintain coherency and therefore validity of his argument distinguishing natural from revealed religion. Although I argue that conscience supports a claim of coherency between the two definitions, it is not sufficient to completely define natural religion because of his appeal to revealed religion. This is the inherent weakness of his argument in that he defines, in a large part, what natural religion by what is not. For Newman to provide a stronger argument for a relationship between natural and revealed religion he would have to better define natural religion on its own. Secondly, he minimizes religions that have similar agency and doctrine as the Judeo/Christian system. He does refer to Islamic faith as false against the argument that it is also a revealed religion in “Chapter 10: Inference and Assent in the Matter of Religion” (GA); however, it not sufficient to say that one religion is natural while another is revealed simply because the tenets are different. His argument for revealed religion as a logical consequent of natural religion, which is a logical consequent of conscience, rests upon structure. He must therefore focus on the differences in structure between different religious creeds to distinguish Judeo/Christian faith from all others. I argue that the phenomenon of conscience supports a theistic worldview in that it seems to point in the direction of moral truth without proof. This implies, as Newman would agree, that there is something intangible and objective outside of ourselves. It is only a small leap from here to entail theism. I also argue in conclusion that more work to Newman’s argument must be made before Christianity can truly claim itself to be authenticated, revealed religion. Conscience as the starting point may yet provide an argument to better support his claim.

Dichotomy and Interdependence: An Analysis of "The Matrix"

2008-12-19T08:21:00.003-07:00

The release of the Wachowski brother’s film The Matrix in 1999 was a milestone in science fiction cinema and special effects. The film depicts a dystopian future where the reality perceived by humans is actually a simulated reality created by sentient machines in order to subdue humans and utilize their biological energy to power a machine civilization. The plot follows Neo, a messianic character in the film, as he is liberated from the bondage of the machines and attempts to unshackle, or unplug, the remaining members of the human race. Combining elements of cyberpunk, martial arts, and what has come to be known as “bullet time” special effects, The Matrix is both visually stunning and conceptually thought provoking. The film also utilizes imagery and a narrative structure to seemingly illustrate many philosophical and social dichotomies that may be familiar in our current cultural context. I will argue that these dichotomies are in fact complements in the film and are not only symmetrical and interdependent but inform and define each other. I will go through the film in chronological order and use the specific imagery and narrative context to describe and illustrate these complements. I will also discuss how the film is a warning against technology and provide a commentary on the sublime nature of reality.

The film opens with greenish, electrically shimmering film logos and ominous music to immediately convey to the viewer that something will be different in this film compared to others. The viewer is then presented with what seems to be computer code written in an unfamiliar, Asian-like language cascading down the screen, slowly disappearing and morphing into the title of the film. The purpose of these first 40 seconds is to set a tone of disengagement and confusion along with begging the viewer to ask the question, “What is the Matrix?” This is important because one of the themes of the film is the philosophical difficulty of reality. In other words, how does one know with certainty that what they perceive to be real is, in fact, true? The more disengaged and confused the viewer is at this stage of the film, the deeper they will be engaged into the film itself as the story develops. This is the first set of dichotomies established in the film – disengagement versus engagement and confusion versus clarity. These dichotomies serve to bring the viewer along for the ride and also reinforce the notion that belief is important to both character and viewer. In the case of Neo, belief is important in a new “reality” (Matrix) where anything is possible and in the case of the viewer, belief is important in accepting the possibility of such a future. Each dichotomy depends on its analogous parts to drive the intrigue forward, present in both character and viewer.

The next scene follows the character of Trinity, first as a voice discussing Neo and later as she performs some seemingly impossible kung fu and flees the agents on the rooftops. The menacing, corporate clad agents set up another dichotomy with the vinyl clad Trinity both in clothing and morality. The viewer is unsure who she is but it seems clear that she somehow represents good while the agents represent evil. We later learn that this is the case, although it is suggested that the roles were reversed at some point in history when humans unjustly treated the machines in their early stages of self-awareness. Clothing is important throughout the film. The agents in their brown suits, matching ties, and square sunglasses could arguably represent a corporate system of control while the vinyl or leather clothing worn by Morpheus and his crew could represent the bondage of the individual or non-conformist in a corporate state. Again, dichotomies of good versus evil and corporate versus individual are established early in the film before the viewer has comprehension of what is taking place. This scene ends with a phone booth and the disappearance of Trinity, the question of how she disappeared left as yet unanswered.

The next scene introduces the Mr. Anderson/Neo character played by Keanu Reeves by taking the viewer through what appears to be an electronic circuit, greenish patterned energy flowing past. This scene also introduces the dichotomies of waking versus sleep and machine versus human. Neo is first seen asleep with headphones on, a computer search running in the background for Morpheus. The search for Morpheus, named for the Greek god of dreams, is actually Neo’s search for an answer to the question of the Matrix. The answer to the question of the Matrix concerns the nature of reality. The mind relies on the senses to interpret the world by which reality is defined. Without the mind or the senses, neither could truly exist just as dying in the Matrix means death in the real world. This is yet another complementary dichotomy that the film illustrates. The imagery of the computer words on a black screen and not an actual voice waking Neo up speaks to the interdependence Neo has with machines along with the idea that reality can be like a dream state, further supporting the notion that reality may be ambiguous. Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy explores and develops methodological doubt along similar lines. This scene will also tie into the computer center of the Nebuchadnezzar in that Mr. Anderson’s room in Matrix looks remarkably like the computer network of Morpheus’ ship. The imagery and quiet narrative of Reeve’s character in this introductory scene are rich with opposites that will reverberate throughout the film – reality versus illusion, waking versus sleep, machine versus human, rationality versus experience - all interdependent and complementary because neither opposite could function or exist without the other.

The notion that “life is but a dream” recurs many times throughout the film along with references to Alice in Wonderland to exacerbate the idea that everything may not be as it seems. References to “follow the white rabbit” and the appearance of the character of Du Jour with a white rabbit tattoo on her shoulder are the most obvious examples of this link to Lewis Carrol. It is interesting that the character of Troy, a somewhat shady figure, reveals the future of Neo by saying, “Hallelujah. You’re my savior, man. My own personal Jesus Christ” and “Don’t worry, you don’t exist.” Finally, Troy says, “It just sounds like you need to unplug.” This is interesting because he seems serious about his use of mescaline, a mind-altering hallucinogen. This could be a commentary about drug use in that by “dropping out”, one may actually be more in touch with what may be actual reality. This notion is certainly supported further by the choice Neo has to make after meeting Morpheus between taking a drug, whether it be a red pill or the blue.
The scene that takes place between Neo meeting Trinity and his introduction to Morpheus further develops many of the dichotomies already established. Trinity confirms that Neo is searching for something other than Morpheus, the work discipline meeting with the boss that looks like an agent, and the attempted escape illustrate the dichotomy between corporate versus individual, reality versus illusion, and the interconnectedness of man and machine. Neo needs computers in the Matrix to find the answer of what the Matrix is, which proves to be part of the machine world. The lecture given to Neo by his boss is remarkably like the message of the what machine world is attempting to achieve with humans, which further adds to the notion of interconnectedness between the parts and the whole of both the machine world and the corporate world. The attempted escape from the agents not only sets up the inevitability that agent Smith refers to in his fight with Neo later in the film but also another dichotomy between ordinary and extraordinary. The humans that are plugged in need the comfort of the ordinary environment produced by the simulated reality of the Matrix, which is, in fact, an environment where the extraordinary feats may be achieved. The journey Neo takes is from the commonplace world that the Matrix provides, into the real world of Morpheus and Zion, and finally back into the commonplace world of the Matrix, is a journey that allows for his transformation into savior. Once again we see interdependence and complementary dichotomies that help define and inform each other woven throughout The Matrix.

The scene from Neo’s interrogation by the three agents to his birth out of the Matrix further develops the ambiguous nature of reality, Neo’s relationship with Agent Smith, and the dual nature of Neo himself. The viewer is once again transported through an electronic device, which seems to give the illusion of coming though a television monitor. This could be a commentary on the dual nature of television and media in general along with establishing yet another dichotomy. As much as we view television and are informed by it, maybe in a way, television views and is informed by us. The imagery of the “bug” transforming into a fleshy creature, disappearing through Mr. Anderson’s navel followed by Neo waking to Morpheus’s phone call further plays with the notions of disengagement, confusion, and reality both for the viewer and in a diegetic way. Agent Smith’s character is developed more in this scene as well, with many negative “human-like” qualities starting to surface such as pride and sadism in Neo’s disturbing loss of his mouth and subsequent invasion by the “bug”. It is interesting that Neo’s character is many times affectively flat, much like Agent Smith. This is not a coincidence as each character helps to define each other. They are in fact symmetrical and complementary just as good and evil or Jesus and the anti-Christ are symmetrical and complementary. Each is, in a way, without purpose and meaning without each other. We also see that Neo is a dichotomy within himself, living two separate lives with almost two different personalities. His choice of taking the red pill after he finally meets Morpheus does not erase the plugged in side of this dichotomy and indeed sets him up for failure before he succeeds by eventually saving Morpheus. The imagery of the mirror becoming unbroken for Neo, covering him, and eventually overwhelming him supports the notion that the two sides will become one in his future. It is only through finding the interdependence between the two-sides of his nature that he is able to master the Matrix. Besides entertaining and challenging the viewer, maybe this is the ultimate message of The Matrix – we all have two sides in our nature and knowledge of this fact and balance between these forces is what we should strive to achieve.

The scenes from Neo’s birth from the Matrix into the “desert of the real” through his visit with the Oracle to Morpheus’ rescue by Neo work together to develop the interdependence that the Matrix and the “real world” have on each other as well as the relationship between knowledge and belief. The imagery and music as Neo “awakens” from the Matrix in a reddish pod overlooking humanity/power generator towers is probably one of the most memorable in all of science fiction film. It is here that the diegetic reality world is revealed to Neo and the narrative reality to the viewer. The power of the mind over the body is clear as Neo is rehabilitated from an atrophied state into a functional member of this new reality. The interesting part of his rehabilitation, however, is that it requires plugging him into a computer construct for training and education. It is also in the construct that Neo learns of nature of the Matrix, which initially is overwhelming to the point of a psychosomatic break. The machines become the tools and life support systems in a new way or maybe just in a different way.

The harshness of the real world aboard the Nebuchadnezzar is also evident by the imagery of ragged clothes, worn out technology, and less than desirable food. In many ways and what will become Cipher’s argument, the Matrix may make for a better life than the real. The epistemic difficulty of certainty and knowledge is fully revealed in these scenes. How do we know with certainty what we know and how can we trust our eyes and other senses to support our sense of truth and actuality? Other questions that are begged are what makes for a good life or what is an acceptable price to pay for freedom? Cipher’s meeting with Agent Smith in the restaurant illustrate that freedom itself may be an illusion and defining a good life may have universal attributes. The classic kung fu scene between Neo and Morpheus also begin to reveal that maybe belief, not knowledge, is more important in both worlds because knowledge itself may be untrustworthy. The cryptic message from the Oracle to Neo allows him the power or freedom to believe in something not as big as saving the world, but in the saving of one man (Morpheus). Trinity and Morpheus’ belief in Neo is both challenged and confirmed while their knowledge is also tenuous. Ultimately, Neo finally believes that, “There is no spoon.” in the lobby gun and kung fu sequence to rescue Morpheus and Trinity later from the helicopter. Through belief, the student becomes the master, another interdependent dichotomy illustrated in the film. Lastly, these scenes begin to develop the dichotomy between fate and choice and its relationship between illusion and reality. As Morpheus says, “There is a difference between knowing the path and walking the path”. This makes the viewer question that notion that if a prophecy can come true, was there ever any choice along the way. The dichotomies in these scenes allow for Neo to become the power that that was prophesized by the Oracle, but challenge both his character and the viewer to wonder if he is simply a tool in a larger scheme, out of his control.
The scenes from Neo’s fight with Agent Smith to the end of the film bring the dichotomies I have discussed so far through imagery and narrative structure to illustrate the complementary and symmetrical nature of interdependent opposites. Neo’s disengagement, confusion, and struggle with the Mr. Anderson side of himself are somewhat maintained in his character but these qualities are brought together with their opposites, which allow him to reach his potential, stop the bullets, and bring about Agent Smith’s demise. Jumping into Agent Smith is symbolic in that there is a part of both characters that is fighting for control and freedom. It also begs the question of how much of Smith is now inside of Neo. If Neo is the ultimate human in the film and Agent Smith is the ultimate machine representation, then by the dichotomous structure that the film takes, both need each other as much they are in conflict. Neo and Agent Smith are visually and narratively the largest representation of Yin and Yang in the film - corporate versus individual, good versus evil, and machine versus human all come together through their interaction. This part of the story will be brought to the forefront more in the second and third Matrix films.

The other dichotomy that is developed in a significant way in these last scenes is between Neo and Trinity. This part of the film develops the love story between them and demonstrates its power over the two characters. Indeed, it was Trinity’s words and kiss, just as in a fairy tale, that was essential to Neo’s resurrection after Agent Smith killed him. This is where the message of hope is revealed – love may sometimes conquer all. Both Neo and Trinity are strong in complementary ways. Both are essential to the plot and storyline in complementary ways. Both find and rescue each other in complementary ways. Both need each other in symmetrical and complementary ways. The notion of male and female, whether that is in physical form or of character, make for the last dichotomy in the film, and not by chance. We cannot venture through this world alone because it can be ambiguous and filled with self-doubt. It is only through the connections we make with other that allows us the hope and ability to make it through each day. This is especially true with those that we consider to be our opposite, our match, or our soul mate because we give as much as we receive in an ultimate state of interdependence. The Matrix presents us with a dystopian future, but it ends on a message of hope, both in the context of the love of one and within the context of society as a whole. Maybe one day all of us, like Neo, we will strike that balance between our own inner dichotomies so that we may also fly.

The relationship that humans hold with machines could arguably be considered fragile. The bone that allowed our ancestors the ability to fend off starvation by killing animals for their meat also held the power for murder of other humans, as Stanley Kubrick illustrated in 2001: A Space Odyssey. The more advanced the tool, the greater potential for its misuse. Computers speed up processes that would be nearly impossible for any one mind alone, but its development also paved the way for new kinds of theft and depravity. Dynamite was invented for use in mining, but history clearly shows how much pain and suffering has come with its development through munitions and bombs. Along with that potential for misuse, the development of technology has increased our dependence on it. We have lost much of the body hair that our ancestors possessed because clothing and other forms of technology no longer made that trait a necessity. How long could we survive without the technology of shelter and electricity? Many of us would survive but it unquestionable that many would perish as a result. It is important to keep in mind, however, that our evolution into sentient creatures may not have been possible without our use of technology. John Harris, author of Enhancing Evolution, argues that human evolution stopped around the mid 1800’s. Technology took enough environmental pressure off of us as a species so that natural selection could no longer act. Instead, he argues that deliberative selection replaced the natural in setting the course for a human future. Therefore, if it is true that we are dependent on technology and have an evolutionary relationship with it (even though it may be misused), it follows that the misuse of technology holds with it the potential to harm us or lead us into our own de-evolution. Technology, like the machines in The Matrix, holds within it dichotomies then for good and evil along with happiness and despair.

The Matrix is, in a way, a commentary on the dichotomy of technology. As much as we depend on technology, the development of technology is dependent on us. Should we ever achieve sentience in the machines that we create, the interdependence between the two would change the way we define responsibility and look at ourselves. In the film, the humans in the “real world” suffer many creature comforts that many would call necessities, but they could not survive without the machines such as the Nebuchadnezzar that serve them. The machine world need humans for power and could not survive without us. We need them as much as they need us. Maybe the conflict between man and machine reached the level that it did because the humans of the future unwittingly built their psyches into the machines and ended up seeing themselves like the repetitive images of mirrors within The Matrix. Many times, we fight as much with our psyches as we do with each other so the future people in the film ended up doing what humans do best – fighting with each other. If we endow a machine with all of the qualities we characterize as human, would we not be fighting ourselves because we have put us into them? What else should we expect of a sentient technology that we make in our image? The message and warning of The Matrix is that technology will no doubt continue to be part of our shared future, but hubris and not remembering that technology has a dark side may become our undoing. Remember that the person that goes higher up a ladder will be able see farther than those below, but the higher one goes up, the harder and more lethal the fall.

To conclude, I will briefly discuss the sublime nature of reality surrounding the story of The Matrix. The epistemological difficulty of reality has been debated since the birth of philosophy. Rene Descartes took the argument to extremes to ultimately argue for the existence of God and provide a method for practicing science. He brought the idea down to one certainty with the cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am). The idea of confusing reality due to being plugged into a machine or in a dream state is not original then to the Wachowski brothers. It is interesting that the development of technology allowed the concept of an ambiguous reality to be conveyed in such a sublime way. In other words, without powerful computers and other technology to generate expansive special effects, The Matrix could not be made, which would not provide us the warning against technology. The image of Neo overlooking the towers of humans dreaming away existence is simultaneously beautiful, terrible, and beyond comprehension – the very epitome of the sublime. Agent Smith also commented on the nature of the Matrix as he is torturing Morpheus, the view from the top offices overlooking the expanse of the Matrix to the artificial horizon. As much as the Matrix represents slavery, it is from a sensory point of view, indistinguishable for anyone except Neo. But what if it was true? What if you, the reader of this paper, did not exist in the way that you think you do? That would be sublime as well because there is just as much beauty, terror, and that which is beyond comprehension in this reality as any other imagined reality so even if you did not live in the desert of the real, I argue that it would not matter. Trinity says to Neo on their way to see the Oracle that the Matrix cannot tell you who you are. Meaning, purpose, and perspective ultimately lie within each of us, regardless of reality. The truth of what our senses tell us is not important in the grand scheme of things. Reality or more precisely the idea of reality provides us the challenges to find the balance within and what we do with the cards we are dealt. All of these ideas may have philosophical implications in regards to truth but at the end of the day, we must function within the world that we live. Maybe then truth, like reality, is also sublime.

Evolution, Technology, and the Sublime: An Analysis of Kubrick's "2001: A Space Odyssey"

2008-12-04T13:28:00.003-07:00

Stanley Kubrick’s release of 2001: A Space Odyssey in the spring of 1968 marked a pivotal moment in filmmaking history. Whether referring to the stark realism of space travel in contrast to such films as Destination Moon (1950) or the deafening quiet and lack of dialogue reminiscent of the silent film era, 2001 was and remains to this day unique. Many argue, including co-screenwriter Arthur C. Clarke, that the story is an expansive 4 million year history of human evolution through intelligent, alien means. I will argue that through Kubrick’s use of music and imagery of the sublime, the film is indeed about human evolution, but more precisely, it concerns the evolution of the human relationship with technology. I will show how the film's depiction of technology makes a commentary that it is not simply a tool of human masters to achieve ends otherwise impossible to our physical selves, but that it actually informs and defines identity and the human condition. As such, human evolution and the human condition are dependent upon technology and the ensuing culture that technology allows, blurring the distinction between master and servant. I will describe the visual and musical aspects of the sublime from the pre-film overture through “Jupiter Mission: 18 Months Later” as support. Lastly, I will briefly discuss a possible implication and future of the human relationship with technology.

Kubrick begins to set the tone of 2001 before the MGM logo even appears by playing a three-minute musical overture of Ligeti’s “Atmospheres” against a blank screen. The eerie quality of the music puts the audience in an expectant mood, which, after the brief appearance of the movie logo and before the opening credits, is delivered by a stunning image of the sunrise over the planet Earth. The imagery immediately places the viewer and that of mankind within an intended perspective – humans as a small, almost insignificant entity in an immense, awe-inspiring universe. Richard Strauss’ grand “Also Sprach Zarathustra” is playing forcefully, further adding to the mood and affect of the sublime. The planetary alignment is representative of the sublime in its grandeur, beauty, and vastness but more importantly, it speaks to the meaning of this celestial configuration in human history. The religious importance of lunar and solar eclipses throughout the history of civilization is undeniable. The black screen of the overture coupled with the sunrise over Earth scene could be interpreted to be symbolic of the religious in that many creation stories start with absence of light and nothingness to a sudden birth of light and form. The creation of the ape-man in “The Dawn of Man” is left open to speculation but this opening sequence sets the stage for the birth of man within the universe, not just within a localized region of our planet.

“The Dawn of Man” opens with wide still-shots of what appears to be the African savannah. It is desolate, vast, and immensely quiet except for the sounds of crickets and wind. This imagery, lack of music, and minimal sounds are used by Kubrick to convey the state from which our ancestors lived – sublimely beautiful and terrible. It is clear from the first images of the ape-men that their nature is different from conventional thought of innate human aggressiveness. They are weak, non-threatening, and starving to death. They forage for plants in the dust alongside obviously plump tapirs and are preyed upon by a leopard from a position above the framing of the shot. The viewer sees sun-bleached humanoid bones strewn about also as an indication that even the basics of what we would deem civilization has not yet been established. The point of this prelude to the monolith is that the ape-men are on the brink of extinction and they do not have the intelligence or means to do anything about it. This is exacerbated by the nighttime scene of fright that seems to be evident on the strained faces of all of the ape-men.

Dawn, however, brings something different to both the ape-men and the audience. It begins with light upon their sleeping faces, the waking of one of their number, and the rising music of Ligeti’s “Requiem”. Before we see the monolith, Kubrick creates another expectant mood of the sublime or, arguably, the religious. When the audience finally sees the monolith, it is with the same curiosity and wonder as the ape-men exhibit, and this is deliberate. The monolith is itself an image of the sublime in its perfection and mystery. It further conveys the notion of the sublime and, again arguably, the “birth” of man when the alignment of the Sun and Moon rise over the rectangular form. Whether divine or alien, the monolith seems to give our ancestors the push they need to survive through the discovery of tools. Primitive in rock and bone, our evolution to sentience is dependent on what will later become technology. The ape-men no longer starve replacing the leopard on the top perch of the food chain. What is troublesome and poignant, however, is the immediate association with appears to be the first murder at the waterhole. A double-edged sword perhaps, but certainly an essential dependence on technology and factor in the evolution if our species has been born.

The image of a bone thrown into the air transposed into a satellite, a leap of 4 million years into the future, is at once memorable and purposeful signifying that maybe mankind has become more sophisticated with the use of tools but not with issues related to what is necessary to take another leap in evolution. Johann Strauss’ “Blue Danube” further conveys the idea of sophistication and evolution as well as once again setting a sublime mood associated with the beauty and vastness of space. It is beyond the scope of this essay to explore possible interpretations of Kubrick’s vision of what our next step in our evolution might look like in “Jupiter and Beyond the Infinite”, but I argue it must involve elimination or, at very least, a minimization of the double-edge nature or dark side of the interdependent relationship we hold with technology. In “TMA-1”, the double-edge nature of technology is evident in the fragility and dependence of not only the physical human self throughout Heywood Floyd’s journey to the Moon, but with the interaction with the Soviet scientists and deception imposed by the discovery of the second monolith as well. It is double-edged or a dark side because, just as our ape-men ancestors, we still rely on technology for life yet use it not to unify but to divide. Most notions of an evolutionary next step involve a move to a more ideal, peaceful, and unified humanity. It is possible that this step will only be achieved by a true mastery of technology coupled with a lack of dependence, which I will further explore next.

In “TMA 1”, we start to see a similarity between man and machine. First, the clothing and emotion are sterile just as the space technology of 4 million years of evolution is sterile. Secondly, there is a mundane quality to the action (or lack thereof) of the characters including Heywood Floyd and the flight personnel. The technology may not be mundane, even by today’s standards, but the acceptance of the technology seems to be associated with quiet boredom or the mundane. From eating liquid food from an enclosed tray to using a gravity-free toilet, the dependence on technology does not seem to be on a conscious level of awareness. When the shuttle lands on the Moon and is lowered into the docking bay, the shuttle itself looks like a human head. Further the bay itself is lit with red light, which gives the impression of womb, more symbolism Kubrick uses to bring together the idea of human evolution and technology. The act ends with the approach of Heywood Floyd and company to the second monolith. Again, there is the same reverence, curiosity, and awesome potential meaning associated with Kubrick’s filming of this scene in a similar way as the ape-men scene with the first monolith. Ligeti’s “Requiem” is again playing communicate both the similarity to our ancestors and the sublime nature of the spatio-temporal moment in history. As before, the imagery of the Earth, Moon, and Sun is highlighted with the monolith, which is abruptly disrupted by the radio interference generated presumably from within.

The acceptance of and dependence on technology sets the stage for next act, “Jupiter Mission: 18 Months Later”. Again, boredom and the mundane seem to be what Kubrick is trying to convey about the reality of space flight. The carousel and the introduction of HAL are a constant reminder for the audience of the dependence Bowman and Poole, indeed humanity, have with technology. The cryogenic chambers with seemingly dead bodies within bring this notion clearly into focus. The similarity between man and machine is also developed further through the seemingly robotic apathy of Bowman and Poole along with certain characteristics of HAL. He suffers from hubris and seemingly human emotion but it is interesting that his speech is maintained at a monotone level from the beginning of the scene through his destruction. It is the emphasis of similarity between man and technology that highlights the interdependence of the two. The tool cannot be without man while man cannot be without the tool. Mankind still wins out in this scene because Bowman is able to achieve what HAL could not - murder. It is also seems clear that since HAL is one of the first of his kind that this might not always be the case unless the construct is changed concerning the interaction and relationship between mankind and technology.

The construct Kubrick portrays through imagery and music of the Jupiter Mission along with the relationship between HAL and the crew of Discovery is at the heart of my thesis – the story of human evolution is inextricably linked with the evolution of technology. Further, technology informs us and defines certain aspects of identity through what is culturally possible with technology. In the case of 2001, the similarity between man and machine are almost necessary for the rigors of space travel. At the same time, it is doubtful that the encompassing technology of HAL and Discovery do not shape the identity of Bowman and Poole. The simulacra that HAL represents, is not only evidence of how far evolution has taken us but what we may become. The more we advance technologically, the more risk we take in changing the human condition that is itself shaped by the technology we create through the our advancement. This is not so hard to believe when we look at cell-phone technology and how it has transformed how we communicate and how we relate to each other. What is even more startling is the relatively short time these cultural changes have taken place. Text messaging has streamlined the number of words necessary to relay a message to someone we may never actually physically have contact with. How is this so different from the design of the cell-phone technology we created to allow us to do that in the first place? We have shaped the technology as much as technology has shaped us.

2001: A Space Odyssey, is both a sublimely beautiful and cautionary at the same time. Like the relationship humans have with technology, the tale carries with it throughout the film the thread of interdependence, danger, and identity in exploring one possible explanation for our evolution. The monolith with its coldly perfect form may be part of our past as well as our future in ways that Kubrick never intended. In other words, maybe technology gave birth to us so we could give birth to more technology, but maybe we are the monolith and our destiny is to merge with technology, to become cold and perfect. If we continually strive to advance and perfect technology and technology shapes who we are in relation to the universe, it is logical and inevitable that humans are headed down the same path to advancement and perfection. The question then is: will we reach that destination or, like the creation of HAL, will we create our own demise? One thing is for certain, our relationship with technology will remain tenuous until we can master ourselves and maybe that was the real message that Kubrick was trying to convey. Only with this mastery of ourselves can we shape advancing technology that will in turn shape an ultimate destination, not a demise.

Daniels' "Why Not The Best?"

2008-10-07T19:55:00.007-06:00

Daniels, Norman (2000). “Why Not the Best" in Buchanan, Allen et al. eds, From Chance to Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 156-203.

This chapter seeks to answer the question why parents should or should not seek the best – even through genetics - for their children. Parents are generally regarded as having permission and, some say, obligation to produce the “best" children possible. This includes development through nutrition, exercises, sports, and other investments to produce the best prudential or moral agents possible. The poor may struggle just to have their children survive and this may be the best they can do or expect of the child. We recognize that best as perceived by society may not constrain many religion’s pursuit of what they feel is best for their children. Neglect and abuse aside, interference is viewed as a fundamental interference to a parent’s conception of a good life. Environmental pursuits seem to be different from genetic because it is viewed as working within the natural capabilities of the child. This modifies the phenotype of the child and there is no agreed upon "best" as to what this should look like. Daniels rejects genetic determinism and claims that it is components of the phenotype that is central to our conception of self, not genotype. Because we leave so much room for environmental effects, this should undercut any idea of genetic determinism. Are there adequate or defensible standards as to what makes a child “best”? Who is allowed to make such decisions under what criteria?

Three positions supporting attempts to perfect children through genetic intervention:
1. Strongest – it is morally required of parents or others to seek to produce the best children possible.
2. Weaker – it is morally good for parents to use a variety of mean, including genetic interventions, to attempt to produce the best children possible, i.e., we attempt to benefit the child for the child’s sake.
3. Weakest – within the legitimate authority of parents in having and raising their children to use at least some forms of genetic interventions in seeking to improve their children.
Is the use of genetic intervention morally good or desirable, other things being equal, in the same way as environmental interventions? Even if some genetic intervention is on balance undesirable, is it morally permissible because of a parent’s legitimate authority over their children? The history of eugenics should give us caution when answering these questions but Daniels notes that prejudice and stereotyping is just as much of a problem for environmental interventions as it could be for genetic.

If we are to say that a parent tries to produce the best child possible, we must reasonably expect the child to share the value and criteria of best means. The problem is that childrearing shapes the values and evaluative standards that shape their outlook on their life and other standards so, in a sense, a child is tainted by the very practices in question. Daniels argues that any attempt to justify an endorsement of steps that produces the effects on the child must include the notion that the child later has the independent capacity to evaluate those steps. The problem here is that the notion of choosing your own character is incoherent when one considers that one must have character and values before one can evaluate character and values. In this respect, this criterion is insufficient to justify a child’s character. Disability is brought up again and he notes that different groups have advocated that their disability allows for a flourishing of other abilities so, with accommodations, this removes much of the disadvantages the disability confers. I think this is problematic in the same way a child's upbringing shapes the perspective of value as both a means and an end to that upbringing. Daniels further notes that there is not systematic contrast between harms and benefits that is objective, i.e., a harm to my life and child may be a benefit to yours. The idea of normal species functioning, Daniels argues, provides a prima facie case for elimination or benefit from genetic intervention in the treatment of disease. This is problematic, however, because it begs the question of who determines the medical boundary line. The authors seem to reject the idea of a parent’s neutrality in the use of genetic intervention and claim that it may lead only to particular or idiosyncratic conception of what the parent’s idea is of a good life.

Daniels then appeals to Feinberg (1980) to explore the case of a child’s right to an open future. I'll make only a few comments as I have studied this concept before in bioethics. He does feel that right to an open future is compatible to genetic intervention in the same way environmental intervention is compatible but he does question how much this has the possibility of limiting those options. If environmental interventions affect evaluative prospects of a future child and genetic interventions have the possibility of doing the same, is the idea of a right to an open future viable considering that autonomy is affected one way or the other? In other words, how much does a parent affect adaptive capacity? A child has moral and legal rights but we also know that even society limits the scope of these rights because they are not in a position, due to development, to make certain moral choices on their own. Daniels next goes into what role the state should play in genetic intervention, if any, of a child. He cautions that a society’s concern does rule out a perspective of what is best for the society, rather than for the individual. I think this disturbs them that eugenic history may repeat itself if society had too much power in this respect. He does think that it may be less problematic in a liberal democracy if it concerning all-purpose traits such as resistance to tooth decay. He argues that a society’s neutrality must be more stringent than a parent's concerning any type of intervention.

Daniels then appeals to Rawls’ notion that reasonable people, despite their own comprehensive moral views and conceptions of a good life, must incorporate within their views a view that others may reasonable disagree about such matters. As such, parents must aim to create children with the intellectual and emotional capacity to do the same, even if that means that child disagrees with the parent. This may be problematic for both environmental and genetic intervention because how can we know the future state or evaluative position of a child that we are responsible for developing?

Daniels' "Positive and Negative Genetic Interventions"

2008-10-07T19:53:00.003-06:00

Daniels, Norman (2000). “Positive and Negative Genetic Interventions" in Buchanan, Allen et al. eds, From Chance to Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 104-155.

Chapter 4 is primarily authored by Daniels but the preface also states that Allen Buchanan, Dan Brock, and Daniel Wilker should be credited as well. The chapter starts off with a brief history of eugenics including the distinction between positive and negative eugenics. The point is to show that there may be a moral distinction between practices that seek to achieve the same goal. The idea of normalcy is brought up to note that an idealized or perfectionist view of superior or normal traits may mean that we know to be normal today may be defective in the future. He concludes this section by pointing out that we are appalled by the bad science of the past. He is implicitly cautioning against science functioning out of control in the future.

The next section starts with a presumption that negative genetic interventions (abortion, screening, somatic/germline cell replacement) are mostly viewed as being permissible while positive genetic intervention (enhancement) is at least problematic and possibly morally impermissible. It is important to note that this chapter tends to focus on public policy as it relates to medical intervention by the state or insurance so it is unlike the focus Harris has on the individual. In fact, he does not even mention whether an individual has a right or the freedom to enhance certain traits. He does delve into social justice issues, which may actually indirectly state his position. He does make a distinction between the eugenics movement of the past and current interest in somatic or germline therapy by noting that we are less concerned about population gene pools and more about individual health. He also notes that the disability movement has increased awareness and led to more acceptance of diversity than in the past. Lastly, whereas negative eugenics was not generally viewed as a moral distinction, it very much is so today, especially when so many are sensitive and frightened that history may repeat itself.

The “brute luck view” or natural lottery that Scanlon coined drives the quest for the right moral approach to the notion of equal opportunity and its implications to health care. The treatment/enhancement distinction is closely related to the idea of medical necessity or a medical boundary line. From a public policy or insurance perspective, it has more to do with etiology than suffering because there are many cases of suffering (mostly psychological) that may not affect equal opportunity. Impairment seems to work better from the insurance view than unhappiness, preferences, or possibly even bad coping behavior. The treatment/enhancement line comes from the idea that it has a disease component that we are not responsible for and an objectively specifiable burden of harm. It must be typical of the human condition and not because someone has a bad attitude. This is problematic in certain cases that have different causal explanations but similar effects on impairment. He asks whether the Aristotelian idea of justice demands that we treat cases like this similarly. This too is problematic as he shows between the case of being dull and having a learning disability. We treat one and not the other (in a narrow sense) even though the starting position may have been the same. This raises the difficulty of making the treatment/enhancement line more arbitrary and of less value. There is also the possibility that the line may be value laden by social constructs, which therefore creates problems with postulating a moral boundary.

The treatment/enhancement line is not the same as the obligatory/nonobligatory line because resources may not be able to meet the needs of all impairments. It is also not the same because society recognizes that we may have certain moral and legal obligations to offer medical services without impairment. Daniels/Buchanan et al. claim that their primary justification for considering a health care service as obligatory by society is for the reasonable effective treatment of disease and impairment. They claim that the line between this and normal functioning is relatively objective and nonevaluative provided by biomedical science. I argue that objectivity is problematic because biomedical understanding/technology changes everyday along with societal values that struggle to keep up. They also claim that the normal functioning line also allows people to remain competitive in all aspects of social life, a point that they will relate to justice. This lead to an equality of opportunity that they argue is an obligation of society to protect. Some diseases/impairments will be more important than others to maintain this “normal range of opportunities”. It is here that they start to appeal to Rawls. They identify two other “pulls” as it relates to egalitarian concerns: to equalize of at least reduce the disadvantages that result from less than equal opportunities regardless of impairment/disease; and to remove the source of unhappiness from which we suffer through no fault of our own.

Daniels view of the normal functioning model rests on Rawlsian view of equality of opportunity. As it relates to health care, it keeps people as close as possible to normal function as possible as a way to create a just, egalitarian society. Liberty must come into the picture but may conflict with resources and efficiency of distributing health care. The equal capabilities model formulated by Sen argues that the object of our egalitarian concerns is equality in what can do or be. We achieve equality of opportunity when our capability sets are equal. Daniels thinks this might be problematic because a theory of justice requires integrating concerns for equality with that of liberty and efficiency, which the equality of opportunity model allows while maintaining equality of capabilities. Incommensurability is mentioned as a problem as well because different people may rank different sets based on different conceptions of a good life. Due to this, no baseline can be established, which may actually push for a more expansive model of medical intervention.

The equal opportunity welfare model says that we have a claim to others assistance whenever we are worse off than they are through no fault or choice of our own. Only if the same expected payoff in preference satisfaction can be achieved, can this model be obtained. Normal capacity for revising our goals, values, and preferences is more of an issue than explicit choice. They then continue to argue that the normal function model makes for better public policy. Further, they claim that support may wane for mental health interventions if reasonable efforts are not made to modify someone’s attitudes or behaviors through environmental means. The same goes for physical genetic enhancement as it relates to genetic enhancement. I do not see how public opinion or support should effect the question of justice and morality, especially as it relates to matters of freedom and health care. In addition, wouldn’t resources be different for enhancement technology than other types of technology? Even if the resources were the same, we would recognize utility of resources for need first, want second. The case that comes to mind is breast enhancement for a mastectomy victim versus the stripper. I think justice would dictate that the mastectomy victim has preference but if the resource was available, why shouldn’t the stripper be allowed to purchase the enhancement. Lack of resources creates a moral boundary on who gets the resource, not a boundary line on the procedure itself.

They conclude by claiming that the point behind appealing to a natural baseline is that it provides a good basis for public action, despite disagreements of value. They claim the natural baseline has not metaphysical importance but is a focal point of convergence to what we owe each other by way of medical assistance or health care. The treatment/enhancement line is useful but they do not expect a lot from it. Doesn’t that imply that maybe it is not the best line to use? They do note that it does not necessarily match up with the permissible/impermissible line. Many enhancements, they claim, would cause serious problems plus there may be other concerns so a moral flag should always be raised concerning questions of enhancement. Public goods and other coordination problems arise when all parents pursue a course intended to be best for the offspring. What parent doesn’t that is within the set of “good” parents? They also believe that enhancement would give a positional advantage and that the values of the child may be in conflict with the values of the offspring.

Harris' "Good and Bad Uses of Technology"

2008-10-07T18:07:00.002-06:00

Harris, John (2007). “Good and Bad Uses of Technology" in Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 123-142.

Harris argues against Leon Kass and Jurgen Habermas whom he believes express a strong opposition to enhancement. Kass argues that the following objections to enhancements fail:
• Safety is not any more a concern for enhancement technology than it does for nonenhancement technology. Harris agrees.
• The access to enhancement technology as it relates to justice and fairness does not stand; only the goodness or badness of the enhancement matters. Harris agrees.
• Parental control over the genotype would add to existing social instruments of parental control and of risks of despotic rule. Harris disagrees and argues that neither genotype nor parental wishes have significant impact on autonomy.
Parents want their children to experience a decent, civilized, and independent life but they will always also want willful control of the process because they think they know best. The claim that attempts to alter our nature through biotechnology is different than through medicine, environment, and education seems wholly implausible on this account. If it is a parents right to alter a child’s nature then the best, most reliable, efficient, and economical method of doing so should be a freedom afforded the parent.

In he next section, Harris addresses Kass’ concerns for cloning and notes that sexual reproduction is akin to roulette and that, if cloning technology was viable, there is less risk than to clone than through sex because the cloner is already a tried and tested product. Since experiences affect physical structures in the brain, there is little chance that a clonee would be exactly like a cloner just as one identical twin is not exactly like the other. Harris rejects pure genetic determinism in favor of free will, choice, and self-development in spite of enhancement. He notes that enhanced powers would not likely be expresses exactly the same way in all individual because on non-genetic factors so there will still be differences between people. We may raise the floor, but the ceiling would be raised as well viz. he rejects the idea that enhancement would create conformity.

Harris then attacks Kass’ critique of enhancement by first noting that it is not always the case that people feel repulsed by the idea of enhancement. Even if they do, it is not a morally relevant feature just as we do not always view it as a moral difficulty when both rich and poor live in the same world. It does not follow that if there is something good or dignified about a natural process that a synthetic modification or replacement is either bad or even of less value. Harris argues that it may actually be better than the natural process because of its relief of human suffering. He then backs to the idea that choice may still mean hard work but acknowledges that making the right choice may be more difficult in the future but that does not mean we should eliminate the choice. He attacks Kass again and comes back to the idea that enhancement, in many forms is already around us so to say that enhancement is somehow different and off-limits is puritanical. Harris obviously rejects the argument from design or God but only claims to want the freedom for individuals to choose for themselves and not have restrictions affect laws come from a religious convictions. In other words, do for your child what you think is best, I will do for mine what I think is best. I think this may have value in conjunction with Glover’s idea of the European model as government as a filter, not a stopper. He argues that Kass’ argument for limitation based on a puritanical and “stunted” view of life shackles the human spirit within the confines of his own imagination and desires. Lastly, he notes that enhancement will only be able to go so far and that experience will still have value viz. there will never be a pill that either induces or removes grief.

Harris then moves to Jurgen Habermas who wrote The Future of Human Nature (2003). Habermas argues against any type of eugenic control and calls enhancement on children human bondage. Further, he claims that it is inegalitarian and destroys future generation’s right to autonomy. Harris comes back with the idea that if we restricted this and restricted that for what a parent can and cannot do, few children would live to be adults. Our parents are instrumental in creating pathways in the brain and, hence, functioning of our minds. This is true with or without enhancement. This goes against the idea that we would be taking autonomy away from our children in some sort of despotic sense. As such, this does not create an unfair social justice of inegalitarianism. Harris concludes by arguing that enhancement would no more result in a loss of personal identity for a future child than a “natural” child born today would. If that child did claim such a loss of identity as the result of enhancement, Harris would remind them that the parents tried to give them best chance at a good life that was available and maybe they should pull themselves together and recognize that they are autonomous beings none the less. The responsibility for how children turn out will always be on the shoulders of parents in so far that they had a choice to do or not to do. To take away handicap or not take away, to enhance or not to enhance; they have to do their best.

Harris' "Perfection and the Blue Guitar"

2008-10-05T22:10:00.001-06:00

Harris, John (2007). “Perfection and the Blue Guitar" in Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 109-122.

Harris primarily takes up against Michael Sandel in this chapter. Sandel’s argument is along the same lines that others have argued, namely that enhancement is beyond us in a way that alters our essential nature and humanity. Harris calls this a conservative position and describes this as being a position the expresses suspicion to change, emphasize the virtue of things the way they are and acceptance of those things. He again points out that human history could be described by enhancement in all fields of human endeavor I mentioned in a previous post. He also notes that enhancement is part of the evolutionary process. I will not detail Sandel’s arguments that Harris quotes at length, only Harris responses as we will probably review Sandel’s work in greater depth later.

Harris does respond to Sandel first by claiming that it is not rational to think that effortful superiority is better than effortless. He uses the sports analogy to compare this idea. Was Pete Rose (the hard worker) better than Joe DiMaggio (the graceful, gifted player)? Harris argues that both had to train to develop what talents they were born with and that they were ultimately judged as baseball players by their achievements. Excellence is the result of doing, not just having. It requires authentic human agency with effort and non-effort. Even the steroid fueled behemoth must work at it and to think that it is easy, is missing the idea of what excellence is or should mean. Now Harris is not arguing for enhancement in this way, he is only arguing against Sandel that there is something inherently less to be valued in achievement from effortlessness compared to more effort.

Harris argues that it is true that an enhanced sense of human agency coupled with increased powers to influence the future and the world may transform our understanding of the moral landscape. A poignant point he makes is that with this technology, we become responsible for our inaction as well as for what actions we do take. Does a child a legitimate claim to harm if a parent fails to act on a disability when that choice was available? Harris would say yes. It is clear that Sandel is a theist so it is not surprising that Harris uses the word “destiny” in regards to the notion of human agency. Sandel also seems to appeal to Rawls in that we should not be entitles to a full measure of the bounty they reap on society compared to those with less gifts. Harris makes the interesting move of arguing that enhancement is actually a way of redistributing gifts before society has to redistribute resources to equalize for the sake of social justice. As Harris says, “enhancement provides more to redistribute and less need for redistribution” (p. 120). Ultimately, Harris wonders whether people who choose to enhance as true masters of their destinies or as the best judges for what they deem best for their children will be able to if arguments like Sandel’s are used to restrict freedom and liberty. This is a bigger question outside the scope of our project, but if God is the presupposition, where is the medical boundary line or is there one?

Harris' "Disability and Super-Ability"

2008-10-05T20:02:00.001-06:00

Harris, John (2007). “Disability and Super-Ability" in Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 86-108.

Harris argues that it is not wrong to prefer to produce or even prefer to be a nondisabled individual rather than a disabled one. He argues that all people are equal, have the same moral worth, and that it is wrong to discriminate against disabled people, but that it is fallacious to assume that to prefer to have a child without disability is an affront the existence of an existing disabled person. Any argument, then, that opposes human enhancement on these grounds does so on a fallacious sense of fear that it has a negative objective cost to a disabled community. He grants that there may be a subjective cost to a disabled person for others choosing children unlike them but that is irrational. Public policy or reproductive choice should not be based on the subjective, irrational thoughts of some individuals when the consequences of inaction does not promote a bettering of lives or decrease in suffering. It is interesting that he agrees that the “disability question” is the most plausible argument against legitimate attempts to make better people.

Harris states, “… it is better that a child be born without disability but not that a nondisabled child is better than a disabled child” (p. 89). He makes an interesting distinction between reason and justification. An in vitro patient may have a reason for not selecting a disabled embryo but the justification would be in terms of entitlement to decline to implant at all, i.e., choice. He agrees that the idea of selecting a nondisabled embryo over a disabled one is based on the notion that disability is disabling and therefore undesirable from the point of view of choice. A disabled person may still have a life worth living and he argues that it is better to have a child with disabilities (unless there is a component of suffering involved) than no child at all. If we have the choice of an embryo, however, we should choose a nondisabled over disabled because of the idea of a better life. He does not define disability in terms of any conception of normalcy nor does he think it depends on a prediction of the subject of the condition will feel. It is simply a matter of best functioning for the best life. Normalcy is a vague term that is constantly changing due to advancing medical and other technologies.

Our parent’s DNA goes into our DNA makeup so any genetic “harm” is causally related to them but only morally so if they are aware that they were likely to transmit those harms or if they were aware that a procedure or other event could have made a better child. Again, to prefer to remove disability is not the same as preferring nondisabled persons over disabled. In this respect, it is not an existential preference. He then discusses his view on abortion, which is pro-Choice and may not be relevant to our project as to why. This will be a good discussion point with Jim. He does appeal to Jonathan Glover and argues that he does not think his (Harris) view provides an ugly attitude towards people with disability. I’m not sure that Harris’ view is strong enough to resist this claim because it does fall into a regress that leads to the extinction of certain types of societies, i.e., deaf, paraplegic, etc. There may be different types of disability that need to be teased apart. Ridding the world of cancer does not mean lack respect for people with cancer but there does seem to be something different concerning deaf culture when many in that culture claim that they have no desire to hear. Is their desire delusional or without a point of reference or is their claim based on something that hearing individuals cannot comprehend such as an increased capacity for touch and the beauty that comes along with it? Harris comes back the same point repeatedly: we have reasons to start out in life with any unnecessary disadvantages, however, slight.

He concludes by addressing what he calls the “Beethoven fallacy”. To choose not to have a child with inherited syphilis is not to say that the world would be better off without Beethoven. Modern notions of choice and intervention may not affect the “who” is born in the same way that it may not affect who I am if my parents were frisky in November versus December. There is more choices other than abortion that affect whether we ever to be. The argument for potentiality can only go so far. He does not address the “super-ability” that I was looking forward to reading but it is a natural extension from disability to super-ability if one accepts the claim that line between treatment and enhancement is at minimum blurry and sometimes the same.

Harris' "What Enhancements Are and Why They Matter"

2008-10-05T17:27:00.003-06:00

Harris, John (2007). “What Enhancements Are and Why They Matter" in Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 36-58.

Harris attempts to argue that the overwhelming moral imperative for both therapy and enhancement is to prevent harm and confer benefit. He suggests that it is unimportant whether the protection of benefit conferred is classified as enhancement or improvement, protection or therapy. He rejects the notion that enhancements can be defined relative to normalcy or to normal species functioning. It is in this chapter that he addresses objections made in terms of motivation or objectives to be achieved along with tests that enhancements have to meet, primarily by Daniels and Buchanan et al. in From Chance to Choice. It is interesting that he finds the question surrounding the debate of change in human nature or evolution ethically uninteresting. Self-evolution, post-humanism, transhumanism, or the sciences of new breeds are not moral issues to Harris.

He starts by claiming that the abnormality of a characteristic relative to other humans does not affect its value unless the abnormality itself has other consequences such as the ostracizing that may take place because of green skin. If, however, the green skin turned into a benefit, then not even the ostracizing would decrease its value. He sees no problem with the creation of new species or a “different” human line if that meant a bettering of life because our current existence is due to a change that bettered us in the past creating our current form of human.

Harris points out that Daniels human subject research would rule out most enhancements while Buchanan et al. suggests that the lack equal opportunity related to enhancement technology would be the biggest moral drawback to enhancement technology. Harris seems to be attacking their idea of normalcy and the medical boundary line. I will be reviewing Daniels and Buchanan et al. later so I will not go into their arguments as much as his responses. Harris argues that the fact that we cannot cure everything has never been an argument for failing to cure something, especially when it is something that causes pain, misery, or premature death. Most of what passes for therapy is an enhancement for the individual relative to a state prior to therapy so the therapy-enhancement line is problematic. The moral imperative comes from the value of minimizing harm, not on conceptions or normality. He also argues that we should strive for equality of opportunity but that it is not the necessary moral condition for treatment or enhancement. Intervening on the natural lottery to simply promote equality of opportunity or ability to compete is not sufficient. Harris also does not think that the notion of normal species functioning or successful social cooperation are key ideas that license interference in the natural lottery as well because many things like aging and disease are part of normal species functioning. It would not be immoral to start vaccinating for HIV/AIDS or cancer even if was initially only available in scarcity. We save lives not to secure equal opportunity or secure access to “normal competition”. We save lives, postpone death, and enhance human functioning to better lives … no further moral justification is needed.

Harris argues against Daniels’ imperative not go above the medical boundary line viz. “normal claiming that his definition is too narrow and does not include benefit to society and population. He argues that we should take the viewpoint of possible functioning, not normal functioning because “normal” is problematic. For Harris, the moral imperative is safety and the duty to compare risks with benefits not on equality of opportunity, not on an ambiguous concept of normality, but rather on the probability of magnitude and probability that the proposed treatment or enhancement saves lives, postpones death, and decreases suffering. Save lives now with a perspective towards justice and equality along the way. The distinction between treatment and enhancement becomes more a matter of semantics, not morality. He concludes with a brief commentary on the nature of the human condition. He seems to think that to object to enhancement based on the grounds that it changes human nature or the human condition does not take into consideration where we have come as a species and how enhancement is everywhere. If we cured heart disease and cancer, we would change human nature and the human condition, which may not be a bad thing.

Harman's "Moral Relativism"

2008-10-04T11:02:00.001-06:00

In Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, Gilbert Harman argues that the truth conditions of moral judgments are always relative to a choice of moral framework. Objections to moral relativistic theories, such as Harman’s, include the claim that it falls into moral nihilism – the idea that morality does not exist and therefore, moral statements have no truth-value. Although Harman explicitly rejects moral nihilism, I will show how he withstands the charge by holding to moral skepticism – the idea that it is not possible to discover the truth-value of any moral statement, but that moral truth may exist. I will first discuss Harman’s claims that morality is a type of bargaining similar to the convention of law and show how this withstands the charge of moral nihilism. Secondly, I will explain how Harman argues that universal features of morality may exist and show how this may be compatible with Harman’s argument. I will then show how this withstands both moral nihilism and moral objectivity - the position that certain acts are objectively right or wrong, independent of human opinion. Lastly, I will argue that moral skeptics, such as Harman, hold an epistemological position, distinct from the metaphysical positions of nihilism and objectivism.

I will begin with a review of Harman’s argument, which starts with a comparison of morality to Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. Just as an object’s mass and motion are relative to a spatio-temporal framework, the truth conditions of a moral statement are relative to a context and moral framework. For example, a passenger on an airplane has a different perception of his or her motion and velocity compared to someone from the ground perceiving the plane in flight. Similarly, the truth condition for Person X for an action is dependent on the context and the moral framework of Person X, which may be different for Person Y. It does not make sense to say that the mass of object P is privileged at a particular coordinate in space at a particular velocity over its mass at another. Likewise, Harman argues that it does not make sense that a moral truth condition is privileged in a particular context within one moral framework over another. In other words, as Harman says, “… no moral framework is objectively privileged as the one true morality.” Next, I will show Harman uses social conventions and a moral skeptic position to reach his conclusion.

Harman is both a moral conventionalist and a moral skeptic. As he states, “…even the most basic aspects of morality are conventional in something like the way in which law is conventional.” He claims that law is also completely conventional but argues that moral conventions are less determinate. This may be due to the smaller, more numerous groups associated with moral conventions such as within families, neighborhoods, and friends. There may even be different moral conventions when one is alone and not in a group. He does say that morality comes about because of social bargaining, much like law. As such, it is more a matter of coming to agreement on the right answer concerning a moral or legal issue versus the recognition of an objective truth. This does not provide support against a claim of nihilism but his explicit rejection of nihilism and his claim that “there are universal truths about moralities just as there are universal truths about spatio temporal frameworks” does support a position of moral skepticism. The following is a review of the premises of his argument:
1. Morality is completely conventional.
2. Truth conditions of moral judgments are made within a context specific framework.
3. Moral skepticism underlies relative moral judgments and can continue to play a serious role in moral thinking.
4. No moral framework is objectively privileged as the one true morality.

Taken together, this entails his conclusion that moral right and wrong are always relative to a choice of moral framework. Next, I will focus on the bargaining or conventional aspect of his argument to further support that idea that it does not fall into moral nihilism.

Bargaining refers to the process of moral decision-making. If the truth condition of a moral action cannot be reached through rational means, then there still may be value in reaching a decision, which may only come about through bargaining. Harman argues that people care about what they value, which indicates that people care about their moral framework in making decisions. Caring points to what Harman calls an affective attitude, which includes desire, fear, and hope, while cognitive attitudes refer to belief, perception, and doubt. Cognitive and affective attitudes may coincide or conflict in an individual or among individuals concerning moral decisions. Moral relativism may help explain why there are conflicts between people or within us; however, it does not tell us why it is important resolve these moral disagreements. It is important to resolve moral disagreements because we need to know what to do in certain situations. In other words, as Harman states, “moral differences involve conflicts in affective attitude that are resolved only if agreement is reached on what to do.” For example, many disagree on the morality of abortion, which requires an agreement to resolve. Abortion laws in the United States reflect a resolution of the moral disagreement surrounding the issue. It is not legal to get an abortion at anytime over a nine-month pregnancy but it is legal within a certain timeframe. Harman would agree that there may be an objective moral truth to the issue of abortion but since we cannot know what that is, we must not give preference to one position over the other and resolve the dispute through bargaining. This is not moral nihilism but rather a pragmatic view of moral skepticism. I will now discuss Harman’s idea of universals and how they are compatible with moral relativism.

Harman notes that, “there will be universal moral truths just as there are universal truths about spatio-temporal frameworks.” In regards to universal moral truths, this may refer to the morality of killing, harm, and deception. In regards to spatio-temporal frameworks, this may refer to the admittance of motion and rest regardless of relative position or velocity. The existence of universal moral truths neither supports moral nihilism nor does it support moral objectivism. Universal moral truth does not entail moral objectivism because although moral truth may exist, knowledge of its truth may be unreachable. Secondly, universal truth may exist for only certain actions, which would still require bargaining to resolve trivial moral disagreements on other matters between individuals or groups with differing moral frameworks. On the other hand, a moral nihilist may claim that the existence of moral agreement among all individuals and frameworks does not entail the existence of objective truth. It may be explained by coincidence or other reasons similar to those posed by evolutionary psychologists. It may also be explained by a different type of social contract such as that formulated by Thomas Hobbes, which I argue does support the idea of moral nihilism via his theory of a state of nature. The existence of universal moral truth can withstand the charge of universal moral truth because of the difference between moral skepticism and the positions of moral nihilism and objectivism. Next, I will expand on these distinctions.

Moral skepticism is an epistemological position while moral nihilists and objectivists claim a metaphysical position regarding the existence or non-existence of moral truth. Truth conditions of moral judgments are either meaningless or an absolute standard regardless of context or opinion because of this claim. Moral skeptics, such as Harman, make no metaphysical claim and are therefore in a categorically distinct position. Moral relativism, then, should not be viewed as being on a spectrum between moral nihilism and moral objectivism. Arguments that challenge the premises of moral relativism do not easily slide into either of the other positions as a result. This does not mean that the argument cannot be defeated, but from the perspective of bargaining and the possibility of the existence of universal truth, arguments for either position do not seem strong enough to reject moral relativism. Harman says that, “moral diversity is nit a disproof of moral absolutism.” I argue, however, that the best argument in support of moral skepticism is based on the fact that people from different cultures, backgrounds, and educational levels do disagree on certain moral truths. For example, the U.S. Republican Party that represents 55 million Americans supports an anti-abortion position that the procedure is always wrong. The Democratic Party on the other hand, represents approximately 72 million Americans and supports a platform that abortion is not always wrong. If so many people disagree then maybe, knowledge on any moral claim is unknowable. If moral truth is unknowable but one allows for the possibility that objective truth exists, then Harman’s moral relativism provides a good argument and explanation for moral diversity.

In conclusion, Harman’s argument for moral relativism withstands the charge that it falls into moral nihilism both explicitly and implicitly. Bargaining provides a process to resolve moral disputes when rationality makes the right answer unknowable. The unknowable nature of objective or absolute moral truth provides support for both moral relativism and skepticism. This does not mean that morality is not important and should not play a serious role in everyday life because of the possibility of the existence of universal truths. Harman allows for this possibility. This may seem to point to moral objectivism but since what exactly those truths are again unknowable, he withstands the charge that his argument is a case for moral objectivity. It is the unknowable nature of moral truths that is important to remember. It is an epistemological claim, and not a metaphysical that further distinguishes moral relativism from both moral nihilism and objectivism. The argument is difficult to argue against unless one makes such a metaphysical claim.

Harris' "Enhancement Is a Moral Duty"

2008-10-03T20:58:00.002-06:00

Harris, John (2007). “Enhancement Is A Moral Duty" in Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19-35.

Harris attempts to introduce the ethical case for enhancement and the positive future of humankind. He uses five examples to give a sense of the debate and the different objections to the different modes of enhancement.

1. Mechanical versus Chemical Enhancement – he comments on the Boorse and Daniels definition of health to include illness as a departure form normal of species-typical functioning. He then makes the analogy of using glasses to binoculars. One raises sight up to a normal level while the other enhances beyond what is normally capable. He argues that to make an argument against enhancement, one would have to argue against the use of binoculars. He then makes some comparisons to give a sense of the moral debate. Buying a child the best education possible versus giving drugs to reach the same level of intelligence. Riding a bike versus using steroids. It seems the current debate says that the first choice is morally acceptable while the second choices are not. Harris seems to be a bit of a cautionary consequentialist in that if it is safe, then he sees no difference if the results are the same.
2. Disease and Vaccination – he notes that there has been very little resistance to this type of enhancement technology. If we alter human beings to affect their vulnerability to things, we are enhancing them. The issue then with new enhancement technology may be a matter of perception.
3. Genetic Enhancement – he notes David Baltimore's work at Caltech as HIV/AIDS and cancer vaccinations using genetic therapies as an example against "normal or species-typical functioning" against Boorse and Daniels. He further argues against Francis Fukuyama's claim that changes to human nature are absolutely unacceptable. Fukuyama's idea of Factor X, what is left when we strip away all of a person's contingent and accidental characteristics, as human nature is argued by Harris to include enhancement because if Factor X can be preserved or even enhanced then it must be a good thing by Fukuyama's own argument. He then notes that cloning is the only way to preserve the human genome and that universal cloning is the only way to prevent genocide. He notes that you could use Aquinas' Doctrine of Double Effect to argue for enhancement but that it would not be sufficient, again from a consequentialist viewpoint.
4. Chemical Enhancement – Harris favors enhancement as an absolute good and not as a positional good. This means that if we enhance for a longer life, it is good in and unto itself, not as an improvement to others even though other that do not have this good may not live as long. Making lives better rather making lives better than others must be the focus concerning enhancements, i.e., there may be inequality but is not necessarily a reason not to enhance. We already treat kidneys and hearts as scarce resources that some may get while others may not and we should work to get to a point that it may be available to all but that does not mean that no one gets a kidney until all can. Making a few better lives now may be unequal now but that does not mean we should abandon making those few lives better. It has to start somewhere and throughout history, new technology has started off on an unequal foot with many examples of that changing to be a common good. There is no moral case for delaying access to new technology or health saving device because it is not available to all.
5. Life Extension – life-saving is equivalent to death-postponing. Why do we look at certain methods of life-saving as morally necessary while talking about others as morally disdainful? If postponing death is a good, what about if we could postpone it indefinitely. Harris argues that regenerative medicine may not always be simply therapeutic but it may have an enhancing dimension. He ends this section with a word of caution by stating that we should not tamper with healthy human beings that will harm rather than benefit.

He concludes with a commentary on The Precautionary Principle and Playing God. He notes that UNESCO's International Bioethics Committee has maintained the idea that "...the human genome must be preserved as a common heritage of humanity." He responds with the following rebuttal of their assumptions:
1. The present point in evolution is unambiguously good and not susceptible to improvement.
2. The course of evolution will naturally make things better, not worse.
He views (1) and (2) as incompatible and argues that the common heritage of humanity is the result of evolutionary change. He then appeals to F.M. Cornford to note that if we reject any action on the present on the possibility of future harm, nothing would ever be done the first time to argue against the precautionary principle against enhancement. Lastly, he argues against the "Playing God" argument by noting that medicine can be described as a comprehensive attempt to frustrate the course of nature and therefore God. Artificially changing the nature of nature has led to a change of human nature.

Harris' "Introduction" and "Has Mankind a Future?"

2008-10-03T19:21:00.004-06:00

Harris, John (2007). “Introduction” and "Has Humankind a Future?" in Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1-18.

Harris attempts to answer the question: if the goal of enhanced intelligence, increased capacities, and better health is something we might strive for though education, why should we not strive to produce these goals through other enhancement technologies, including genetic enhancement? He defines enhancement as good if they make us better people. His thesis defends enhancement and argues that not only are enhancement permissible, but that in some cases, there is a positive moral duty to enhance. He briefly appeals to Plato, Marx, Locke, Rousseau, and Bentham to argue that we, as moral agents, have a responsibility to make the world a better place. He notes that we have reached a time in human history at which further attempts to make the world a better place must include changes to the world and humanity. He does not seem to think this is a bad thing and he will show later in the first chapter. He does not think that it is a bad thing that our descendants will not be human in the sense that we now know, but that it is inevitable from an evolutionary point of view or a technological point of view. He thinks that natural selection will be replaced with deliberative selection and Darwinian evolution will be replaced by enhancement evolution. He believes that humans have a moral responsibility to make informed choices for our fate and the fate of the world in which we live along responsibility to make a world a better place. Done correctly, we can take the chance out of evolution and place it within our hands so that change leads to a better species altogether. He seeks to find an ethical way to enhance intelligence, happiness, strength, and life expectancy in ways that protect the safety of people and are consistent with justice, government, and regulation.

He will look at stem cell technology, gene manipulation, embryo selection, drugs, and mechanical enhancements. Harris will also argue against the health and disease models advanced by Boorse and Daniels, which we should review. He argues that the presumption is that citizens should be free to make their own choices in the light of their own values, whether or not these choices and values are acceptable by the majority. He will argue against Michael Sandel, Leon Kass, and Jurgen Habermas who have supported arguments against enhancement. He thinks that choice of phenotypical traits such as hair, eye, and skin color are morally neutral because it is it no worse to be black versus white or blond versus brunette, etc. Harris advocates for research and argues that the fetus is an irredeemably ambiguous entity and not sacred. Research should be regarded not only as desirable but as a positive moral obligation.

He opens up the first chapter by claiming that human enhancement is a good thing and that our genetic heritage is in need of improvement. He also quotes de Lampedusa, "If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change." He takes this tact to argue against a conservative position and points out those conservatives who argue against enhancement actually engage in enhancement all the time. He notes that glasses and vaccinations are forms of enhancement – an improvement from what went on before. We enhance in these ways because we are decent, moral people who want to protect each other from harm and benefit ourselves and others. He argues that there is no inherent difference in types of enhancement. The opportunity to create healthier, longer-lived and therefore better lives is a moral responsibility and in the best interest of governments and society.

Harris then appeals to Bertrand Russell's Has Man a Future? to note that we must preserve and expand on what is good in humans, which entails that we should improve in humans over preserving the species in its current form. Harris does not believe that illness and poverty are likely to occur by chance over the thousands of generations evolution requires so any change for the better, based on where we are at as a species, must be up to us. Our potential is in our hands. In this sense, evolution does become something concerning progress and thus becomes teleological. Again, he goes back to the conservative question and argues that we must change at least to preserve, which may mean things cannot remain the same. Shelter, learning, teaching, toll using, farming, social living, and language lend to human enhancement. He argues that genetics will just be next in the list.

Harris does acknowledge that anything listed as historical proof of enhancement has been ill used but that does not discount the overall benefit to humans nor does it entail that we not attempt new technologies for enhancement. Just because something may be used improperly, does not mean that it should be abandoned altogether. Also, just because a new technology may not be available to all is not a good argument to abandon it until it can be. Take writing for example, at one time only a few were allowed to learn and slowly it became available to all. The same with certain antibiotics and electronic technologies. Sometimes technologies that advance are produced slowly. This does not mean that it is unjust or will not be available to all at some point later in the future. Just because it is elitist now does not mean that it always will. He then appeals to Richard Dawkins to warn against a "fetish" of sticking to any one evolutionary stage because any static period in our evolutionary past would entail that humans in our current form would not exist. This will be an argument he uses against Kass, Sandel, Annas, and Fukuyama. Evolution is change so why not embrace it instead of arguing that evolution exists but let's do everything possible to keep it static now. Lastly, he argues that we should take the dangers seriously but without knowledge of how probably or serious the dangers are against the probability and size of the benefits, we have to rational basis for either precaution or enthusiasm. Is ceasing to be human in the way we know now truly problematic?

Borges' "The Aleph"

2008-09-29T14:37:00.003-06:00

The first narrative theme of Jose Luis Borges’ The Aleph (1949) concerns the protagonist’s grief over his unrequited love and death of Beatriz Viterbo. The fact that Borges’ fictionalizes the protagonist as “Borges” speaks to the multi-layered complexity of the story that is indicative of his writing style. Also indicative of his style is the prima facie unrelatedness of themes or stories within a story. For example, within the story of unrequited love and death in The Aleph, Borges develops the story of writers and their aesthetic differences along with the later story of the aleph itself, an object in space that contains all other points in space that allows simultaneous viewing of everything within. Seemingly distinct, the three stories are connected in a meaningful way. In the following, I will briefly analyze each of the three themes or stories within The Aleph. I will then show how each theme relates to, parallels, and informs the other. Lastly, I will argue that the three themes share problems of perception and show that Borges’ is claiming that true knowledge of the sublime, like death and art, is unreachable.

The story of unrequited love and the death of Beatriz begins with a commentary on the fleeting nature of memory and ends with a horrific vision in the aleph of Beatriz’s physical decay. Borges says, “… the vast, unceasing universe was already growing away from her and … the universe may change but I shall not, thought I with melancholy vanity.” This refers to Borges’ sad attempt to hold Beatriz as near in memory as he thought she was in life. It is sad because of the lengths he goes to keep the memory of her intact viz. befriending Daneri, a writer he despises, simply to have access to the house where Beatriz lived. It is the memory of Beatriz that drives the false relationship and humiliation of Daneri until the end. This is a metaphor for the false relationship and humiliation Borges’ feels over the memory of his lost love that he cannot relinquish. It is not until Borges sees Beatriz in the aleph that he lets go of her. It is not a coincidence that it is at the same time Daneri loses his house and the aleph. It is also not a coincidence that not letting go of Beatriz, Daneri losing the aleph, and the aleph itself are too much to endure or too far to reach without the loss of something else – identity. I will show that identity is also a thread that ties the three stories or themes together.

The story of writers and their aesthetic differences points to subjective nature of art. What is beheld in Daneri’s eyes as, “A stanza interesting from every point of view” , Borges beholds as, “…the poet’s work had not lain in the poetry, but in the invention of reasons for accounting the poetry admirable.” The striking difference between the two interpretations is what is important to note because it begs the question of which one of them is prideful or delusional or if it is an all-together different question of what art is in the first place. Borges paints the picture that Daneri is pompous and unskilled so when it is revealed that Daneri takes second place in the National Prize in literature, it speaks more to the subjective or inaccessible nature of art. The reader is somewhat confused because Borges is somewhat the hero in the story. Borges discusses Daneri’s award, however, with detached resignation. It is confusion and detached resignation that links the emotional state of the writer’s story with that of the story of unrequited love and death. Loss is confusing and acceptance of a loved one’s death is that of detached resignation. The aleph is also confusing and Borges’ response is detached when he lets it go because the aleph, like art and death, is overwhelming and a reminder of our lack of significance. To protect one’s identity against insignificance, one must keep the unreachable at a distance and resign, unconsciously or not, to this fact.

The story of the aleph, although more visual and fantastic, is easier to understand than the other two stories if one accepts the idea that it is actually a metaphor for the sublime. The words Borges uses such as “…dizzying spectacles … infinite … spider-web … labyrinth … secret, hypothetical object …” clearly points to classic definitions of the sublime. It is this object “… whose name has been usurped by men but which no man has ever truly looked: the inconceivable universe.” that conceptually links the three stories together. Those same words could arguably be used to describe death or art as it can be for the sublime. The distinction between the story of the aleph and the other two is the representative necessity of the aleph but then, that is the point. We cannot truly know death. We cannot truly know art. We cannot truly know the sublime. It is only through representations that can we conceptualize the unconceptualizable. This is why, according to Borges, the three concepts and the three stories are unreachable and always will be regardless of how much we may fool ourselves that it is within our reach.

The unconceptualizable nature of death, art, and the sublime is due to the limitations of human perception. In other words, the three stories and themes of Borges’ The Aleph share epistemological problems that our senses cannot resolve. We can approximate but never truly ascertain the nature of death, which is why we grieve so much and many times hang onto the memory of love lost. We may approximate but never truly ascertain the qualitative nature of art even though many argue it is firmly within the realm of the subjective. We may approximate the nature of the sublime but we are resigned to simply represent it through language and thought that may never be significant enough to truly understand. Borges’ protagonist is, in a way, sad and pathetic in his relationship with Beatriz and Daneri. His loss in the National Literature contest points to his failure in his art as well and that is the point. The character of Borges is us and we cannot presume, without risk of hubris, that we can achieve true knowledge of the sublime, art, death or we would be just as sad, just as pathetic but this is not a gloomy prospect. There is beauty in his vision of Beatriz as there is in his interpretation of art. There is beauty in the aleph as well but not knowledge and that is the thread between the stories that ties all the other threads together. We can appreciate beauty and the inconceivable without true knowledge of why it is beautiful.

Glover's “Human Values and Genetic Design”

2008-09-25T07:16:00.001-06:00

Glover, Jonathan (2006). “Human Values and Genetic Design” in Choosing Children: Genes, Disability, and Design. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 73-104.

Glover explores philosophical issues surrounding liberty, the harm principle, and human nature as it relates to designing children. He starts with a quote by James Watson, “Most of us are in favor of autonomy … as long as we are not hurting someone else.” (p.73). He then launches into John Stuart Mill and reminds us that according to his political philosophy, “… the only purpose for which power can rightfully exercised over any member of a civilize community, against his will, is to prevent harm to other.” (p. 74). Glover again brings up Derek Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem, which states that different policies will shape the world in ways that will lead to different people but that does not mean that they would be worse off than an alternative set of descendents would have been. We may want to explore this idea further because I can imagine a future that is worse off than an alternative set based on bad policy. Would be actually be glad they were born if life is miserable? Maybe some would but others may not, especially if freedom and autonomy are compromised because of bad policy. Glover proposes the idea of ‘transpersonal harm’ to mean one course of action brings about a world where those people exist that are worse off than an alternative set of people, in a alternative future based on different policy so he does recognize that bad choices now can harm those in the future.

The idea of a medical boundary is a more conventional view that claims that intervention is acceptable if it seeks to eliminate disability below a medical standard of what defines disability. As genetic technology advances, this line could change providing an argument that we could have allowed enhancement now, which would be equivalent to treating disability in the future but the problem still remains of who is to decide. He comes back to the idea of human flourishing and advocates the notion that medically defined disability is morally acceptable and that in some cases, non-medical choices may be desirable to promote human flourishing. He also points out that those who advocate only to the medical boundary must specify why that boundary is so special. We should check out Robert Noziak and his idea of the ‘genetic supermarket’.

Glover argues that we should restrict liberty in making genetic choices only when something comparable important to human flourishing is at stake. He suggests that a regulated European model market may allow individual freedom with certain genetic features restricted in the name of public interest. The question then becomes, which choices should be excluded from the democratic debate. Some concerns include:
1. The dangers of uniformity.
2. Genetic inequalities.
3. The possible threat to central parts of human nature.
We recognize that sometimes the value of benefit to the minority justifies inequality. Again, Rawls comes into the picture. The problem here is that inequalities go deeper than economic concerns and are automatically replenished via future generations. The possibility of further class separation is not without merit. Then again, parental acquiensence may minimize inequalities in a reasonable free market. This might not have any effect in overall inequality because as he says, “… parents may all be standing on tiptoe without their children being able to see any better.” (p. 80). He also points out that enhancement for bad reasons may not necessarily entail a child’s harm or regret.

The next section explores definition of human nature. He does worry and argue against any type of state enhancement program as being eugenic. Francis Fukuyama comes up again with his central idea of human dignity and that consciousness, reason, feelings, and the capacity for oral choice must be preserved. Two possible starting points for the exploration of what we value in human nature:
1. The recognition that our nature includes both good and bad qualities.
2. The idea of a good life for human beings.
Glover argues that the first point acknowledging the dark side of human nature might not be subject to elimination through genetic enhancement but rather one of containment if we are to maintain autonomy. He suggests that the best account of a good life comes from an overlap between some version of human flourishing and some version of happiness. He calls this a liberalizing that tends toward convergence. The Darwinian and normal functioning account of human flourishing are too narrow. Humans do not want to do things passively but through experience so the Brave New World scenario must be avoided. The binocular analogy he makes adds depth to the genetic perspective as it relates to:
1. The fit between what you want/value and what your life is like.
2. How rich your life is human goods, what relationships you have with other people, your state of health, autonomy, and scope for creativity.
The hope for shared values then comes from resources of science and subjective experience so essentially an inner and outer view of human experience. As such, a plausible account of human flourishing is unlikely to have one blueprint.

Glover argues that there is a case for optimism in principle and caution in practice. This entails that public debate should continue about known and possible risks but that should not instill paralysis. Lastly, he appeals to the idea of open future to remind us that the future is open to us but that we must leave some of theta openness to the future as well.

Glover's “Parental Choice And What We Owe To Our Children”

2008-09-21T16:22:00.001-06:00

Glover, Jonathan (2006). “Parental Choice And What We Owe To Our Children” in Choosing Children: Genes, Disability, and Design. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 37-72.

Glover starts by claiming that reproductive autonomy or whether or not to have a child is accepted throughout much of the world with exceptions as follows:
1. Religious objections to contraception.
2. Religious or moral objections to abortion.
3. Some would restrict autonomy where it requires access to techniques of assisted reproduction.
He seems to reject these reasons for infringement on parental autonomy including that for population control as in China. In this chapter, he explores the question of whether autonomy extends only to the question of having a child or if that extension should apply to what kind of child to have.

He argues in the second section of the chapter that the hope to have child without disability us unproblematic from the point of view of the child, procreative liberty, in this sense, is not in conflict with what we owe our children. As far as potential children not conceived, he claims that we do not owe them anything because they are even a potential third party viz. if I choose not to have a child because thallosemia, no rights have been infringed. Many argue that we should accept children into the world unconditionally regardless of disability. Glover does not think it is wrong to want a child without disability so he rejects the denial of prenatal intervention on those grounds.

The third sections opens up with the basic view ethics concerning positive and negative rights:
1. Sometimes we owe others not to act in certain ways.
2. Sometimes we owe others to act in certain ways.
One of the first appeals here is to Thomas Scanlon, “…we aspire to justify our decisions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject. If they can reasonably reject our decisions then we are subject to their reproach. He then makes the distinction between doing harm when it could be avoided and not acting when you could reasonably protect someone from harm. By accepting that we are responsible, somewhat to the future children in creating policies or making individual choice we are saying that different people will be born than otherwise would be the case. Morality then is more than what we owe people. Is it a question of morality to bring one child into the world with less of a chance to a flourishing life than another with a greater chance even if both are happy to be alive? One of the issues of reproductive ethics is what our decisions do to the world (non-Identity principle) in addition to the individual. Glover seems to make a deontological move at the end when deciding correct action for a deaf child being born (p. 50). Selecting for a deaf embryo is, he argues, is more justified than a potentially hearing child made deaf.

The next section explores the following two questions concerning what we owe our children:
1. What we owe our children has to do with their having good lives.
2. What we owe our children has to do with respecting their autonomy.
His first claim is that no child being born with a life worth living has been harmed by being born. Glover then explores the ‘zero-line’ approach or the line just above ‘very terrible’ to answer the question of whether or not it is justified to have a child at this level. We should check out Julian Savulescu’s Principle of Procreative Beneficence, the idea that couples should select the child of all the possible children they could have that will have the best chance to a good life or at least as good a life as other based on available information. Glover suggests that medical, social, and economic factors may be components in determining the criteria for a good life. He then argues that passive exclusive is also a form of injustice and that equality of opportunity is seen as requiring action to reduce socially caused disadvantage. Previously, inborn differences were seen as independent of what justice society provides but genetic technology makes this less so. Genetic intervention against disability can increase a child’s chance for flourishing. Therefore, parental freedom should be constrained only by limits the potential flourishing of their child whether that is limited by poverty or by disability. Does this mean that poor people should not have children? He does call for a balance between parental freedom and flourishing of the child but it seems that by including some social factors, he is setting his argument up to serious objections. It will be good to explore the ‘zero-line’ philosophy he is arguing. Is this not just one-step above ‘very terrible’?

The section of the chapter focuses on identity and autonomy. He appeals to Kant to claim that to be treated merely as a means versus and end in and of themselves, there has to be some violation of autonomy or denial of some respect owed. He does state that the fetus and newborn do not have the capacity for choice so the issue of respecting the child’s autonomy does not arise at either stage. This may be problematic if we consider that future autonomy may be affected by choices made prior to the development of that capacity to choose. He rejects the idea of true independence and self-creation because of our ties to both genes and environment thereby limiting the right to an open future. I agree that certain choices away from disability may actually increase the openness of a potential future but that genetic intervention may be problematic in controlling how others control that future. I also agree with Habermas that genetic intervention will alter our self-understanding but that does entail a significant or negative effect compared to our current capacity for self-understanding. Glover does say that too much genetic intervention may make us feel like puppets to our parent but that some loss of independence may be a worthwhile price to pay.

Glover's "Disability and Genetic Choice"

2008-09-20T14:26:00.002-06:00

Glover, Jonathan (2006). “Disability and Genetic Choice” in Choosing Children: Genes, Disability, and Design. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 4-36.

Glover argues that, other things being equal, it is good if the incidence of disabilities is reduced by parental choices to opt for potentially more flourishing children. His argument rests upon the premise that disability impairs the capacity for human flourishing. He does acknowledge the potential cost of the expressivist argument, which claims that by limiting the birth of individuals with disability we are actually disrespecting and diminishing the value of those living with disability. He will attempt to show that perspective and intent are necessary to minimize harm in this respect.

He begins by treating the effects of the medical and components of disability. If society minimizes the stigma or functionality of disability, then this minimizes the gap between ‘normal’ and disability. Genetics and the perspective of society may blur the line between healthy and unhealthy but Glover argues that we should give up on the debate between defining disability as a functional limitation and that of social context because it is indeed both. The human flourishing model that he proposes may change the nature of disability on the individual level because of the life choices that individual makes and how that influences the notion of flourishing. I argue, however, that disability may impoverish on an unconscious level the choices one can make. Glover does address this later but it remains messy when addressing the choices of those individuals living today that refute the idea that their choices were limited. He does stick with the idea that “… disability involves a functional limitation, which (either on its own or – more usually- in combination with social disadvantage) impairs the capacity for human flourishing.” (p. 9). Refer back to p. 12 for a brief discussion of normality, which is relevant for our project. He agrees that it is a messy concept but that it is necessary to stick with a socially constructed and context dependent concept of normality that includes elements of the numerical and the normative (p. 13).

It seems a large point of Glover’s concept of flourish depends on the choices available to the individual but how does this affect a fetus or newborn, which cannot choose those attribute that define ‘flourish’. He tries to distinguish between externally and internally compensated disability. This may be relevant to our project if we incorporate some relativistic qualifiers. In other words, the idea that deafness is not a disability is only relative to those who are deaf so intervention/enhancement to a fetus or newborn is not a slight to those that are deaf because the fetus is in a different relativistic position. He appeals to Mill’s notion of higher and lower pleasures, which we want to draw out in our appeal to enhancement should we go in that direction. He argues against John Harris over the distinction between harming and wronging a child. Glover argues that it may be wrong to limit flourishing but that it does not harm the child to be born with certain disabilities. Harris argues that is harm to have a child that has disability. We will have to dive deeper into Harris’ argument. Does he mean just those disabilities that we can detect and ‘treat’?

He comments on common social misconceptions of disability as follows:
1. “… people with disabilities must have a severely reduced quality of life or even a life barely worth living.”
2. “There is a tendency to think of disability as a person’s main feature.”
3. “… there is a tendency to shy away from people with disability.”
Might this not be exacerbated if enhancement becomes commonplace? Won’t there be a social push to make biological functioning ‘perfect’? He believes that there is a positive and ugly side to the expressivist perspective but claims that we can minimize the ugly side by:
1. Focus on defeating disease/disability not because we do not respect individuals with that disease/disability but for what it does to individuals.
2. Parents should want to have a child without disability because disability reduces the chance of flourishing.
He concludes by claiming that genetic choice to eliminate disability is not a form of eugenics and even that some forms of enhancement may be justified because of the addition to chances of future flourishing. The potential objection to his argument will be defining what flourish actually means. I think we should also explore how diversity helps shape the idea of human nature, i.e., a more homogeneous population.

Wachbroit's “Normality and the Significance of Difference”

2008-09-18T07:48:00.001-06:00

Wachbroit, Robert (2006). “Normality and the Significance of Difference” in Parens, Eric, Chapman, Audrey R, and Press, Nancy (eds.) Wrestling with Behavioral Genetics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 235-53.

Wachbroit argues that current investigations into human genetics do not seem capable of identifying the essential properties of being human. Genetic discoveries will affect our conception, which is directly related to how we understand “normal”. The more we learn about the genetic causal factors of various conditions the more explanatory language will be in genetic terms. What constitutes normality of health will be reassessed medically and socially. Discoveries in the fields of medicine and psychology in relation to genetics will alter out understanding of normality and how we conceptualize others and ourselves. Normality may be defined as:

1. A mathematical concept.
2. An evaluative concept.
3. A biological concept.

Mathematical normality is understood to refer to the mean, median, or mode of a distribution. The Bell Curve, Gaussian distribution, and Normal Curve are roughly equivalent and examples of normality in mathematics. Evaluative normality refers to conventional, cultural, institutional, and ethical norms. Less precise and more subjective than mathematical normality, evaluative norms are often context specific, as one type of behavior in one cultural setting may not be considered normal in another. Biological normality refers to the language that biologists, physicians, or psychologist use to refer to a biological unit such as an organ, a physical reaction, or an environment a person experiences. For example, "You have a normal heart", "Her vital signs were normal", or "He had a normal childhood" all refer to a biological concept of normality.

The biological concept of normality is problematic because it refers to the subjective meaning of 'healthy' and may not point to the average, majority, or ideal. When a physician says that a patient has a normal heart she is not referring to the average heart because that is epistemologically impossible. Secondly, when a psychologist determines that someone had a normal childhood, it does not point to a specific home environment but rather a healthy one, which may or may not realistically reflect the majority of home environments. Lastly, when an optometrist says that a person has normal vision she is not appealing to ideal vision, which may be closer to that of a fighter pilot. Behavioral concepts of normality also suffer from subjective meaning and are contextually problematic related to definitions of average, majority, or ideal. Lastly, not always do statistical, social, and biological understandings coincide although advances in science can shorten the gap in some cases. They are three categories of meaning, not three different meanings.

Why different parts of an organism evolve the way it does (Wright) or whether function is to be understood in terms of the organism’s overall ability to survive and reproduce (Boorse) will affect one’s conception of biological normality. When applied to behavior, we may actual redefine the type of behavior under examination, which may affect the social meaning of the term normal. Like Press, Wachbroit refers to medicalization of behavior as problematic within the context of normality because of the conflation of social and biological meanings. He points to education of the public of the distinction so that conflation is minimized. He shows that Fukuyama’s defintion of human nature conflates the distinction. His definition of human nature allows for change over time in case of disease or medical advances but Wachbroit rejects a changing view of what it means to be human. He concludes by asking the question, which is relevant to our research, whether something is human nature if there is 51% or more of a genetic component versus something that is 49% genetic in nature? Does the environmental factors of causation have anything to do with human nature?

Duster's "Behavioral Genetics and Crime, Violence, and Race"

2008-09-17T19:08:00.012-06:00

Duster, Troy (2006). “Behavioral Genetics and Explanations of the Link between Crime, Violence, and Race” in Parens, Eric, Chapman, Audrey R, and Press, Nancy (eds.) Wrestling with Behavioral Genetics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 150-75.

Duster argues that scrutiny and skepticism should be employed in behavioral genetic research because of the trend to more between population differentials and the socially constructed bias of the criminal justice system. Lewontin commented on statistical problems related to comparing within group variance and between group variance related to the IQ controversy of the 1970s. The problem here lies within the idea that humans share 99.9% of identical DNA and research that tries to correlate genetic ancestry with behaviors such as violence, criminality, and impulsivity. Like Press, he appeals to the notion of social constructionism as it relates to behavior. Many researchers also argue that physical variations in the human species have no meaning except the social ones we create, which have no constancy. “Race” can have a substantial effect on how people behave but that does entail a link to genetic causation. If, however, researchers initiate research based on certain trends such as the disproportionate number of African Americans incarcerated compared to the general population, then run the risk of making invalid conclusions similar to the “science” of phrenology in the late 19th century. He does argue that we should eliminate racial and ethnic classifications in the routine collection and analysis of data but rather that we need to recognize, engage, and clarify the complexity of interaction between taxonomies of race and genetic outcomes.

I agree with his idea of the Zeitgeist or spirit of the time in conducting research because we must accept that, in many ways, we are products of our environment and societies as much as we are products of our genome. Duster provides a slew of evidence to back up his claim that we may want to revisit. He also speaks to the circular nature of labeling theory in hat he terms a “looping effect”. This will be especially important related to ASPD and the MAOA connection. Then again, in the context of drug treatment, is genetic “profiling” to eliminate disability really a bad thing? He sites cystic fibrosis and beta-thallosemia as examples of ethnic or group specific diseases that may warrant research. The important difference is that of a physical disorder and that of behavior but this does not address the question of whether physicalism or genetics gives rise to behavior. He also speaks of the difference between genetic markers and explanatory causation of crime that we will have to keep in mind.

Kaebnick's “Behavioral Genetics and Moral Responsibility”

2008-09-17T19:08:00.011-06:00

Kaebnick, Gregory E. (2006). “Behavioral Genetics and Moral Responsibility” in Parens, Eric, Chapman, Audrey R, and Press, Nancy (eds.) Wrestling with Behavioral Genetics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 199-219.

Kaebnick explores three philosophical positions related to behavioral genetics, free will, and determinism:
1. Strong defenses of free will rejecting determinism.
2. Hard determinism, which rejects free will
3. Compatibilism, which accepts both.

The idea of agency is relevant to the discussion of behavioral genetics because of claims to genetic causation and questions of exculpation. It seems that few argue that genes made anybody do anything but the argument from predisposition begs a threshold question of how much is too much impulse. He raises an interesting question concerning the conviction of two individuals for violent crimes. One has a genetic marker for what is claimed to be criminality or violence and the other does not. If we are a product of genes and environment, then it is possible that they are exculpable as well. Is it right to say that neither have free will? I think not, again from cases of similar genotype or environment that so not commit crime or violence. He argues that behavioral genetics increases the sophistication of language used in the free will or determinist debate but not the framework. In other words, the timeless question is not in danger of being resolved anytime soon. Could this be, as Brock and Buchanan posit, because both rest on metaphysical claims that no empirical investigation can overturn? Ask Jim to expand on the compatibilist account because I do not see how human behavior can be fully determined by natural forces (genes) but still allow for free will except in relationship to certain types of behavior. How would we know if the social constructionist position has value? I agree with the idea of strong impulse versus overwhelming impulse as it relates to strengthening the free will position. If it is overwhelming, does this not point to lack of control or insanity as Edgar spoke to? He appealed to Kant and Wittgenstein as an alternative perspective that relied on the power of language and perspective to relay a different idea of free will. Kant believed that we must assume ourselves to be free for practical purposes even if did not fit with our scientific understanding of the world. We may not be able to ever to resolve the debate because of the metaphysical uncertainty of what genetics can reveal but as Wittgenstein claims, the language we use in this age will have to change to make for meaningful dialogue between nature and nurture, genes and environment, and responsibility and blame.

Edgar's "Impulsivity, Responsibility, and the Criminal Law"

2008-09-17T19:08:00.010-06:00

Edgar, Harold (2006). “Impulsivity, Responsibility, and the Criminal Law” in Parens, Eric, Chapman, Audrey R, and Press, Nancy (eds.) Wrestling with Behavioral Genetics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 176-98.

Edgar argues that behavioral genetic research will not have a significant impact on the criminal justice system because the idea that most people are responsible for their actions most of the time is central to law and will not change anytime soon. He makes the distinction between the purpose of the law and the process of deciding what criteria is justified for the relatively few people who are not responsible for their actions. He claims that the current work in genetics of impulsivity is unlikely to have an impact on the responsibility doctrine of because society’s impulse to collective self-protection may be stronger than that of collective compassion. He does add that if treatment of disorders that are argued to have a strong genetic causal component, then the system already has judiciary discretion built into the system. The point here is that the science would have to be strongly conclusive that treatment would work, i.e., criminal behavior will not be repeated. The difference between violent and nonviolent behavior is socially relevant and may not change regardless of what science discovers related to causation.

He then discuses the issue of free will as it relates to the justice system. Does a social moray disappear once it is known that a label, punishment, or stigma is morally undeserved? Psychology, genetics may yield as yet unknown understanding of the why but the criminal justice system will not abandon threats and disapproval associated with certain actions. He then discusses the case of Kansas v. Hendricks to point out that predisposition alone is not enough to convict but rather specific behaviors in the past. This will be important if we stick with ASPD and the MAOA link. It recognizes that past behavior may indicate future recidivism but it provided cautionary language in the definition of “mental abnormality”. The most interesting point he makes is that once a person is proved to have done some criminal act, that person is another category outside of those who do not commit criminal acts. He concludes this section with an appeal for public discourse on the subject, which will be complicated and difficult.

The strongest point Edgar makes concerning the stability of the criminal law doctrine is that some people who do not commit crimes have the same genetic endowment (or lack thereof) and similar environments as those who do point to choice rather than determinism. He also mentions that the law should actually be tougher on those who have a stronger impulse to violate, not the other way around. In order to have significant effect on legal doctrine, science would have to provide stronger evidence of exculpability than the literature currently provides. Most states only recognize a “mental” condition as insanity. His last point is that legal doctrine only changes with majority findings, which may be difficult to show in cases of ASPD, impulsivity, and chronic recidivism. I believe teasing apart the environmental component may be even more difficult here making the case for genetic determinism as a legal defense even more difficult.

Brock's “Behavioral Genetics and Equality”

2008-09-17T19:08:00.009-06:00

Brock, Dan W. (2006). “Behavioral Genetics and Equality” in Parens, Eric, Chapman, Audrey R, and Press, Nancy (eds.) Wrestling with Behavioral Genetics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 220-34.

Brock argues that the there is not a moral objection to enhancement technologies but to selective access to them in ways that would exacerbate social, moral, and economic inequalities. The future holds the possibility that many natural differences in life and well being may become more into our control but not without the risk that moral, social, and economic inequality would increase. How much of class structure is based on heredity and wouldn’t any new medical or genetic treatment related to enhancement necessarily be outside the purview of anyone but the rich? Many may think that significant enhancement technology is science fiction but the notion of increasing inequality is not a far stretch. He discusses social justice and distinguishes between formal and fair equality appealing to Rawls to claim that fair equality of opportunity requires equal opportunities of those similarly endowed and motivated. Rawls may argue for physical enhancement behind the veil of ignorance but not for enhancement available to a select group of individuals in the society giving them unfair advantage over the rest. Ask Jim why he claims that diversity and idiosyncrasy would diminish in such a state when he argues for the potentiality of an increased gap. I thought he made a rather poignant analogy to the dismal quality of public education in the U.S and opportunity for individuals in that lower income group. He comments on the difference between brute luck and option luck to claim that our current system accepts bad brute luck but not bad option luck. The point is that bad brute luck may only be available to a few further inequitizing society thereby being an issue of injustice.

Brock argues that the value of traits change over time due to the social, political, economic, and I argue technological framework of society. How do we decide what traits will be of value in an unknowable future? Take height. There seems to be cultural value to being thin and tall but that could change. History shows us that women with more curves were more sought after than thin women. The idea of equalizing is not feasible because that means that we would have to de-enhance those with extraordinary ability but enhancing based on cultural values that may change is not in the long run equalizing natural assets. It may be fine motor skills that are of value today ad brute strength tomorrow. I find it interesting that he withholds speculation on the potential for inequality simply within the context of preventing genetic disease. He agrees that limiting the use of genetic technology will be difficult because of the complexity of positional and intrinsic value to cases of benefit to the individual and society. What if we could make firefighters stronger with more stamina? It still comes down to where do we draw the line. He concludes with a discussion of human nature, dignity, and evolution arguing that it would be problematic to sustain a moral community or democratic institution that respected the human rights of all. He speaks of a natural aristocracy that might develop. Would we not look at this as an instance if speciation, which still begs the question of what is it that makes us human.

Press' "Social Constructionism and Medicalization"

2008-09-16T23:42:00.004-06:00

Press, Nancy (2006). “Social Construction and Medicalization” in Parens, Eric, Chapman, Audrey R, and Press, Nancy (eds.) Wrestling with Behavioral Genetics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 131-49.

Press argues that behavioral genetics depends on traits, concepts, and phenotypes that may not be the product of nature but socially constructed and therefore inconstant phenomena. This does not allow for the construct validity needed for natural inquiry and could lead the field astray with negative social consequences. Social constructionism is the idea that the traits under question have a social or environmental basis. Medicalization helps construct and reify the behaviors under which behavior geneticists engage. It can also refer to the increasing number of aspects of life that are being brought under the purview of medicine thereby making medicine more of a social force in social constructionism. Geneticization describes the extension of medicalization to the genetic realm. She attempts to get to the heart if universal versus localized traits and it’s link to genetic research. Do traits have to be universal to have a valid genetic component or is this more of the “gloomy prospect” applied to group? Her claim that it is possible to undertake a biographical investigation of a social construct speaks to the Husserlean idea of presuppositionlessness but that is also problematic. Can behavior ever be reduced away from the micro or macrocosm of the environment? My thoughts are that it might be possible in some cases. She may be onto something concerning universals but what about reexamining a “universal” within a cultural context? That would address her concern that culture dictates what we research but it does raise the issues of “What is believed to be true about behavior affects the very behavior which it purports to explain”. (Eisenberg, 1988, 145)

Press speaks to the way science should work against a holistic view that local interactions lend support. Ask Jim about the trend to be interdisciplinary with academic research. Would this not speak to a more holistic view of causation? The problem is that we cannot extract ourselves from within the social construct we are living and this is a difficulty with the scientific method we employ, the conclusions we make, and the very questions, as Press points out, we ask about human behavior. We have to remember to take a look at the possible difficulties with the DSM-IV and its susceptibility to social constructionism. It seems that Press thinks that psychiatry is more grounded in physicalism than psychology but the distinction and difficulties will be important when we start drawing the line based on APA criteria. We will also have to reference the idea of health as a status symbol in addition to normative language. I agree that medicalization and social constructionism surrounding traits in question may lead researchers astray but the question is how much is this a factor or does it depend on the trait in question as we seems to be heading for our project. I more strongly agree that the conclusions of genetic study have a impact on perception of behavior in society and that we are working along a continuum where we draw the line viz. “no bright line” is drawn”.

The last part of the essay speak to research with low rates of probability of success because of the aforementioned difficulties but what if the genetics drove the cultural norm in the first place. The debate for the evolutionary basis of altruism continues and it is here that we may or may not be able to tease apart nature versus nurture. She references Turkheimer and her slightly more positive take on the gloomy hypothesis. Last thought: she makes the distinction between smoking behavior and lung cancer as a focus for research as an example of medicalization but didn’t the research on the disease of lung cancer lead to a social construct that smoking is harmful and undesirable thereby pointing a reciprocal relationship between physical inquiry and social constructs? Hasn’t that been a good thing that we socially frown on smoking than we did 20 years ago or is that just my own perspective on the matter due to my own relationship to and within my society?

Ethical Issues Concerning Genetic Screening for Complex Behavioral Traits

2008-09-11T07:20:00.003-06:00

In addition to Wrestling with Behavioral Genetics (Parens, 2006), the following books are next on the list to read and work through fro my UROP project with Jim. After we rough up an idea for a thesis today, I need to spend some time in the library researching the most current journal articles n the subject. Are we pointing in the direction of causation and behavior or will we more or less accept the tenants of genetic links to behavior and argue for drawing a line somewhere between treatment and enhancement? Will we focus on ASPD that probably has the most social relevance and potential for arguments in the realm of policy or more in the medical arena for traits such as depression that may have more medical implications?

Enhancing Evolution – Harris argues that we are morally obligated to enhance but how does factor into intervention on the behalf of others, i.e., children. He appeals to political and moral philosophers such as Bentham, Rousseau, Locke, and Russell. He seems to argue against the model for health and disease proposed by Boorse and Daniels. He speaks to arguments of sufficient seriousness, sufficient probability, and proximity to justify human freedom.

Choosing Children – Glover argues that in order to make the claim that enhancement will minimize or eliminate disability, we must first understand and define disability. Also, how are we to ethically argue for the elimination of certain disabilities such as deafness? This is especially relevant when many in the deaf community do not view deafness as a disability. I think the disability component will be good to explore since the question of normality and possible dichotomous relationship between disability and enhancement. It also appears that he tries to distinguish between the rights of parents and the right of children in addition to arguing that there should be constraints on parental choice. He seems to tackle the idea of a modern eugenics with an emphasis on what enhancement means to notions of justice and genetic competitiveness. Based on the introduction and skimming, he seems to argue for intervention and the redrawing of the line to push the envelope of “normal” while arguing against enhancement that leads to societal inequities.

From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice – Buchanan et al. offer a systematic analysis of issues surrounding genetic technology, ethics, and social policy. Published in 2000, it may start to date itself except for the arguments on more timeless philosophical issues of justice and human nature. While the history of eugenics leading up to Nazi Germany is important, it seems that there was a case to be made for the existence of a form of modern eugenics before completion of the human genome project so if we move in a positive direction, maybe we should not shy away from the past but embrace a redefinition that incorporates ethics, social theory, and learning from the past. Just an idea … not quite sure if it’s a good one. It seems that the Buchanan essays are more relevant to our research but we should selectively read arguments by the other authors including those concerning:
1. Distributive justice
2. Human nature and bases of inequality
3. Normality
4. Tailoring environments
5. Moral boundaries
6. Treatment versus enhancement
7. Egalitarianism
8. Normal function model
9. The idea of “best”
10. The right to an open future
11. Reproductive freedom

Schaffner's "Behavior: Its Nature and Nurture Pt. 1"

2008-09-10T22:43:00.003-06:00

Schaffner, Kenneth F (2006). “Behavior: Its Nature and Nurture, Part 1” in Parens, Eric, Chapman, Audrey R, and Press, Nancy (eds.) Wrestling with Behavioral Genetics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 3-39.

Schaffner attempts to provide an overview of various concepts of behavioral causation with an emphasis on explaining the genetic component. The following are thoughts and questions that may help piece together the puzzle to ultimately form a thesis concerning ethical issues of genetic screening for complex behavioral traits. This is more like free association but its purpose is to get thoughts out. How does moral relativism play into our discussion? Schaffner speaks to genetic and environmental causation but how do psychological factors play into the equation? What about behavior as a phenomenological factor rather than a trait? By calling behavior a trait, are we not presupposing a form of reductionism to genetics? In more touchy-feely language, am I not more than what my genetics, environment, and a G x E interaction dictate? We need to check out Rawls? He is used as an argument for genetic enhancement and intervention. Hat is the effect of environment on evolution? What about environmental heritability? How will w divide up quantitative versus molecular approaches to behavioral genetics? Schizophrenia too genetic to study? Depression too environmental? We may want to stick with ASPD due to the link to criminality. We may also want to explore thresholds of risk to help draw the line if we are not going to reject any intervention or enhancement?

In the first dialogue, Schaffner appeals to Lewontin on red blood cell phosphatase activity to explain environmental and genetic variation. He mentions on pp. 13 a study in which all phenotypic variation is due to environmental factors. What about Stotz’s claim that the gene also acts as an environment, i.e., what is the effect of the rest of the genome on the trait? Have Jim show you the math concerning the heritability of having a brain being zero (pp. 16). We need to explore problems with the equal environment assumption if we are to argue against the benefit of genetic testing o n ASPD. What is the best argument for behavior being genetically linked (broad)? The problem with the fearful mice experiment is that what if a mouse ate some bad cheese and had diarrhea? Would it be classified as fearful? How to distinguish?

Rowe and Jacobson (1999) developed criteria for factors deemed shared environmental effect
1. Near universals in culture do not count.
2. Environmental exposure must be common to all siblings.
3. The environmental exposure must have directional effect on the trait in question.
4. The environmental exposure must change the trait in a constant direction in order for it to be shared.

Problem with (1) if environment does have an effect on gene frequency. Problem with (2) is that how do you define common experience? Problem with (3, 4) is how do you tease out other effects (both genetic and environmental)? Even Schaffner realizes this difficulty since he places this idea as a “term of art”. He seems to agree with the “gloomy prospect” of possibly never being able to tease out environmental effects in the narrow, non-shared sense. Has anyone looked at DNA from 100 years ago compared to now? If there is a significant difference (problems with qualifying significance) would that not point to environmental inheritance or would it be argued as genetic? Problems with models. What the simplest and most complex model for behavioral genetics?

Chris Marker's La Jetee´

2008-09-09T23:23:00.004-06:00

This is the first of many posts related to my Comparative Literature class, The Sublime & The Sci-Fi Film. There is a difference in watching a film in an analytic mode versus sprawled out on the couch with a bag of Cheetos. I have already noticed that I am looking with a more critical and appreciative eye. If you love film, I would recommend taking a similar film class, which emphasizes the visual image as much as the narrative. The following and future posts on this subject will be more stream-of-consciousness so I apologize if it is hard to follow.

La Jetee´ (1963) directed by Chris Marker is the first film we viewed. It is only 27 minutes long but is dense with powerful images so it did not feel like a short film. It is interesting that one theme of the film concerns time and the unique style plays with the viewer’s perception of time. The film was shot in black and white and is not a motion picture per se but rather like looking a series of photographs. Instead of 20 or 30 frames per second, it is closer to one frame every 10-20 seconds. It was odd at first but it become less noticeable as the story unfolded. The film opens with an overhead shot of a Paris airport (Orly to be precise) frozen in time but with the scream of jet engines in the background. Oh, I’m pretty sure La Jetee´ means “jet” but I also think it is a play on the term “jetty”, which refers to a structure extended in to the sea. This is relevant to the paradoxical nature of time travel the film touches upon. The sounds transition from the screaming of jets to beautiful opera/choir music, which makes the disconnect between sight and sound even more distinct. The narrative (in French, English subtitles) tells the story of little boy on the observation deck of the airport who has the image of a woman frozen in his memory just as the images of the film are frozen to the viewer. It is interesting that the narrative mentions that it is a Sunday. Maybe a commentary on the religiosity of technology? At the same time the image is frozen in the boys memory, a man dies nearby … the viewer does not know how or why. The narrative then says that WWIII starts shortly after that. The frozen images show Paris before and after nuclear devastation. It mentions that there are victors and prisoners but also that all are driven underground due to radiation. Victory without salvation. Victory but life like a rat.

The narrative speaks of experiments that drive the subjects to madness or death. The boy on the observation deck is now a man, the next subject of mysterious tests. It is subtly implied that the victors are German and whispers in German are heard softly in the background. Feel of Nazi camps and human experimentation. There is even a camp director. The man expects Dr. Frankenstein or a mad scientist but finds a “reasonable man” who explains that the human race is doomed, that space is out of the question, and the only hope is through time. Past and future must come to the aid of the present if they are to survive. Living in the moment theme throughout? What’s up the glasses with multiple-lenses? Questioning of memory? Technology destroyed but the technology will save them? The experiments do not seem to be of a mechanical nature but rather of mental/pharmacological nature. Shots and masks over the eyes that make me think if insane asylums. The first time he “goes under” or “travels back” he comes upon a past in a park with children. The narrative repeats the word “real” many times. Real park, real children, etc. Traveling through time to a timeless world. Am I dreaming or sleeping? If mental, then definitely some Cartesian dualism going on here. Mind body problem. Living in the moment.

This is the end of Part I. I’ll add the rest as a comment later. Now I’m off to read Plato.

Best wishes,
Roger

Bulgakov's "The Master and Margarita"

2008-06-24T22:14:00.002-06:00

Last night I attended my first literary book group since arriving in Salt Lake almost 3 years ago. The group was open to anyone but only Barnes & Noble employees like me were present. I was immediately reminded of how much I enjoy reading and discussing literature with others with the same love of a good book. The book we read was The Master and Margarita by Mikhail Bulgakov. I have to confess that I procrastinated a bit so was forced to rush in the last couple of days before we met. I think that was mostly due to my experience with the Russian literature of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. I read The Brothers Karamazov, Notes from Underground, and an abridged version of War and Peace eons ago and did not appreciate as much as I think I would now. The Master and Margarita was entertaining and engaging … I regret not starting it earlier to contemplate all the second and third level thought that I’m sure just blew over my head.

In a nutshell, The Master and Margarita is the story of the Devil’s visit to Soviet Russia in the early 1930’s and the seventh proof of God’s existence, which is if the devil exists then God must exist. He has a retinue with him, including a vodka-drinking, gun-wielding cat the size of a hippopotamus, who wreak havoc on the atheistic Muscovites. It also jumps back to the time of Christ (Yeshua Ha-Notsri) and Pontius Pilate leading up to the crucifixion. Throw in a love story between an author in an insane asylum and his true love, who becomes a witch and Hostess of Satan’s Grand Ball to free him, and you have the basics of the story. It is a satire of the intelligentsia of Stalin’s Russia, a play on Faust, and ultimately of love and peace (but not salvation). I recommend reading it. I certainly will again with much greater care.

I do not have any commentary but the discussion did raise a couple of questions to chew on.

1. If there is a devil, does he need people to believe in God for true temptation to occur?
2. What does it say about human nature when we kinda root for the bad guys like Behemoth the vodka-drinking cat in films and literature?
3. Are the consequences of our actions or our intention more important?

That’s all for tonight. We’re reading The Last Temptation of Christ by Nikos Kazantzakis, author of Zorba the Greek, for next month. We will meet the fourth Monday of July if you are interested in joining us. I promise not to procrastinate on this one.

Best wishes,
Roger

The Coherency of Evolution and Faith - Part IV

2008-06-16T16:40:00.004-06:00

Part III lists all questions and comments raised to date from original posts and replies in Part I and II. So far, Dr. Jason Epps, my friend and colleague (hopefully to remain as such), has been the only person to pose such responses; therefore, my comments and questions are directed mostly to what I discern to be his position favoring Creationism over the claims of science concerning evolution. I will provide a brief treatment of epistemological issues raised thus far and then speak, mostly by reference, to some science questions raised.

The Distinction between Science and Faith
So far, the attempt has been made to place science and faith on the same playing field regarding what kind of knowledge they provide and the manner in which belief functions. In other words, the claim is that faith is ultimately common to both science and faith. Respectively, this is both simplistic and fallacious. There is not just one category of belief nor is there just one form of knowledge. Belief in God, belief that I will be killed if I play on the freeway, belief that I am not just a brain in a vat, and belief in the Big Bang Theory of the Universe are different categories of belief that provide different types of knowledge. I am not saying anything new here; many epistemologists have recognized this for centuries. For a more complete treatment of this idea, one may refer to an introductory text in epistemology such as Morton’s Theory of Knowledge (2002). If you would like a theological treatment of faith, reason, inference, and assent you may refer to Cardinal John Henry Newman’s A Grammar in Aid of Assent (1870). Newman’s work is especially relevant regarding the difference between inference and faith.

In regards to science, inference is used to make claims that have yet to be empirically proven. For example, the Big Bang Theory was inferred from the observation that the universe seems to be expanding. The inference is that if the visible universe is currently expanding then it was smaller in the past. Taken back far enough the inference leads to an extremely dense, hot singularity and an event that is known as the Big Bang. This is not faith. It is based on observations that can be replicated. Inference is more flexible to revision than faith because new observations are a different kind of evidence than what faith may require for change. Reason and observation are all that is required to produce an inference. Faith is much more complex and requires intuition and affect in addition to reason. Faith, unlike inference, does not always require direct observation. Another difference between inference and faith is that faith is not simply a belief; it requires volition of action for coherency. Inference, unlike faith, may never affect daily life. Quite simply, faith points to a different kind of truth and knowledge than inference points to associated with science. So, if one is truly interested in discovering truth, the choices after appeal to or replication of observations become:

1. Deny the observations that lead to inference because of difficulties associated with empiricism.
2. Offer an alternative inference. This leads to the formulation of a theory that may be tested to either reject or refine that theory.

Option (1) is problematic because if you reject all observation and experience then one may fall into deep skepticism, which should also apply to one’s own position and leads nowhere meaningful. Skepticism helps keep claims to knowledge rigorous but when taken too far, like most things, is not helpful or practical. Therefore, the question then becomes what observations are reasonable to accept in propositions and inference. Who decides what to accept and what to reject? My observation of the Creationist position, thus far, is that observations that lend support to a position contrary to their own or that supports a theory with implications contrary to their own is many times rejected outright. Does this aid in the search for objective knowable truth or is it simply easier to ignore the tough questions that entail from observations of the physical world?

I think Option (2) is much more interesting and at the heart of what any debate related to coherency should address. The problem, however, still comes back to the demarcation problem. There are exceptions and some difficulties with verifiability and testability but these two qualities seem to provide what Creationism and I.D. do not. If one infers God, is one still practicing science? Maybe yes but on only two questions related to prima causa:

1. How did matter come into existence in the first place?
2. How did the first nucleotide or lipid necessary for even a simple Eukaryotic cell come into existence in the first place?

After those first two moments in time (and maybe not even then), no appeal to God, the supernatural, or anything non-naturalistic should be made for it remain science. Why? Because science and religion serve two separate, distinct functions in human society and are categorically different, not opposing ends of a spectrum. To change science or religion to function in a similar manner as the other defeats the type of knowledge that may be discovered from its distinct, respective position. I simply do not understand why many (but not all) in the religious community want them to be the same thing. If they are the same, do the same epistemological difficulties apply to their position as well? Some argue that the push to get science and religion on the same playing field is part of a larger sociopolitical agenda to get prayer back into the classroom at the expense of all that we have gained over the last 300 years. It is easy to see why when you have action plans such as the Wedge Strategy associated with Philip Johnson, author of Darwin on Trial. One of the purposes of this blog is to explore the characteristics that make science distinct so I encourage asking the tough question of “What is Science?” and posting what qualities you feel science should possess that are distinct from religion. Also, check out the websites for the Center for Scientific Creation and The Discovery Institute to make up your own mind on the larger issue of evolution … just don’t look for many citations without a last name of Behe, Dembski, or Meyer.

A Few Replies and a Comment on Science
I must begin by stating that this exercise has shown me how much more science I need to learn. I have 3 years of Biochemistry, 1 year of Physics, 1 year of Genetics, 2 quarters of Zoology, 1 semester of Philosophy of Genetics, and 1 semester of Science & Society under my belt (all college level). I am also a big fan of the History Channel, Animal Planet, TLC, and the Discovery Channel. Lastly, I have read a decent amount of hard science on my own including Brian Greene’s Elegant Universe, Michio Kaku’s Parallel Worlds, Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History in Time and Universe in a Nutshell. I am not listing this to brag; my purpose is actually quite the contrary. The type of knowledge science provides is so vast that to answer all the specific questions in a particular field is rather difficult and upon reflection, I should have done more to increase my knowledge of the natural world to be able to more eloquently answer the questions posed in this blog. As such and in regards to the questions of evolution and other scientific questions raised, I recommend checking out and defer to TalkOrigins because they provide answers to these types of questions and more with many citations to source materials. They respond to but do not present Creationist or I.D. positions but provide numerous links to alternative views including Creationism and I.D. websites here. As with any Internet resource, be skeptical and judge for yourself. I have a few replies to specific questions and comments raised so far.

*** “Big Bang theory posits that at some point, there was nothing that somehow became something.” ***
This misrepresents the theory. The inference for the theory leads back to an extremely dense, hot singularity. This allows for many things including a cyclical beginning and end to the universe due to black holes or God. Stephen Hawking and Brian Greene do not posit the idea of something from nothing. Neither my physics book nor anything I researched on the web claimed something from nothing either. I am interested in a citation for your claim. Hawking and Greene do acknowledge the difficulty of the prima causa for creation of matter in purely naturalistic terms.

*** “When has “mutability” been observed?” ***
See TalkOrigins on Five Major Misconceptions about Evolution regarding direct and indirect evidence observable in the here and now. Any basic biology or evolutionary biology text should also provide examples.

*** “There is still no observable evidence for transmutability. I would challenge anyone reading this blog to produce it. If you can’t produce it, then you have to concede that there is a significant measure of “faith” that is involved in accepting evolution – as much as it might hurt to admit it :0) ” ***
Once again, either you are rejecting the abundance of observations that lead to this inference or you are not doing your homework. Many transitional fossils have been found that lend support to an inference of transmutability between species and genera, between families, genera, and classes, and between kingdoms and phyla. Check out the TalkOrigins link here for a brief treatment regarding such evidence. I also suggest reading the full article entitled Transitional Vertebrates Fossils FAQ. Your challenge has been produced, no concessions to faith given, and no hurt felt, thank you very much. Do you claim that all these observations are a hoax or do not exist? If not, what inferences would you make with the data? I highly recommend checking this section out because it addresses the misconception of extreme transmutability that has been raised such as transmutation of a frog to a cow or fish to a man. I found the idea fascinating that such extreme mutability is actually evidence against evolution.

A few more questions:
1. What is an evolutionist? If I believe in coherency between faith and religion, what is my label? How would one categorize Francis Collins? He is Director of the Human Genome Project and Evangelical Christian. He believes that evolution is not only real but also evidence of God.

2. How can evolution be coherent with the idea of Biblical inerrancy? Is the Bible a guide to the physical, spiritual, or both? If it is a physical guide then how does it help answer modern questions of medicine, biology, or physics that were inconceivable roughly 2000 years ago?

3. If the message of the Bible refers to an immaterial soul, how are morality and meaning affected by evolution, a material process?

4. What specifically does treatment of science with epistemological integrity look like or entail?

5. What are the 700 dissenters who claim, “We are skeptical of claims for the ability of random mutation and natural selection to account for the complexity of life? Careful examination of the evidence for Darwinian theory should be encouraged.” actually saying? It does not seem to denounce evolution but calls for skepticism and careful examination of evidence, which no scientist would (or should) disagree. See Jason’s blog on the subject here for the specific document.

I appreciate the comments and questions so far. I think Socrates had it right when he argued that the way to truth involves pursuing thought in many directions and to follow out logical implications of thought. It makes us uncomfortable to challenge our own positions but drives those who truly seek truth to continue to work and discover. I do not understand how Creationism or I.D. allows for the possibility of further work to discover the many unanswered questions; however, I am open (and still waiting) for answers to analytically evaluate. Only in this way may objective truth may be discovered and therefore become knowable.

As always, respectful comments are encouraged.

Best Wishes,
Roger

The Coherency of Evolution and Faith - Part III

2008-06-16T11:41:00.005-06:00

Here are all of the questions and comments raised in Part I and II. If I missed anything, it was not my intent. Please leave a post detailing any errors so I may update.

Questions Raised to Date

1. Are strict adherents to either side interested in civil conversation?

2. Should the debate be under the label of “science”? Why or why not?

3. How is science defined?

4. How does Intelligent Design not fall prey to a regress that concludes with an entity we traditionally define as God?

5. What does a basic definition of evolution need to consist of?

6. Does this definition go beyond Darwin's understanding in "Origin?”

7. How many dissenters of the theory constitute a significant amount?

8. What do you mean by "accredited scientist”?

9. If the dissenters of the theory from #7 above make a supernatural conclusion, are they still practicing science?

10. Who has the burden of proof and why?

11. Is the burden of proof to show that evolution or intelligent design or creation is right, wrong, or that one is science and that one is not?

12. If the moral and Biblical implications of evolution are intolerable to so many of faith, is reconciliation, debate, coherency, or any other unifying word even possible?

13. Big Bang theory posits that at some point, there was nothing that somehow became something. Why is it that this belief considered science when it is plainly not naturalistic or empirically observed?

14. When has “mutability” been observed? Variation within species has certainly been observed, but when has “transmutation?” If we haven’t then why refer to this as science? If you can’t observe it in the present, in a lab for example, doesn’t that case to be science? Or does that line of reasoning apply only to those who believe in God?

15. How many evolutionists would adhere to the recent finding that the universe had a beginning?

Comments and Difficulties Raised to Date

A. Certain words and concepts need to be clearly and concisely defined if any productive conversation is to take place.

B. There needs to be a clear-cut statement of belief for Evolution, Creationism, and Intelligent Design.

C. Science should be systematic and not appeal to supernatural causation.

D. Religion and science, once you carry them back far enough, are both based upon faith.

E. Just as religion, science is based upon ultimate foundations that cannot be empirically verified.

F. The debate should not be under the label of “science” because I.D. and Creationism appeal to the supernatural and lack a methodology for further research. It would be acceptable for the debate to be under Philosophy, Sociology, or Education.

G. Current mainstream science appeals to the supernatural just as much as creation science does. If it did not, it would have no foundation upon which to rest its evolutionary conclusions.

H. Intelligent Design is equivalent to God and is simply a tactic around the Supreme Court ban on the teaching of Creationism in public schools.

I. Related to # 4 above. A regress presupposes that the ultimate Intelligent Designer is subject to the natural order that He created and exists outside of. This is illogical. God created the physical order of things that includes reason, logic, time, space, and laws. The idea that a creation must have a Creator is valid in the order that God created but it makes little sense to suppose that He is subject to rules that He created for a reality where He does not primarily “reside.”

J. There is still no observable evidence for transmutability. If evidence cannot be provided then there is a significant measure of “faith” that is involved in accepting evolution.

K. “That evolution is” versus “how evolution is” are two separate questions.

L. Under 1% of working earth and life scientists in the United States dissent with the theory of evolution.

M. Majority has absolutely nothing to do with truth. Most people thought Galileo was an idiot but the overwhelming majority was overwhelmingly wrong.

N. Related to L above. These are two different studies. You are committing a fallacy by combining the two to draw a conclusion. Your conclusion implies that the 700 dissenting scientists are the ONLY scientists who disagree of question the “absoluteness” of evolutionary theory.

O. Let’s make sure science treats its subjects with epistemological integrity.

The Coherency of Evolution and Faith - Part II

2008-05-31T01:12:00.005-06:00

The following is a comment I made 5/31/2008 to the post "The Coherency of Evolution and Faith"(5/29/2008). It was requested that I make this its own post so as requested ....

Upon reflection on this issue, I believe many related questions must be answered to even envision what the debate should look like so I’m going to ask a few of those questions and leave the first substantive commentary to Mario (or anyone else for that matter). These are in no particular order.

1. Should the debate be under the label of “science”? If you think yes, then why? If you think, no then under what label and why?

2. Can someone please outline an argument for me how Intelligent Design does not fall prey to a regress that concludes with an entity we traditionally define as God?

3. The following is a basic definition that I pulled from Wikipedia (5/30/2008): “In biology, evolution is the process of change in the inherited traits of a population of organisms from one generation to the next. The genes that are passed on to an organism's offspring produce the inherited traits that are the basis of evolution. Mutations in genes can produce new or altered traits in individuals, resulting in the appearance of heritable differences between organisms, but new traits also come from the transfer of genes between populations, as in migration, or between species, in horizontal gene transfer. In species that reproduce sexually, new combinations of genes are produced by genetic recombination, which can increase the variation in traits between organisms. Evolution occurs when these heritable differences become more common or rare in a population.”

I used Wikipedia because it seems to be a basic source for basic definitions and nothing in this definition seems out of line with my understanding of the basic tenants of the theory. What more is required for a meaningful debate to take place?

4. If there are 480,000 accredited, University affiliated earth and life scientists working in the United States alone, how many dissenters of the theory constitute a significant amount?

5. If the dissenters of the theory from #4 above make a supernatural conclusion, are they still practicing science?

6. Who has burden of proof and why?

7. If the moral and Biblical implications of evolution (regardless of the observations, inferences, or argument) are intolerable to so many of faith, is reconciliation, debate, coherency, or any other unifying word even possible?

I hope we get some meaningful dialogue to answer these and many more to come. I will try to work out my answers to my own questions … unless Battlestar Galactica is on, of course.

Cheers,
Roger

The Coherency of Evolution and Faith - Part I

2008-05-29T01:15:00.003-06:00

If we assume that evolutionary theory points to a certain kind of truth and that faith also points to a certain kind of truth then it is only logical that there must be a certain kind of coherency between the theory of evolution and faith. Naturalism as a metaphysical worldview versus God seems to be the boiled-down, line-in-the-sand issue, not mutability of species as the basic, basic tenant of evolutionary theory. Too bad we couldn’t put representatives from both camps in a cage match, let them fight it out, and be done with the conflict, bickering, name-calling, hypocrisy, and tactics that take place on both sides of the fence. Since we cannot do a cage match … as cool as that might be … what would it take from both sides to resolve this debate? Maybe all I can hope for in this post is formulation of questions that must be answered before resolution can be achieved but I am truly interested in thoughtful, respectful solutions.

So … what do you think?

Best Wishes,
Roger

Darwin, Science, and the Demarcation Problem

2008-05-29T00:16:00.003-06:00

Our study of Darwin’s theory of evolution, its aftermath, and implications unsurprisingly begs as many questions as it answers. One of the biggest questions related to the study of the theory involves epistemic and presuppositional difficulties of science. To resolve these difficulties first requires a definition of science, which relates to what is called the demarcation problem. I will make a few brief comments on the demarcation problem but leave the majority of its treatment to my friend Mario, a much wiser philosopher than I.

The demarcation problem in the philosophy of science concerns the boundary between science, and everything else. In other words, it asks the question what is science and what is not science? One version of the problem concerns the boundary between science and pseudo-science. Advocates of pseudo-science claim that it should be on the same playing field as science even though it does not function in the same way. The difficulty and resolution of demarcation lies within the criterion used to distinguish science from pseudo or non-science.

The term “science” is socially significant because it seems to make a claim on a certain type of knowledge or truth. Some argue that this leads to preferential access to money, policy, and security within educational institutions. As such, the demarcation problem and its resolution significantly affects our definition of social justice and what is taught to children in public schools.

Good philosophy should present difficulties of claims made in an argument as part of its treatment. As it relates to science, keep in mind that some propositions could be true and have nothing to do with scientific formulation or considerations. In addition, we may still intend science to be a truth-seeking activity or a better way of arriving at true beliefs but it does not entail that scientific claims are always true.

Please stay tuned to this post as I have a feeling the debate will be more than interesting. Well, hopefully.

Best Wishes,
Roger

Agnosticism and Coherent Belief

2008-05-28T11:18:00.005-06:00

The problem of divine hiddenness attempts to answer the question of God’s existence in the absence of direct evidence. One of the first philosophers to formulate the problem was Saint Anselm of Canterbury in the 11^th century but it was J.L. Schellenberg who revitalized the debate in 1993 with the following argument:

1. If there is a God, He is perfectly loving.
2. If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur.
3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.
4. No perfectly loving God exists.
5. Therefore, God does not exist.[1]

In Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (2002), editors Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser present arguments from various philosophers and theologians that respond to the problem of divine hiddenness and Schellenberg’s claim. Paul Draper, one of the authors from the collection, responds from an Agnostic viewpoint with the following argument:

1. There is no direct evidence of God.
2. There is evidence that supports theism over naturalism.
3. There is evidence that supports naturalism over theism.
4. Comparative strength of the evidence cannot be determined.
5. Suspension of belief is justified when it is not clear which side is supported by stronger evidence.
6. Therefore, suspension of belief in God’s existence is justified.[2]

Schellenberg’s argument is problematic for Draper because, according to Schellenberg, reasonable non-belief supports the denial of God’s existence, not justified suspension of belief.

Draper’s argument distinguishes itself from both atheism and theism as a distinct point, not a point on a dichotomous spectrum. Theism and atheism support a metaphysical position in that God’s existence or naturalism respectively explains the ultimate nature of being and the world. Draper’s formulation of the agnostic position does not support a metaphysical but an epistemically uncertain position. This epistemic position holds in balance both evidential arguments in support of theism and those in support of naturalism. This is not to say that evidence supporting the existence of God and the evidence supporting naturalism both have a value of .5 but only that the relative weights of the evidence cannot be determined. Since the comparative strength of the evidence is unclear, agnostics make no metaphysical claim. From the agnostic viewpoint, either God or naturalism may be explanatory to the nature of the universe but no conclusion from individual evidence, at least at this time, is possible. This is clearly different from the Schellenberg’s reasonable nonbeliever because the nonbeliever still makes some metaphysical claim concerning God’s existence.[3]

Schellenberg represents the agnostic position in two different ways, neither of which represents agnosticism in quite the same way as Draper intends. First, Schellenberg represents one type of agnostic as weighing the evidence in support of the existence of God as equivalent to a probability of .5 against the evidence supporting the nonexistence of God.[4] This would lend support to his argument; however, as mentioned above, this is clearly not representative of Draper’s formulation in that a measure of probability is impossible because the relative weights are indeterminable. Secondly, Schellenberg represents another type of agnostic who argues against the atheist conclusion and claims that there is no way of telling what the evidence shows.[5] This may seem to be the same position that Draper takes but there is a distinct difference between the two. The agnostic, as Schellenberg describes, would not be able to defeat the atheist because to do so requires a defeater that would entail at least some theistic belief. According to Schellenberg, this is out of line with the agnostic position because holding to an atheistic defeater that theism provides is “confused” so atheism wins out either by the lack of a defeater or incoherence. Schellenberg would be correct if Draper took a metaphysical position but again, he holds to an epistemic position that is, by definition, without theistic or atheistic defeaters. Defeaters entail some conclusion of the evidence that Draper finds impossible to discern. For example, 20^th century cosmology may support theism but that does not entail a conclusion that cosmology is evidence of theism.[6] Only if Draper made such a conclusion could he use that as a defeater against atheism. This has already been shown to be incoherent. Therefore, an agnostic must defend the agnostic position of epistemic uncertainty, not a particular conclusion of either theism or atheism against the opposing side. Atheism and theism both support a conclusion as their positions. How can an argument concerning a truth claim of atheism over agnosticism ever be meaningful if the agnostic does not make a truth claim? As long as Draper and other agnostics remember this key point, they will withstand Schellenberg’s claim that agnosticism really is just support for atheism and maintain agnosticism as a unique, distinct position that is not along a spectrum between atheism and theism. In this sense, an argument of the type Schellenberg described between the atheist and the agnostic would never happen and is not valid support of his claim.

According to Draper, it is both coherent and necessary that an agnostic engage in certain religious practices such as prayer because as he stated, “… unlike an atheist, I believe there just might be a God listening.”[7] This may seem like a contradiction related to the argument detailed above; however, action is distinct from belief and the agnostic position would preclude certain religious and atheistic activities that required a certain kind of faith. Faith requires belief and for the agnostic, belief only goes as far as knowledge that one of two possibilities must be true. Faith for the agnostic then must be limited within the scope of this belief. As it concerns theism and atheism, let us say that prayer, attending church, or not doing either (atheism) are first order activities while accepting a religious post, serving a mission or volunteering to speak out against religion (atheism) are second order. The distinction between first and second order activities is the level of faith necessary to not create a contradiction with the activity. If one is seeking or allowing for the possibility of theism, any first order religious activity is justified while no second order activity could possibly be justified. The same may be said of atheistic activities but it is simpler to classify because first order atheist activities involve no action while second order atheist activities involve some form of activism that either promotes atheism or speaks out against theism. Both of the latter are clearly not in line with the agnostic position but inaction is coherent with the agnostic position because of the possibility that God does not exist. Agnostic practice is a problem for Schellenberg because a person of reasonable nonbelief could not perform religious activities without contradiction. It is here that the distinction is made between Draper and Schellenberg’s nonbeliever because of Draper’s lack of contradiction in regards to holding both possibilities within an epistemically uncertain position.

In his essay, “Seeking but not Believing: Confessions of a Practicing Agnostic” Draper responds directly to Schellenberg in the following way:

1. “A theist might counter that ambiguous evidence … is actually evidence for theism.”[8]
2. “… ambiguous evidence has other implications besides reasonable nonbelief … it makes theistic practice possible.”[9]
3. “ … let’s assume that ambiguous evidence is much more likely on naturalism … so is strong evidence supporting naturalism … Does it follow that my agnostic stance is unstable? Again, the answer is ‘no’. The answer would be ‘yes’ if it could be shown that, prior … naturalism and theism are equally probable.”[10]

Draper’s response is problematic on (1) an (2) because he somewhat appeals to theism to counterbalance Schellenberg. He does eventually revert to and justify suspension of judgment based on ambiguous evidence along with inability to weigh opposing support (3); however, as mentioned above, it is important that the agnostic respond solely from the agnostic position. To answer the problem of agnostic instability from a theistic position to counter Schellenberg only strengthens the theist claim. He concludes by rightly defending the agnostic position in (3) showing that prior assumption cannot be made concerning the probability of naturalism or theism. Further defense of the agnostic position by Draper should include a discussion of assumptions made by both camps that lend support to their respective claims. Arguably, one of the strengths of the agnostic position is the lack of assumptions it holds in regards to evidence used to support its position. It could even be said that agnosticism makes no assumptions because it makes no metaphysical truth claim.

[1] J.L. Schellenberg. “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals: A Collaborative Discussion.” In Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, edited by Howard-Snyder, Daniel and Moser, Paul K., 33-61. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

[2] Paul Draper. “Seeking but not Believing: Confessions of a Practicing Agnostic.” in Divine Hiddenness, 197-214.

[3] Schellenberg distinguishes between the inculpable non-believer who does not believe in the existence of God through no fault of her own and that of the culpable believer who may be stubbornly blind to divine evidence. See Divine Hiddenness, 43.

[4] J.L. Schellenberg. “What the Hiddenness of God Reveals: A Collaborative Discussion.” in Divine Hiddenness, 55.

[5] Ibid, 56.

[6] Paul Draper. “Seeking but not Believing: Confessions of a Practicing Agnostic.” in Divine Hiddenness, 201.

[7] Ibid, 210.

[8] Ibid, 209.

[9] Ibid, 210.

[10] Ibid.

The Problem of Evil and Soul-Making

2008-05-27T22:40:00.004-06:00

I wrote the following essay for my Philosophy of Religion class at the University of Utah. The more I learn, the more I realize my ignorance. I believe my professor provided feedback on my argument and not on any of my theological claims. Any comments on these claims relating to Christianity and/or the Bible would be appreciated.

The problem of evil relates to a prima facie contradiction between the existence of evil or suffering and the existence of God. The answer to the problem of evil usually entails differentiating definitions of the terms evil, benevolence, and omnipotence along with a conclusion of the existence or non-existence of God. Theodicists defend the existence of God and sometimes use the problem of evil to justify their theistic claims. Philosopher John Hick is such a theodicist and contributed greatly to the debate with his book Evil and the God of Love.[1] Hick attempts to justify the existence of evil by claiming that it allows for moral development or soul-making and is therefore in line with the existence of God.[2] Soul-making then is a greater good than the absence of evil and justifies evil as part of God’s design of the world. The basic deductive argument as it relates to the problem of evil is as following:

1. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
2. God has the power to eliminate all evil.
3. God knows when and where evil exists.
4. God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
5. Evil exists.
6. Therefore, God does not exist.

Christian theology rests on premise (1) and therefore refutation of the atheistic conclusion (6) relies on resolving a contradiction between premises (2) through (5) based on traditional definitions of omnipotence, omniscience, benevolence, and evil. Philosophers and theodicists have disagreed with these traditional definitions and reformulated the premises to support the existence of God. For example, Nelson Pike redefines the benevolence of God to allow evil only if there is a morally sufficient reason for evil or suffering.[3] Pike further proposes that evil may exist in the best of all possible worlds thereby eliminating contradiction. Roderick Chisholm added to the idea of evil’s existence in the best of all possible worlds by claiming that evil can (and must) be defeated in order to contradict (6).[4] Terence Penelhum questioned the presupposition inherent in (5) and showed that Christians must be committed to justifying all evils because of the possibility of spiritual benefit that we may not have the epistemic capacity to understand.[5]

John Hick begins his theodicy by acknowledging evolution as an “unavoidable Christian tenet” while maintaining our “spiritualization as a child of God.”[6] He rejects the presupposition that it is God’s plan is to create a hedonistic paradise common to atheistic arguments and instead uses the analogy of the parent and child to show that God is primarily interested in developing the soul.[7] He proposes that it is more fruitful, in this context, to look to the future rather than the past as it relates to the teleology of the existence of evil. He then distinguishes between physical pain and suffering to show that much of human misery transcends physical pain while anxiety, fear, and remorse are sufferings of the soul.[8] It is here that he proposes that an epistemic distance is necessary for free-will to exist in relation to God. Sinfulness and the value of redemption create a paradox that Hick claims places suffering within divine providence.[9] The key point to his argument is that without evil, there could be no morally correct action because the consequences of any action could never be evil or inflict suffering. Without moral consequence, development of the soul and redemption would never be realized. Being made in His image does not mean comfort and idleness but rather tasks, challenges, and problems. He addresses the problem with the mystery of random, unexplained suffering by suggesting that mystery may be an important part of soul-making as demonstrated by compassion and altruism. He further suggests that the mystery of dysteleological suffering may be beyond human understanding but still may be support for theism by again emphasizing that evil paradoxically allows human goodness within a context of world divinely created for soul-making.[10]

Hick’s soul-making theodicy, at first glance, does seem to overcome the contradictions inherent in the classic problem of evil. However, it has many problems in its formulation and conclusion of God’s existence. First, soul-making theodicy does not adequately account for evolution and our coming into spiritual existence. Hick recognizes that evolution is a fact of nature and his idea of a two-stage process of spiritualization necessarily means that at some point in our development, the hand of God touched us. Being made in his image seems to mean that we had to evolve certain capacities that would allow belief and reason to be possible. In other words, we had to physically evolve a cerebral cortex and higher brain functioning. Was it God’s plan that we evolve in a certain way that allowed only humans to have the capacity of being made in is image? This fits nicely with many tenets in the Book of Genesis but is problematic in terms of evolution even as simple as the Great Chain of Being.[11] If God’s design of our world is to provide us with a physical reality capable of developing our soul, it does not make sense that there would be a need of a two-stage process. God being omnipotent and omniscient of the fact that He was going to make us in His image at some point could just have easily made us according to the literal interpretation of the Book of Genesis without the need of an evolutionary process. The uniqueness or specialness of humans in God’s scheme and dominion over all other animals in Christian faith conflicts with evolution in the fact that evolution makes it possible that other creatures might develop cognitive capacities similar to our own and therefore be possible of being made in His image as well.

Secondly, with regards to animals, soul-making theodicy does not adequately account for their suffering. If suffering and evil are necessary for humans who uniquely have a soul that requires developing and God is both omnipotent and omniscient then it is possible that a world could exist where pain, suffering, consequence, and redemption only applied to humans. Hick would respond that pointless evil does not exist because the very mystery of the appearance of pointless suffering allows the possibility of compassion or some other form of human goodness. This does not hold up to the fact we can conceptualize unknown suffering that negates a realistic response of human goodness. How can compassion and altruistic behavior be shown to the animal that gets caught in the La Brea tar pits that no one witnessed slowly, horrifically dying? Redemption and the possibility of human goodness points to the actions we may or may not perform. Any suffering outside the possibility of action or outside the possibility of witness seems to serve no purpose to the process of soul-making and is therefore pointless if humans are the only one of God’s creations that has a soul.

The same reasoning applies to the suffering and evil of mass or innocent human suffering that goes without witness as well. We can imagine an individual without family or friends who dies in a way that not even a corpse or skeleton remain. We can also imagine that this individual died in such a way that their suffering did not contribute to the development of their own soul such as slowly suffocating while in a coma, i.e., no higher brain functioning to realize suffering of say dying alone but enough base functioning to feel physical pain. There does not seem to be either the capacity for human goodness to be demonstrated in the face of the suffering or the ability to reflect on the mystery of the point of suffering that we discover after the fact. If neither is possible then I argue that it is pointless evil and does not fit within Hick’s formulation of a soul-making theodicy without the contradiction of omnipotence, omniscience, or benevolence inherent in the classic problem of evil. In other words, the argument for suffering as teleological in any capacity still falls short regarding evil without benefit to anyone either before or after the suffering even in an environment expressly designed for soul-making.

Lastly, Hick creates a paradox that many theists, particularly those of Christian faith, would find unacceptable. First, assume that God exists and allows suffering for the possibility of morality in our world for the purpose of soul making. Next, assume that Heaven and Hell exist as reward or punishment for the choices we make in this world. Then imagine an individual who because of free-will, faith, and the environment God provides for the development of the soul, chooses a path of moral correctness and earns a place in Heaven. According to Christian doctrine, Heaven is a paradise where conditions are perfect. Then by Hick’s formulation Heaven must either be absent of free-will or morality. Free-will would allow wrong or mistaken action but wrong action is not possible in the paradise of Heaven because conditions are perfect. Further, there seems to be evidence in the Bible that free-will is punishable and evil as demonstrated by some accounts of Lucifer and the Fall. Lastly, to say that Heaven is absent of morality would be heretical to Christian doctrine since God is morally perfect and Heavenly paradise is again, a place where conditions are perfect. If the design of the physical world allows development of the soul, what does the design of Heaven allow regarding free-will, development, and morality?

[1] Hick, John. Evil and the God of Love. New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966 (rev. edn., 1977).

[2] Hick, John. “Soul-Making and Suffering.” In The Problem of Evil, edited by Marilyn M. Adams and Robert M. Adams, 168-188. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Selections include only Chapters 12 and 14 from Evil and the God of Love (rev. edn., 1977).

[3] Pike, Nelson. “Hume on Evil” In The Problem of Evil, p. 41.

[4] Chisholm, Roderick M. “The Defeat of Good and Evil” In The Problem of Evil, p. 68.

[5] Penelhum, Terence. “Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil” In The Problem of Evil, p. 81-82.

[6] Hick, John. “Soul-Making and Suffering.” In The Problem of Evil, p. 168.

[7] Hick, John. “Soul-Making and Suffering.” In The Problem of Evil, pp. 169-171.

[8] Ibid, p. 176.

[9] Ibid, p. 178.

[10] Ibid, p. 188.

[11] The conceptualization of a Great Chain of Being is a Western idea of the medieval period. It is illustrated as a hierarchy with life as a continuum from material to immaterial and inanimate to animate. This basically covered everything from rock to God. Our human existence places us on the on the border of material and immaterial and therefore closest to God.

Aquinas' "Summa Theologica"

2008-05-27T22:03:00.004-06:00

Saint Thomas Aquinas. "The Existence of God", 1265-74. In Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 4th ed., edited by John Perry et al., 80-82. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

The Summa Theologica (Question 2, Article 1) responds to Saint Anselm’s Ontological Argument as such:
1. Someone hearing the word “God” may believe that God may have a body and not understand it to mean that which nothing greater can be thought.
2. Just because God may be meant to mean that which nothing greater can be thought, it does not entail that He actually exists.

Aquinas then responds to two arguments against the existence of God:
The Problem of Evil
1. God is infinitely powerful (omnipotent).
2. God is infinitely good (benevolent).
3. A benevolent and omnipotent God would not allow evil to exist.
4. Evil exists.
5. Therefore, God does not exist.

Aquinas argues that God is infinitely good and would allow evil only if He could bring good out of evil. The difficulty with this response is the problem of pointless evil. If Bambi is caught in a forest fire that no one witnesses and dies a horrible, painful death then it seems like pointless evil if we define suffering as evil. If animals have no souls, then what good comes from their pain? Unless humans (the only creatures that have souls) either experience or witness suffering, then there can be no test of faith questioning the benevolence of God.

Argument from Naturalism
1. If we can account for something based on a few original causes (prima causa) we should not use many.
2. We can account for everything without appeal to God via naturalism.
3. Therefore, there is no need to say God exists.

We must trace whatever nature does back to a first cause because nature works for a definite end under the direction of a higher agency. This response is also problematic because it begs the question regarding the purpose of nature, direction, and higher agency. Naturalism, by most definitions, seems to exclude supernatural causation.

Aquinas response and argument for the existence of God consists of the Quinquae Viae or the “Five Ways”.
1. The argument from change – objects that have potentiality for change cannot actually change without some other force. Everything that changes is made to change by something else. If we regress this principle to a first cause, we conclude that the first cause is not changed by anything. This is what we understand to be God.
2. The argument from causation – efficient causes come in series and we cannot find anything that is its own efficient cause because that would entail that it came before itself, which is logically impossible. Efficient cause cannot go back to infinity, which means that there is a first efficient cause. This is what we understand to be God.
3. The argument from possibility and necessity – some things can either exist or fail to exist. If something can fail to exist then at some point it has failed to exist. A regress again leads us to conclude that at some point, nothing existed. For something to begin to exist, there must be something that already exists out of necessity. We must therefore conclude that there exists something necessary that does not owe its necessity to anything else but causes the necessity of other things. This is what we understand to be God.
4. The argument from the gradation of things – some things are found to be better, truer, or nobler than others. Something is said to have more or less of a quality according to its distance to its maximum. The greatest thing, according to Aristotle, is the cause of everything of that kind. Therefore, there is something that is the cause of being, goodness, and perfection. This is what we understand to be God.
5. The argument from the governance of the world – all things, even those lacking consciousness, act for a purpose.

Premises 1-3 do not conclusively proof the existence of God over naturalism. One could argue that you can substitute “Big Bang” for “God” in these premises as well. There will always remain, however, the question of where matter came from in the first place when it comes to the Big Bang even if you believe in a cyclical, no loss of matter hypothesis.

Premises 4-5 are problematic if you do not assume the existence of God in the first place. It is hard, once again, to get away from the subjectivism as in Anselm’s argument and his idea of “greater”. If we cannot objectively define “greater” and “lesser” without human convention then this will always be a problem. This is a better argument than Anselm but more is required.

As always, your thoughts and comments are welcomed.

Best Wishes,
Roger

Saint Anselm's "Ontological Argument"

2008-05-24T18:42:00.006-06:00

Saint Anselm of Canterbury. "The Ontological Argument", 1077. In Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 4th ed., edited by John Perry et al., 78-79. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

This relates to yet another philosophical project I am tackling this summer. The goal is to read a broad range of introductory readings to provide a more solid base and better speak the language of philosophy. As always, I encourage your thoughts and wisdom.

Anselm’s argument for the existence of God breaks down as such:
1. A being may be imagined which none greater can be conceived.
2. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the mind alone.
3. If we imagine a being that exists only in our mind then it is not a being which none greater can be conceived.
4. A being which none greater can be conceived must also exist in reality.
5. Therefore, God must exist because He is a being which none greater can be conceived.

This argument seems valid but Anselm makes a couple of assumptions that makes me question its soundness. First, there is no proof that existence in reality is greater than existence in the mind alone (premise 2). Einstein’s theory tells us that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light. It takes light from the sun approximately 9 minutes to reach Earth yet our imagination can take us to the sun instantaneously thereby making our mind more powerful than the limits on matter. In addition, all religious belief entails a belief in some form of dualism because of the immaterial nature of the soul. If we maintain our mind within our soul after we die then the mind is greater than the reality of physical substance. This is problematic for Anselm because premise 2 is key to his argument.

Secondly, Anselm also assumes that there is some sort of inherent value difference between beings that allows us to objectively use the term “greater”. Am I greater than my cat? He lives a plush life, does not have to work, or worry about matters I address in my blog. Maybe our more highly developed cerebral cortex is a curse rather than a blessing. Anselm’s argument does not get off the ground unless someone can show that greatness actually exists.

The last problem with Anselm’s argument has to do with the problem of omnipotence. If God can do anything then He can make a being greater than Himself. It is then conceivable that there is a being greater than God, which allows God not to exist in reality but only in the mind according to Anselm’s argument. This is the weakest and most paradoxical problem of Anselm's argument that again relates to the problem of “greatness”.

I will leave this with a similar paradox and nod to The Simpsons. “Could God microwave a burrito so hot that He could not eat it? Homer can be so deep.

Best Wishes,
Roger

Exploring "Battlestar Galactica"

2008-05-24T16:44:00.002-06:00

About a month ago, my friend and co-worker at Barnes & Noble turned me onto Battlestar Galactica. It took a while for me to be convinced that I should watch it because I do not have a lot of time and, let’s be honest, there is a lot of crap on TV. He spoke about the show, however, with a glimmer in his eye that spoke to more than his inner Sci-Fi geek. I decided to try it because I trusted his recommendation and needed some entertainment that was dichotomous with some of the drier philosophical readings I have had to work through lately. Last semester I started reading graphic novels again for that same reason, not the just any comics but quality storylines such as Identity Crisis by Brad Meltzer, The Watchmen by Alan Moore, Green Lantern: Rebirth by Geoff Johns, and Green Lantern: The Sinestro Corps War- Volume I also by Geoff Johns. I highly recommend these titles for quality of writing, artwork, and literary value. To Andy and Cousin Doug, I am indebted.

I am also indebted to both of them for turning me onto Battlestar Galactica. It is one the best shows I have had the privilege to watch. For those of you laughing at this point, check out the pilot/3-hour mini-series. If you are, like me and at least two others that read this blog, then you will agree and be hooked. I guess I picked the wrong show, however, if I wanted to shy away from deep philosophical and literary issues because it is packed with questions of this sort from moment one. However, enough with the advertising without pay. I intend to add Battlestar Galactica as another project of this blog and encourage your responses. I will attempt to address:

1. Religion – Cylons are monotheistic while the humans are polytheistic. There are signs of Christianity, Mormonism, and Greek mythology that warrant exploration.
2. Humanity under Pressure – I will not be giving much away when I say that the scenario of the show is based on the idea that 99.999% of humanity is wiped out and the remainder is being relentlessly pursued and under threat of being killed at any moment. How does social interaction and human value change under such conditions and what does it mean?
3. Morality – there are so many moral questions in this show I do not even know where to begin. Since I like to argue and nothing makes for an argument like controversy, I will at least tackle the issue of abortion that comes up in the show. If the morality of abortion is different when there are so few of us left then can that morality change when we are safe and plentiful? How does the issue of personal freedom play into all this?
4. Social Justice – when are freedoms and non-basic rights justifiably sacrificed? Are they ever even if those very freedoms somehow put the larger group at risk? When is it justified for the military to overthrow the civilian government and who gets to decide?
5. Genocide – what constitutes enough of a threat by one group to justify wiping out every man, women, and child of that group?
6. Human Essence – what does it mean to be human? Self-awareness or consciousness? The ability to love and hate? What will it mean if and when we either create or meet something else that has these qualities?

I'm sure there will be more but six questions seems like an appropriate number of topics to start with, especially since the character Six in the show is way hot in that Amazonian, super-naughty, wipe out your species kind of way. I hope you watch the show, read along here, and participate in the discussion.

Best Wishes,
Roger

Herschel's "The Study of Natural Philosophy"

2008-05-21T11:34:00.011-06:00

Herschel, John. "The Study of Natural Philosophy", 1830. In Darwin: A Norton Critical Edition, 3rd ed., edited by Philip Appleman, 49-57. New York: W.W Norton & Company, Inc., 2001.

This piece seems to refer back to Hume's Problem of Induction but allows for observation and inference as long as it does not conflict with the Bible. Here are the main points:

1. Humans are speculative beings. We contemplate the world and objects around us not with passive indifference but as a system of order and design.
2. No natural object unimportant or trifling to the natural philosopher.
3. The natural philosopher seeks to determine the operation of general causes to describe general laws.
4. Principles not phenomena, laws not insulated facts, are the object and inquiry of the natural philosopher.
5. All human discoveries seem to be made only for the purpose of confirming more strongly the truths contained in sacred writings such as the Bible.

Vera causa, induction, and presuppositions again resurface as issues of science. Herschel agreed with Darwin that observations support Darwin's Principle of Divergence but he disagreed with Darwin conclusions because the implications so clearly departed from the Bible, especially in regards to humans. I think Herschel was looking for naturalistic answers to scientific inquiry that fit with God's word.

Herschel sought one truth, not two possible truths. For many people today, it is a choice between two dichotomies, not a quest to find the truth of two worldviews. We will explore this more as we go but one question I will continue to explore is why does evolution preclude design, intelligence, or God as prima causa? Why does the Book of Genesis have to be interpreted as a statement of biology versus a statement of our spirit, soul, or immaterial self as being in the image of God? After all, black people and white people look prima facie distinct, as do men and women. So, what image of God is the correct image or does Genesis simply imply a dualistic human nature of body and soul?

Lyell's "Principles of Geology"

2008-05-21T09:49:00.009-06:00

Lyell, Charles. "Principles of Geology", 1830-33. In Darwin: A Norton Critical Edition, 3rd ed., edited by Philip Appleman, 49-52. New York: W.W Norton & Company, Inc., 2001.

Norton Critical editions contain abridged excerpts from source texts so we rely somewhat on the discretion of the editor for arguments and observations to critique. It has been pointed out that Appleman is not a scientist but a poet and English Professor. Must one be a scientist to legitimately comment on science? What defines a scientist? Is it adherence to philosophical or methodological naturalism? I will attempt to answer these questions over the course of the project but already, getting to the truth seems to be a messy endeavor. These questions are relevant to critiques of evolutionary theory as well. Philip Johnson, author of Darwin on Trial and prominent critic of evolutionary theory, is a Law Professor from Berkeley. He is also a founder of the Intelligent Design Movement and architect of the Wedge Strategy. Does this make his argument against evolution any less valid? I briefly mentioned presuppositions in my prior post. How do we not color our reasoning and arguments with bias to legitimize our conclusions? I have provided more questions than answers here but this may be a great way to start this project. Skepticism should be the default position of science ... maybe non-scientists ought to approach it the same way. Oh yeah, the link on the Wedge Strategy is from Wikipedia. As with all things Wiki, I encourage further reference and understanding that at best, Wikipedia only provides a broad definition, not a definitive one and not everyone agrees on even the broad definitions. OK, onto to Lyell.

Here are the main points and observations from Principles of Geology:

1. He references Lamarck and Cuvier to the progress of geological understanding of the fossil record. Lamarck believed that the fossil record indicated that species diverged from the original but not that species went extinct. This supported more of an old earth view that was rejected by Cuvier and the scientific community of the time. Cuvier was a catastrophist who believed in the fixity of species and extinction.
2. Lyell refers to rock formation (volcanic) and strata as evidence of an old earth and, "... tranquil deposition of sedimentary matter, and the slow development of organic life.” (49).
3. He seems to refer to modern continental theory that the continents were at one time a single land mass (Pangaea). The excerpt does not refer to Pangaea directly, only that continents grow. Is this a reference to erosion, volcanic action, and continental drift?
4. He does acknowledge an "Eternal Being" and refers to design and unity of purpose.
5. He does not think that the "finite powers of Man" will allow even speculation of the truth regarding the beginning or end of so vast a scheme (geology and biology?).

Lyell was one of the biggest influences on Darwin. He was given Volume I of Lyell's work by Captain Fitzroy on the Beagle soon after departure from England. Darwin sent for Volume II later on in the voyage. Lyell's work and the concept of an old earth is important to Darwin's theory because, generally speaking, natural selection requires vast amounts of time. Evidence of a roughly 6,000-year-old earth as posited by some religious groups would be a difficulty for evolutionary theory even though they would still have to answer the question of genetic drift and mutation. Does anyone know of the best evidence that supports a young earth outside of an appeal to the Bible?

I am curious to know of the best modern evidence of an old earth. Carbon dating? Tectonic plate theory? Paleontology? This also seems to relate to modern astronomical/cosmological theory.

Darwin Group - Goals and Purpose

2008-05-21T08:37:00.010-06:00

This summer, I am involved in a Darwin discussion group. The purpose of this group is to explore the science behind Darwin, Darwin's actual writings, and the aftermath of Origin of Species. The impact of Darwin touches many aspects of modern science and life. I have some educational experience in chemistry, biochemistry, genetics and biology while other members of the group do not. Some of the members have taken a Philosophy of Genetics class but the course did not deal directly with evolutionary arguments. My goal is to work through the science to judge the strength of evolutionary arguments to better respond to questions concerning the teaching of evolution in public schools, the Intelligent Design debate, and what seems to be a religious anti-evolutionary view. I want to be clear that I do not think that just because you go to church on Sunday that you must automatically reject evolutionary thought. However, the religious implications of the theory and the general religious and/or conservative party line (for lack of better words) is a real conflict that has not been resolved since the time of Lamarck, almost 200 years ago. Lamarck published Zoological Philosophy in 1809, was a early proponent of evolution, and was attacked by the scientific and religious community of the time for suggesting that species were not fixed or as Darwin would later call it, subject to variation according to the Principle of Divergence.

I will come back to this subject from time to time and encourage your respectful comments. Regardless of your feelings on the matter, it is a controversy, passions run high on the issue, and arguments for reconciliation seem remote. If this is of interest to you, I would also recommend checking out Tough Questions a blog run by Dr. Jason Epps who is a both a friend and colleague of philosophy. He also happens to have a doctorate in Theology and is Pastor of Gospel Fellowship Church. Jason is much more prolific with his writing/blogging than I and teaching me to be more analytical and critical in all of my work in philosophy. I'm sure our debates this summer will center on epistemological difficulties and the question and definition of "What is Science?" He and I may have different presuppositions going into this project but we are both interested in getting a little a closer to the truth. Stay tuned to both blogs and let's see how we fare in that pursuit.

If you are interested in following along with the reading ...
Appleman, Philip, ed. Darwin: A Norton Critical Edition, 3^rd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001. ISBN: 0-393-95849-3

Ronin, Godzilla, and Philosophy

2008-05-18T13:56:00.001-06:00

For those wondering about my user name, a Ronin is a samurai without a lord or master. I do not have delusions of being a great warrior nor am I alluding to an atheistic worldview. I do not have a Bushido Shoshinshu code of honor or discipline required of a samurai. Rather, I am drawn to the idea of a drifting person in search of answers to regain something lost that may or may not have any meaning. It is natural to associate with those of like purpose and it is here that I make the connection with the wandering Japanese mercenary of ancient times. School, especially the study of philosophy, tends to beg more questions that it answers. Age may lead to wisdom but it also tends to challenge the psyche with regret. Like the Ronin of old, this blog will seek to answer various questions, mostly philosophical and literary, and do battle in the province of the past.

As far as Godzilla goes, it just does not get any better than watching a guy in a rubber suit destroying a miniature city and battling other guys in similarly ridiculous rubber suits. I think Godzilla is one of the most fascinating characters in literature. Don’t laugh, I know you sometimes want to say, “I am Godzilla! You are Japan!” to the mini-van driving troglodyte on the cell phone that just cut you off or to the TV producers that gave you 3 minutes of your favorite show and 5 minutes of commercials related to erectile dysfunction, fast food, and cleaning products you will never use.

Seriously, Godzilla is the product of the nuclear, social, and economic apocalypse of one of the last true empires. Japan is the only post-apocalypse country in the world so it is fitting that a pissed off, radiation breathing monster is their quasi-mascot. Godzilla is also female so I guess it is a commentary of sorts that the strongest, most willful female in film over the last 80 years is a monster. What is interesting is that she is decidedly good or evil not based on her intent but on random chance and consequence to a people for which she is barely aware and could not care less about. If Godzilla happens to walk into Tokyo to do a little shopping, battles Rodan instead, and saves the city from Rodan’s purposeful wrath, she is the heroine. If her favorite sushi bar is out of Dragon Rolls and she flattens the city then she is the most terrible threat to all of human existence. There is a bit of Godzilla in all of us and that is why such a silly genre has endured since its introduction in 1954. I am not suggesting that we are amoral creatures, only that we are not always aware of the suffering and joy we unwittingly impose on others. Morality and awareness will be recurring themes that I will revisit in this blog.

So, that is part of the reason why I chose Ronin and Godzilla as my user name and image for this blog. I am sure the rest of the story is still unknown to me and is possibly psychiatric in nature. What fictional or historical figure do you find a kindred spirit and why?